the term presentation of self refers to

Impression Management: Erving Goffman Theory

Charlotte Nickerson

Research Assistant at Harvard University

Undergraduate at Harvard University

Charlotte Nickerson is a student at Harvard University obsessed with the intersection of mental health, productivity, and design.

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On This Page:

• Impression management refers to the goal-directed conscious or unconscious attempt to influence the perceptions of other people about a person, object, or event by regulating and controlling information in social interaction.
• Generally, people undertake impression management to achieve goals that require they have a desired public image. This activity is called self-presentation.
• In sociology and social psychology, self-presentation is the conscious or unconscious process through which people try to control the impressions other people form of them.
• The goal is for one to present themselves the way in which they would like to be thought of by the individual or group they are interacting with. This form of management generally applies to the first impression.
• Erving Goffman popularized the concept of perception management in his book, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life , where he argues that impression management not only influences how one is treated by other people but is an essential part of social interaction.

Impression Management in Sociology

Impression management, also known as self-presentation, refers to the ways that people attempt to control how they are perceived by others (Goffman, 1959).

By conveying particular impressions about their abilities, attitudes, motives, status, emotional reactions, and other characteristics, people can influence others to respond to them in desirable ways.

Impression management is a common way for people to influence one another in order to obtain various goals.

While earlier theorists (e.g., Burke, 1950; Hart & Burk, 1972) offered perspectives on the person as a performer, Goffman (1959) was the first to develop a specific theory concerning self-presentation.

In his well-known work, Goffman created the foundation and the defining principles of what is commonly referred to as impression management.

In explicitly laying out a purpose for his work, Goffman (1959) proposes to “consider the ways in which the individual in ordinary work situations presents himself and his activity to others, the ways in which he guides and controls the impression they form of him, and the kind of things he may or may not do while sustaining his performance before them.” (p. xi)

Social Interaction

Goffman viewed impression management not only as a means of influencing how one is treated by other people but also as an essential part of social interaction.

He communicates this view through the conceit of theatre. Actors give different performances in front of different audiences, and the actors and the audience cooperate in negotiating and maintaining the definition of a situation.

To Goffman, the self was not a fixed thing that resides within individuals but a social process. For social interactions to go smoothly, every interactant needs to project a public identity that guides others’ behaviors (Goffman, 1959, 1963; Leary, 2001; Tseelon, 1992).

Goffman defines that when people enter the presence of others, they communicate information by verbal intentional methods and by non-verbal unintentional methods.

According to Goffman, individuals participate in social interactions through performing a “line” or “a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself” (1967, p. 5).

Such lines are created and maintained by both the performer and the audience. By enacting a line effectively, a person gains positive social value or “face.”

The verbal intentional methods allow us to establish who we are and what we wish to communicate directly. We must use these methods for the majority of the actual communication of data.

Goffman is mostly interested in the non-verbal clues given off which are less easily manipulated. When these clues are manipulated the receiver generally still has the upper hand in determining how realistic the clues that are given off are.

People use these clues to determine how to treat a person and if the intentional verbal responses given off are actually honest. It is also known that most people give off clues that help to represent them in a positive light, which tends to be compensated for by the receiver.

Impression Management Techniques

• Suppressing emotions : Maintaining self-control (which we will identify with such practices as speaking briefly and modestly).
• Conforming to Situational Norms : The performer follows agreed-upon rules for behavior in the organization.
• Flattering Others : The performer compliments the perceiver. This tactic works best when flattery is not extreme and when it involves a dimension important to the perceiver.
• Being Consistent : The performer’s beliefs and behaviors are consistent. There is agreement between the performer’s verbal and nonverbal behaviors.

Self-Presentation Examples

Self-presentation can affect the emotional experience . For example, people can become socially anxious when they are motivated to make a desired impression on others but doubt that they can do so successfully (Leary, 2001).

In one paper on self-presentation and emotional experience, Schlenker and Leary (1982) argue that, in contrast to the drive models of anxiety, the cognitive state of the individual mediates both arousal and behavior.

The researchers examine the traditional inverted-U anxiety-performance curve (popularly known as the Yerkes-Dodson law) in this light.

The researchers propose that people are interpersonally secure when they do not have the goal of creating a particular impression on others.

They are not immediately concerned about others’ evaluative reactions in a social setting where they are attempting to create a particular impression and believe that they will be successful in doing so.

Meanwhile, people are anxious when they are uncertain about how to go about creating a certain impression (such as when they do not know what sort of attributes the other person is likely to be impressed with), think that they will not be able to project the types of images that will produce preferred reactions from others.

Such people think that they will not be able to project the desired image strongly enough or believe that some event will happen that will repudiate their self-presentations, causing reputational damage (Schlenker and Leary, 1982).

Psychologists have also studied impression management in the context of mental and physical health .

In one such study, Braginsky et al. (1969) showed that those hospitalized with schizophrenia modify the severity of their “disordered” behavior depending on whether making a more or less “disordered” impression would be most beneficial to them (Leary, 2001).

Additional research on university students shows that people may exaggerate or even fabricate reports of psychological distress when doing so for their social goals.

Hypochondria appears to have self-presentational features where people convey impressions of illness and injury, when doing so helps to drive desired outcomes such as eliciting support or avoiding responsibilities (Leary, 2001).

People can also engage in dangerous behaviors for self-presentation reasons such as suntanning, unsafe sex, and fast driving. People may also refuse needed medical treatment if seeking this medical treatment compromises public image (Leary et al., 1994).

Key Components

There are several determinants of impression management, and people have many reasons to monitor and regulate how others perceive them.

For example, social relationships such as friendship, group membership, romantic relationships, desirable jobs, status, and influence rely partly on other people perceiving the individual as being a particular kind of person or having certain traits.

Because people’s goals depend on them making desired impressions over undesired impressions, people are concerned with the impressions other people form of them.

Although people appear to monitor how they come across ongoingly, the degree to which they are motivated to impression manage and the types of impressions they try to foster varies by situation and individuals (Leary, 2001).

Leary and Kowalski (1990) say that there are two processes that constitute impression management, each of which operate according to different principles and are affected by different situations and dispositional aspects. The first of these processes is impression motivation, and the second is impression construction.

Impression Motivation

There are three main factors that affect how much people are motivated to impression-manage in a situation (Leary and Kowalski, 1990):

(1) How much people believe their public images are relevant to them attaining their desired goals.

When people believe that their public image is relevant to them achieving their goals, they are generally more motivated to control how others perceive them (Leary, 2001).

Conversely, when the impressions of other people have few implications on one’s outcomes, that person’s motivation to impression-manage will be lower.

This is why people are more likely to impression manage in their interactions with powerful, high-status people than those who are less powerful and have lower status (Leary, 2001).

(2) How valuable the goals are: people are also more likely to impress and manage the more valuable the goals for which their public impressions are relevant (Leary, 2001).

(3) how much of a discrepancy there is between how they want to be perceived and how they believe others perceive them..

People are more highly motivated to impression-manage when there is a difference between how they want to be perceived and how they believe others perceive them.

For example, public scandals and embarrassing events that convey undesirable impressions can cause people to make self-presentational efforts to repair what they see as their damaged reputations (Leary, 2001).

Impression Construction

Features of the social situations that people find themselves in, as well as their own personalities, determine the nature of the impressions that they try to convey.

In particular, Leary and Kowalski (1990) name five sets of factors that are especially important in impression construction (Leary, 2001).

Two of these factors include how people’s relationships with themselves (self-concept and desired identity), and three involve how people relate to others (role constraints, target value, and current or potential social image) (Leary and Kowalski, 1990).

Self-concept

The impressions that people try to create are influenced not only by social context but also by one’s own self-concept .

People usually want others to see them as “how they really are” (Leary, 2001), but this is in tension with the fact that people must deliberately manage their impressions in order to be viewed accurately by others (Goffman, 1959).

People’s self-concepts can also constrain the images they try to convey.

People often believe that it is unethical to present impressions of themselves different from how they really are and generally doubt that they would successfully be able to sustain a public image inconsistent with their actual characteristics (Leary, 2001).

This risk of failure in portraying a deceptive image and the accompanying social sanctions deter people from presenting impressions discrepant from how they see themselves (Gergen, 1968; Jones and Pittman, 1982; Schlenker, 1980).

People can differ in how congruent their self-presentations are with their self-perceptions.

People who are high in public self-consciousness have less congruency between their private and public selves than those lower in public self-consciousness (Tunnell, 1984; Leary and Kowalski, 1990).

Desired identity

People’s desired and undesired selves – how they wish to be and not be on an internal level – also influence the images that they try to project.

Schlenker (1985) defines a desirable identity image as what a person “would like to be and thinks he or she really can be, at least at his or her best.”

People have a tendency to manage their impressions so that their images coincide with their desired selves and stay away from images that coincide with their undesired selves (Ogilivie, 1987; Schlenker, 1985; Leary, 2001).

This happens when people publicly claim attributes consistent with their desired identity and openly reject identities that they do not want to be associated with.

For example, someone who abhors bigots may take every step possible to not appear bigoted, and Gergen and Taylor (1969) showed that high-status navel cadets did not conform to low-status navel cadets because they did not want to see themselves as conformists (Leary and Kowalski, 1990).

Target value

people tailor their self-presentations to the values of the individuals whose perceptions they are concerned with.

This may lead to people sometimes fabricating identities that they think others will value.

However, more commonly, people selectively present truthful aspects of themselves that they believe coincide with the values of the person they are targeting the impression to and withhold information that they think others will value negatively (Leary, 2001).

Role constraints

the content of people’s self-presentations is affected by the roles that they take on and the norms of their social context.

In general, people want to convey impressions consistent with their roles and norms .

Many roles even carry self-presentational requirements around the kinds of impressions that the people who hold the roles should and should not convey (Leary, 2001).

Current or potential social image

People’s public image choices are also influenced by how they think they are perceived by others. As in impression motivation, self-presentational behaviors can often be aimed at dispelling undesired impressions that others hold about an individual.

When people believe that others have or are likely to develop an undesirable impression of them, they will typically try to refute that negative impression by showing that they are different from how others believe them to be.

When they are not able to refute this negative impression, they may project desirable impressions in other aspects of their identity (Leary, 2001).

Implications

In the presence of others, few of the behaviors that people make are unaffected by their desire to maintain certain impressions. Even when not explicitly trying to create a particular impression of themselves, people are constrained by concerns about their public image.

Generally, this manifests with people trying not to create undesired impressions in virtually all areas of social life (Leary, 2001).

Tedeschi et al. (1971) argued that phenomena that psychologists previously attributed to peoples’ need to have cognitive consistency actually reflected efforts to maintain an impression of consistency in others’ eyes.

Studies have supported Tedeschi and their colleagues’ suggestion that phenomena previously attributed to cognitive dissonance were actually affected by self-presentational processes (Schlenker, 1980).

Psychologists have applied self-presentation to their study of phenomena as far-ranging as conformity, aggression, prosocial behavior, leadership, negotiation, social influence, gender, stigmatization, and close relationships (Baumeister, 1982; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi, 1981).

Each of these studies shows that people’s efforts to make impressions on others affect these phenomena, and, ultimately, that concerns self-presentation in private social life.

For example, research shows that people are more likely to be pro-socially helpful when their helpfulness is publicized and behave more prosocially when they desire to repair a damaged social image by being helpful (Leary, 2001).

In a similar vein, many instances of aggressive behavior can be explained as self-presentational efforts to show that someone is willing to hurt others in order to get their way.

This can go as far as gender roles, for which evidence shows that men and women behave differently due to the kind of impressions that are socially expected of men and women.

Baumeister, R. F. (1982). A self-presentational view of social phenomena. Psychological Bulletin, 91, 3-26.

Braginsky, B. M., Braginsky, D. D., & Ring, K. (1969). Methods of madness: The mental hospital as a last resort. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Buss, A. H., & Briggs, S. (1984). Drama and the self in social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1310-1324. Gergen, K. J. (1968). Personal consistency and the presentation of self. In C. Gordon & K. J. Gergen (Eds.), The self in social interaction (Vol. 1, pp. 299-308). New York: Wiley.

Gergen, K. J., & Taylor, M. G. (1969). Social expectancy and self-presentation in a status hierarchy. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 5, 79-92.

Goffman, E. (1959). The moral career of the mental patient. Psychiatry, 22(2), 123-142.

• Goffman, E. (1963). Embarrassment and social organization.

Goffman, E. (1978). The presentation of self in everyday life (Vol. 21). London: Harmondsworth.

Goffman, E. (2002). The presentation of self in everyday life. 1959. Garden City, NY, 259.

Martey, R. M., & Consalvo, M. (2011). Performing the looking-glass self: Avatar appearance and group identity in Second Life. Popular Communication, 9 (3), 165-180.

Jones E E (1964) Ingratiation. Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York.

Jones, E. E., & Pittman, T. S. (1982). Toward a general theory of strategic self-presentation. Psychological perspectives on the self, 1(1), 231-262.

Leary M R (1995) Self-presentation: Impression Management and Interpersonal Behaior. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.

Leary, M. R.. Impression Management, Psychology of, in Smelser, N. J., & Baltes, P. B. (Eds.). (2001). International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences (Vol. 11). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Leary, M. R., & Kowalski, R. M. (1990). Impression management: A literature review and two-component model. Psychological bulletin, 107(1), 34.

Leary M R, Tchvidjian L R, Kraxberger B E 1994 Self-presentation may be hazardous to your health. Health Psychology 13: 461–70.

Ogilvie, D. M. (1987). The undesired self: A neglected variable in personality research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 379-385.

• Schlenker, B. R. (1980). Impression management (Vol. 222). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Schlenker, B. R. (1985). Identity and self-identification. In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), The self and social life (pp. 65-99). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Schlenker, B. R., & Leary, M. R. (1982). Social anxiety and self-presentation: A conceptualization model. Psychological bulletin, 92(3), 641.

Tedeschi, J. T, Smith, R. B., Ill, & Brown, R. C., Jr. (1974). A reinterpretation of research on aggression. Psychological Bulletin, 81, 540- 563.

Tseëlon, E. (1992). Is the presented self sincere? Goffman, impression management and the postmodern self. Theory, culture & society, 9(2), 115-128.

Tunnell, G. (1984). The discrepancy between private and public selves: Public self-consciousness and its correlates. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 549-555.

Further Information

• Solomon, J. F., Solomon, A., Joseph, N. L., & Norton, S. D. (2013). Impression management, myth creation and fabrication in private social and environmental reporting: Insights from Erving Goffman. Accounting, organizations and society, 38(3), 195-213.
• Gardner, W. L., & Martinko, M. J. (1988). Impression management in organizations. Journal of management, 14(2), 321-338.
• Scheff, T. J. (2005). Looking‐Glass self: Goffman as symbolic interactionist. Symbolic interaction, 28(2), 147-166.

The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life – A Summary

A summary of The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life by Erving Goffman, and a brief discussion of its relevance to A level Sociology. 

Executive Summary

The best way to understand human action is by seeing people as actors on a ‘social stage’ who actively create an impression of themselves for the benefit of an audience (and, ultimately themselves).

When we act in the social world, we put on a ‘front’ in order to project a certain image of ourselves (call this part of our ‘social identity’ if you like) – we create a front by manipulating the setting in which we perform (e.g. our living room), our appearance (e.g. our clothes) and our manner (our emotional demeanour).

In the social world we are called upon to put on various fronts depending on the social stage on which we find ourselves and the teams of actors with whom we are performing – the work-place or the school are typical examples of social stages which require us to put on a front. On these social stages we take on roles, in relation to other team-members and carefully manage the impressions we give-off in order to ‘fit in’ to society and/ or achieve our own personal goals

Impression management involves projecting an ‘idealised image’ of ourselves, which involves concealing a number of aspects of a performance – such as the effort which goes into putting on a front, and typically hiding any personal profit we will gain from a performance/ interaction.

Unfortunately because audiences are constantly on the look-out for the signs we give off (so that they can know who we are) ‘performers can stop giving expressions, but they cannot stop giving them off’. This means that we must be constantly on our guard to practice ‘expressive control’ when on the social stage. There are plenty of things that can go wrong with our performance which might betray the fact that we are not really the person who our act suggests that we are – we might lose bodily control (slouch), or make mistakes with our clothing (a scruffy appearance) for example.

We generally tend to think of performances as being of one or two types – the sincere and the contrived. Some people sincerely believe in the parts they are playing, they invest their true selves in the impression they give off, this is the typical case. However, other people act out their roles more cynically – they do not believe the parts they are playing are a reflection of their ‘true selves’ but instead only play their part in order to achieve another end.

Thankfully most audience members are tactful and voluntarily stay away from back-stage areas where we prepare for our social roles, and if we ever ‘fall out of character’ they tend to engage in ‘tactful inattention’ in order to save the situation.

From a research methods point of view the significance of Goffman lies in the fact that f we really want to understand people, we would need to engage in participant-observation in order to get back-stage with them, because we only get to see peoples true feelings when they stop performing.

If a researcher merely gave people a questionnaire to fill out, or even if they did an in-depth interview with them – they could be perceived by the respondent as a member of an audience – and the results we get could just be a performance put on for the benefit of the researcher.

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Erving Goffman’s Theory of Presentation of Self

by kdkasi | Aug 1, 2023 | Socialization Theory

Erving Goffman’s Theory of Presentation of Self: Understanding Dramaturgy in Everyday Life

Erving Goffman, a renowned Canadian-American sociologist, introduced the concept of the “Presentation of Self” as a theoretical framework for understanding human behavior in social interactions. Drawing inspiration from theater and dramaturgy, Goffman posited that individuals engage in impression management, carefully crafting and presenting different versions of themselves to shape how others perceive them. This article explores the key components of Goffman’s theory, delves into the concept of impression management, and provides real-life examples to illustrate how individuals perform the roles of their social identity in everyday life.

Dramaturgy and the Social Stage:

Goffman’s theory of Presentation of Self adopts a dramaturgical approach, likening social life to a theatrical performance on a stage. Just as actors play various roles in a play to elicit specific reactions from the audience, individuals in society adopt different personas or social masks to influence how they are perceived by others. Social interactions are akin to scenes, and individuals become performers on this social stage, employing various techniques to create desired impressions.

Front Stage and Back Stage:

In Goffman’s theory, individuals have both front stage and back stage selves. The front stage represents the public realm, where people are in the presence of others and actively engaged in impression management. This is where individuals present their desired self-image and adhere to societal norms and expectations. On the other hand, the back stage is the private realm, where people can relax and drop their social masks. It is in this context that individuals can be their authentic selves, away from the watchful eyes of the audience.

Examples of Front Stage and Back Stage Behavior:

Job Interview:

• Front Stage : During a job interview, a candidate carefully presents themselves as competent, confident, and professional. They may dress formally, maintain eye contact, and articulate their skills and experiences to impress the interviewer and secure the position.
• Back Stage: Before the interview, the candidate may engage in self-preparation, rehearsing answers to common questions and calming nerves. They may also seek support and encouragement from family or friends, allowing themselves to express doubts or anxieties that they would not reveal during the actual interview.

Social Media:

• Front Stage: On social media platforms, individuals curate their posts and profiles to portray a particular image to their followers. They often share highlights of their lives, such as achievements, vacations, and positive experiences, presenting themselves in a favorable light.
• Back Stage: Behind the polished social media façade, individuals may face challenges and struggles in their personal lives. They may use private messaging or close groups to express vulnerability, share more intimate details, or seek advice and support from trusted friends.

Impression Management:

Impression management is a fundamental aspect of Goffman’s theory. It refers to the conscious and unconscious strategies individuals employ to influence how others perceive them. These strategies include:

• Dramatic Realization: Individuals use body language, facial expressions, and tone of voice to communicate emotions and intentions effectively. For example, a politician may adopt confident body language during a speech to project leadership qualities.
• Signaling: People use props, clothing, and symbols to convey specific messages about their identity or social status. For instance, wearing a professional suit signals authority and competence in a corporate setting.
• Idealization: Individuals present themselves in a positive light, emphasizing their strengths and achievements while downplaying weaknesses. This behavior can be seen in dating scenarios when individuals strive to create a positive impression on potential partners.

Conclusion: Erving Goffman’s theory of Presentation of Self provides a profound understanding of how individuals perform various roles and manage impressions to navigate social interactions. By viewing social life as a stage, we can better grasp the complexities of human behavior and the intricate ways in which individuals present themselves to the world. Understanding the dynamic interplay between front stage and backstage behavior, as well as the techniques of impression management, sheds light on the intricacies of human interaction and the art of self-presentation in our everyday lives.

By Khushdil Khan Kasi

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Module 4: Socialization

Roles and the presentation of self, learning outcomes.

• Describe how individuals present themselves and perceive themselves in a social context

Status and Roles

Sociologists use the term status to describe the responsibilities and benefits that a person experiences according to their rank and role in society. Some statuses are ascribed —those you do not select, such as son, elderly person, or female. Others, called achieved statuses , are obtained by choice, such as high school dropout, self-made millionaire, or nurse. As a daughter or son, you occupy a different status than as a neighbor or employee.

As you can imagine, people employ many types of behaviors in day-to-day life. Roles are patterns of behavior that we recognize in each other, and that are representative of a person’s social status. Currently, while reading this text, you are playing the role of a student. However, you also play other roles in your life, such as “daughter,” “neighbor,” or “employee.” These various roles are each associated with a different status.

If too much is required of a single role, individuals can experience role strain . Consider the duties of a parent: cooking, cleaning, driving, problem-solving, acting as a source of moral guidance—the list goes on. Similarly, a person can experience role conflict when one or more roles are contradictory. A parent who also has a full-time career can experience role conflict on a daily basis. When there is a deadline at the office but a sick child needs to be picked up from school, which comes first? When you are working toward a promotion but your children want you to come to their school play, which do you choose? Being a college student can conflict with being an employee, being an athlete, or even being a friend. Our roles in life powerfully affect our decisions and help to shape our identities.

One person can be associated with a multitude of roles and statuses. Even a single status such as “student” has a complex role-set , or array of roles, attached to it (Merton 1957).

Figure 1. Parents often experience role strain or role conflict as they try to balance different and often urgent competing responsibilities. (Credit: Ran Zwigenberg/flickr)

Presentation of Self

Of course, it is impossible to look inside a person’s head and study what role they are playing. All we can observe is outward behavior, or role performance. Role performance is how a person expresses his or her role. Sociologist Erving Goffman presented the idea that a person is like an actor on a stage. Calling his theory dramaturgy , Goffman believed that we use impression management  to present ourselves to others as we hope to be perceived. Each situation is a new scene, and individuals perform different roles depending on who is present (Goffman 1959). Think about the way you behave around your coworkers versus the way you behave around your grandparents or with a blind date. Even if you’re not consciously trying to alter your personality, your grandparents, coworkers, and date probably see different sides of you.

As in a play, the setting matters as well. If you have a group of friends over to your house for dinner, you are playing the role of a host. It is agreed upon that you will provide food and seating and probably be stuck with a lot of the cleanup at the end of the night. Similarly, your friends are playing the roles of guests, and they are expected to respect your property and any rules you may set forth (“Don’t leave the door open or the cat will get out.”). In any scene, there needs to be a shared reality between players. In this case, if you view yourself as a guest and others view you as a host, there are likely to be problems.

Impression management is a critical component of symbolic interactionism. For example, a judge in a courtroom has many “props” to create an impression of fairness, gravity, and control—like her robe and gavel. Those entering the courtroom are expected to adhere to the scene being set. Just imagine the “impression” that can be made by how a person dresses. This is the reason that attorneys frequently select the hairstyle and apparel for witnesses and defendants in courtroom proceedings.

Figure 2. Janus, another possible “prop”, depicted with two heads, exemplifies war and peace. (Photo courtesy of Fubar Obfusco/Wikimedia Commons)

Again, Goffman’s dramaturgical approach expands on the ideas of Charles Cooley and the looking-glass self . We imagine how we must appear to others, then react to this speculation. We put on certain clothes, prepare our hair in a particular manner, wear makeup, use colog ne, and the like—all with the notion that our presentation of ourselves is going to affect how others perceive us. We expect a certain reaction, and, if lucky, we get the one we desire and feel good about it. But more than that, Cooley believed that our sense of self is based upon this idea: we imagine how we look to others, draw conclusions based upon their reactions to us, and then we develop our personal sense of self. In other words, people’s reactions to us are like a mirror in which we are reflected.

Think It Over

• Describe a situation in which you have tried to influence others’ perception of you? How does Goffman’s impression management apply to this situation? 
• Draw a large circle, and then “slice” the c ircle into pieces like a pie, labeling each piece with a role or status that you occupy. Add as many statuses, ascribed and achieved, that you have. Don’t forget things like dog owner, gardener, traveler, student, runner, employee. How many statuses do you have? In which ones are there role conflicts?
• Modification, adaptation, and original content. Authored by : Sarah Hoiland for Lumen Learning. Provided by : Lumen Learning. License : CC BY: Attribution
• Social Constructions of Reality. Authored by : OpenStax CNX. Located at : . License : CC BY: Attribution . License Terms : Download for free at http://cnx.org/contents/[email protected].
• Social Constructions of Reality. Provided by : OpenStax. Located at : https://openstax.org/books/introduction-sociology-3e/pages/4-3-social-constructions-of-reality . Project : Sociology 3e. License : CC BY: Attribution . License Terms : Access for free at https://openstax.org/books/introduction-sociology-3e/pages/4-3-social-constructions-of-reality
• Charles Cooley Looking Glass Self. Authored by : Brooke Miller. Provided by : Khan Academy. Located at : https://www.youtube.com/embed/XCxe9HbfJcM?enablejsapi=1 . License : Other . License Terms : Standard YouTube License
• Dramaturgy (Dramaturgical Analysis). Provided by : Sociology Live!. Located at : https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=5&v=5Qe5TI__ZDU . License : Other . License Terms : Standard YouTube License

Goffman's Front-Stage and Backstage Behavior

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• M.A., Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara
• B.A., Sociology, Pomona College

In sociology, the terms "front stage" and "backstage" refer to different behaviors that people engage in every day. Developed by the late sociologist Erving Goffman, the concepts form part of the dramaturgical perspective within sociology that uses the metaphor of the theater to explain social interaction.

• The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life

Erving Goffman presented the dramaturgical perspective in the 1959 book "The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life." In it, Goffman uses the metaphor of theatrical production to offer a way of understanding human interaction and behavior. He argues that social life is a "performance" carried out by "teams" of participants in three places: "front stage," "backstage," and "off stage."

The dramaturgical perspective also emphasizes the importance of the "setting," or context, in shaping the performance, the role of a person's "appearance" in social interaction, and the effect the "manner" of a person's behavior has on the overall performance.

Running through this perspective is a recognition that social interaction is influenced by the time and place in which it occurs as well as by the "audience" present to witness it. It is also determined by the values, norms , beliefs, and common cultural practices of the social group or the locale where it occurs.

Front Stage Behavior—the World Is a Stage

The idea that people play different roles throughout their daily lives and display different kinds of behavior depending on where they are and the time of day is a familiar one. Most people, consciously or unconsciously, behave somewhat differently as their professional selves vs. their private or intimate selves.

According to Goffman, people engage in "front stage" behavior when they know that others are watching. Front-stage behavior reflects internalized norms and expectations for behavior shaped partly by the setting, the particular role one plays in it, and one's physical appearance. How people participate in a front-stage performance can be highly intentional and purposeful, or it can be habitual or subconscious. Either way, front-stage behavior typically follows a routinized and learned social script shaped by cultural norms. Waiting in line for something, boarding a bus, flashing a transit pass, and exchanging pleasantries about the weekend with colleagues are all examples of highly routinized and scripted front-stage performances.

The routines of people's daily lives—traveling to and from work, shopping, dining out, or going to a cultural exhibit or performance—all fall into the category of front-stage behavior. The "performances" people put on with those around them follow familiar rules and expectations for what they should do and talk about with one another in each setting. People also engage in front-stage behavior in less public places, such as among colleagues at work and as students in classrooms.

Whatever the setting of front-stage behavior, people are aware of how others perceive them and what they expect, and this knowledge tells them how to behave. It shapes not just what individuals do and say in social settings but how they dress and style themselves, the consumer items they carry around, and the manner of their behavior (assertive, demure, pleasant, hostile, etc.) These, in turn, shape how others view them, what they expect of them, and how they behave toward them. Put differently, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu would say that cultural capital is a significant factor both in shaping front-stage behavior and how others interpret the meaning of it.

Backstage Behavior—What We Do When No One Is Looking

When people engage in backstage behavior, they are free of the expectations and norms that dictate front-stage behavior. Given this, people are often more relaxed and comfortable when backstage; they let their guard down and behave in ways that reflect their uninhibited or "true" selves. They cast off elements of their appearance required for a front-stage performance, such as swapping work clothes for casual clothes and loungewear. They may even change how they speak and comport their bodies or carry themselves.

When people are backstage, they often rehearse certain behaviors or interactions and otherwise prepare for upcoming front-stage performances. They might practice their smile or handshake, rehearse a presentation or conversation, or prep themselves to look a certain way once in public again. So even backstage, people are aware of norms and expectations, which influence what they think about and do. In private, people behave in ways that they would never in public.

However, even people's backstage lives tend to involve others, such as housemates, partners, and family members. One may not behave as formally with these individuals as standard front-stage behavior dictates, but they may not fully let down their guards either. People's backstage behavior mirrors the way actors behave in the backstage of a theater, the kitchen within a restaurant, or the "employee only" areas of retail shops.

For the most part, how one behaves front stage significantly differs from an individual's backstage conduct. When someone ignores the expectations for front-stage and backstage behaviors, it may lead to confusion, embarrassment, and even controversy. Imagine if a high school principal showed up to school in her bathrobe and slippers, for example, or used profanity while speaking with colleagues and students. For good reason, the expectations linked to front-stage and backstage behavior influence most folks to work pretty hard to keep these two realms separate and distinct.

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• A Biography of Erving Goffman
• Famous Sociologists
• What Is a Total Institution?
• Why We Really Ignore Each Other in Public
• How Our Aligning Behavior Shapes Everyday Life
• Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity
• Understanding Resocialization in Sociology
• What Is Role Conflict in Sociology?
• An Overview of Labeling Theory
• 15 Major Sociological Studies and Publications
• Emma Watson's 2014 Speech on Gender Equality
• Definition of a Formal Organization
• Why We Selfie
• Understanding Social Exchange Theory

The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959)

Erving goffman (1959): the presentation of self in everyday life.

By Jason Taylor

Introduction

Erving Goffman (1922-1982) was “arguably the most influential American sociologist of the twentieth century” (Fine & Manning, 2003, p. 34). This summary will outline one of his earliest works – The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life , originally published in 1956. The book was published more widely in 1959 with some minor changes and in 1969, won the American Sociological Association’s MacIver Award (Treviño, 2003). It has been listed by the International Sociological Association (1998) as the tenth most important book of the last century.

Goffman (1959, p.12) introduces his “report” as “a sort of handbook” which details “one sociological perspective from which social life can be studied”. In it, he describes “a set of features… which together form a framework that can be applied to any concrete social establishment, be it domestic, industrial, or commercial”.

Goffman (1959) intends on providing a unique sociological perspective from which to view the social world. He names this perspective dramaturgical analysis. Elegantly intuitive, this perspective directs us to view the social world as a stage. Goffman is using the language of the theatre to describe social interaction. Much like on the stage, ‘actors’ take on ‘roles’ – they engage in a performance . There is an audience who views and interprets this performance. There are props and scripts. And there is a ‘front stage’ and a ‘backstage’.

Following the introduction, the book is broken down into six main chapters. These are:

• Performances
• Regions and Region Behaviour
• Discrepant Roles
• Communication out of Character
• The Arts of Impression Management

These six chapters outline the six ‘dramaturgical principles’ of Goffman’s theory (Fine & Manning, 2003; Manning, 1992). This section will outline some of the core aspects of each of these ‘dramaturgical principles’. The first principle (performances) will be the most detailed of the six, because it is the fundamental theoretical basis for Goffman’s (1959) overall concept. The additional five principles can be seen as supporting and building upon this underlying idea. Following from this fairly extensive summary of the book, a critical evaluation will discuss some of its main criticisms and consider why it remains an exceptionally influential piece of Sociology. Finally, we will end with some cautionary advice from Goffman on the scope and practicality of his theory.

1. Performances

A “performance” may be defined as all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion that serves to influence in any way any of the other participants. (Goffman, 1959, p.26)

I have been using the term “performance” to refer to all the activity of an individual which occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which has some influence on the observers . (Goffman, 1959, p. 32)

So, by ‘performance’, Goffman (1959) is referring to any activity by an individual in the presence of others which influences those others.

It is important to recognise that there are various situations, circumstances and settings within which a performance can take place. One of the most obvious, perhaps, is a job interview. In this case, the interviewee is likely presenting a version of themselves that they believe the interviewer values in their employees – well-mannered, confident (but not arrogant), respectful, hard-working, trustworthy, and so on. They may attempt to present these characteristics through the way they dress, their posture, their manner and tone of speaking, their body language, etc. Indeed, the interviewer will also be putting on a performance – perhaps restraining themselves so as not to reveal too much about how the interview is going or presenting an authoritative demeanour, for example. However, performances occur in more subtle settings and situations, too. When a couple go out to dinner, they present themselves in a certain way – both towards each other as well as the person serving them and to other diners. The way we dress, the way we speak, the facial expressions we make, our body language, all amount to a kind of performance.

Goffman (1959) suggests that performances are an essential aspect of how we “define the situation”:

When an individual enters the presence of others, they commonly seek to acquire information about him or to bring into play information about him already possessed. They will be interested in his general socio-economic status, his conception of self, his attitude toward them, his competence, his trustworthiness, etc. Although some of this information seems to be sought almost as an end in itself, there are usually quite practical reasons for acquiring it. Information about the individual helps to define the situation, enabling others to know in advance what he will expect of them and what they may expect of him. Informed in these ways, the others will know how best to act in order to call forth a desired response from him. (Goffman, 1959, p.1)

Essentially, the argument here is that social interaction requires performances from all actors involved in any social interaction in order to define and negotiate the situation we find ourselves in. Through our performances, we make claims about what the situation is, who we are, and what to expect from one another.

A word of caution here. Goffman (1959) is not necessarily implying that individuals are consciously deceiving one another or ‘faking it’… at least, not all of the time:

At one extreme, one finds that the performer can be fully taken in by his own act; he can be sincerely convinced that the impression of reality which he stages is the real reality. When his audience is also convinced in this way about the show he puts on—and this seems to be the typical case—then for the moment at least, only the sociologist or the socially disgruntled will have any doubts about the “realness” of what is presented. At the other extreme, we find that the performer may not be taken in at all by his own routine. This possibility is understandable, since no one is in quite as good an observational position to see through the act as the person who puts it on. Coupled with this, the performer may be moved to guide the conviction of his audience only as a means to other ends, having no ultimate concern in the conception that they have of him or of the situation. When the individual has no belief in his own act and no ultimate concern with the beliefs of his audience, we may call him cynical, reserving the term “sincere” for individuals who believe in the impression fostered by their own performance. (Goffman, 1959, pp.17-18)

Certainly then, an individual may intentionally and consciously put on a performance in order to gain in some way from a given situation. However, performances occur in any and all social interactions. The performer may well be convinced that the performance they are giving is not really a performance at all and instead may view it as an authentic reflection of him- or herself.

Nonetheless, there has been criticism that Goffman presents a cynical view of the ‘self’. Manning (1992), for example, argues that Goffman’s theory is based on what he calls the ‘two selves thesis’. One aspect of the self is considered to be a careful performer, while the other is the “cynical manipulator behind the public performance” (Fine & Manning, 2003, p. 46). We will return to this and other criticism later in the discussion.

An essential aspect of performance, one we have considered in examples already, is what Goffman (1959) calls ‘front’:

It will be convenient to label as “front” that part of the individuals performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who observe the performance. Front, then, is the expressive equipment of a standard kind intentionally or unwittingly employed by the individual during his performance. (Goffman, 1959, p. 22)

Front can be broken down into two broad components:

Setting: the manipulation of the environment to support a particular performance…

… involving furniture, décor, physical layout, and other background items which supply the scenery and stage props for the spate of human action played out before, within, or upon it.  (Goffman, 1959, p.22)

Personal Front:

refers to the other items of expressive equipment, the items that we most intimately identify with the performer himself and that we naturally expect will follow the performer wherever he goes. As part of personal front we may include: insignia of office or rank; clothing; sex, age, and racial characteristics; size and looks; posture; speech patterns; facial expressions; bodily gestures; and the like. (Goffman, 1959, p. 24)

Personal Front is broken down into two further categories – ‘Appearance’ and ‘Manner’. Appearance refers to the performers social status – how they are dressed, for example, or any status symbols they may have on show; while manner may be taken as “those stimuli which function at the time to warn us of the interaction role the performer will expect to play in the oncoming situation” (Goffman, 1959, p. 24). For example:

a haughty, aggressive manner may give the impression that the performer expects to be the one who will initiate the verbal interaction and direct its course. A meek, apologetic manner may give the impression that the performer expects to follow the lead of others, or at least that he can be led to do so. (Goffman, 1959, p.24)

Performances are often a collaborative effort. Individuals will often find themselves in situations whereby they must perform as part of a ‘team’. Examples of this include colleagues at work, students in a classroom, and family outings. ‘Teams’ work together to maintain a common impression and cooperate to contribute to defining the situation. They are required to trust one another to play their role convincingly.

Individuals who perform together as a team are therefore mutually dependent on one another. Each may have a specialised role to play, and there may be a ‘director’ who has “the right to direct and control the progress of the dramatic action” (Goffman, 1959, p. 97).  Members of a team are also generally aware that each individual within the team is performing while they are ‘frontstage’.

Members of a team also have access to a ‘backstage’ where they are able to relax and cease performing – to an extent. However, it should be recognised that each individual will still maintain their own personal performance, intended to be observed by other members of the team.

3. Regions and Region Behaviour

Continuing with the metaphor of the stage, Goffman (1959) considers there to be various regions, variably observable to different audiences, where performers will have more or less need to perform. He distinguishes between three different ‘regions’. These are front region , back region and outside region .

Front Region: Also referred to as ‘frontstage’. An audience is present and a performance is given. Essentially, an individual is ‘frontstage’, at least to a degree, any time they are in the presence of others.

Back Region: Also referred to as ‘backstage’. When ‘backstage’, individuals and teams can rehearse, relax and behave ‘out of character’.

[Backstage], the performer can relax; he can drop his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of character. (Goffman, 1959, p. 122)

An individual ‘backstage’ no longer has to be concerned with their appearance or manner, or with with manipulating the setting to accommodate or please an audience. Under normal circumstances the audience has little or no access to the backstage region.

Outside Region: A region occupied by ‘outsiders’ who are not intended to be present by a performer. These outsiders are neither performers or actors and are often considered to be ‘intruders’. Performances vary based on who is in the audience. Outsiders may cause confusion or embarrassment because they may not be the ‘intended audience’ for a specific performance. Goffman (1959) gives an example of a couple who regularly bicker unexpectedly receiving a guest who they do not wish to be aware of their marital troubles. Essentially, the current performance must be adapted to accommodate the outsider, although “rarely can this be done smoothly enough to preserve the newcomer’s illusion that the show suddenly put on is the performer’s natural show” (Goffman, 1959, p. 139), In other words, the ‘adapted’ performance may not be a convincing one.

4. Discrepant Roles

For far, we have considered most individuals to be categorised in one of three ways – a performer, an audience member, or an outsider. But Goffman (1959) notes that ‘discrepant roles’ also exist, where an individual may not appear what they seem or may not completely fit into any of these three predefined categories. Some examples of discrepant roles include:

The Informer:

… someone who pretends to the performers to be a member of their team, is allowed to come backstage and to acquire destructive information, and then openly or secretly sells out the show to the audience. The political, military, industrial, and criminal variants of this role are famous. If it appears that the individual first joined the team in a sincere way and not with the premeditated plan of disclosing its secrets, we sometimes call him a traitor, turncoat, or quitter, especially if he is the sort of person who ought to have made a decent teammate. The individual who all along has meant to inform on the team, and originally joins only for this purpose, is sometimes called a spy. It has frequently been noted, of course, that informers, whether traitors or spies, are often in an excellent position to play a double game, selling out the secrets of those who buy secrets from them. Informers can, of course, be classified in other ways: as Hans Speier suggests, some are professionally trained for their work, others are amateurs; some are of high estate and some of low; some work for money and others work from conviction. (Goffman, 1959, pp. 145-146)

A shill is someone who acts as though he were an ordinary member of the audience but is in fact in league with the performers. Typically, the shill either provides a visible model for the audience of the kind of response the performers are seeking or provides the kind of audience response that is necessary at the moment for the development of the performance.  (Goffman, 1959, p. 146)

We must not take the view that shills are found only in non-respectable performances… For example, at informal conversational gatherings, it is common for a wife to look interested when her husband tells an anecdote and to feed him appropriate leads and cues, although in fact she has heard the anecdote many times and knows that the show her husband is making of telling something for the first time is only a show. A shill, then, is someone who appears to be just another unsophisticated member of the audience and who uses his unapparent sophistication in the interests of the performing team. (Goffman, 1957, pp. 146-147)

Non-persons:

… are present during the interaction but in some respects do not take the role either of performer or of audience, nor do they (as do informers, shills, and spotters) pretend to be what they are not. (Goffman, 1959, p. 151)

Goffman suggests examples of ‘non-persons’ such as servants, children, the elderly and the sick. The term ‘non-person’ may come across as insensitive or prejudiced, but to be clear, Goffman is trying to outline how people are seen, thought about and treated within this framework. Such examples highlight members of society who are seen as neither performer, audience or outsider and do not make substantial impact on the way people behave in their presence. ‘Non-persons’ can often move between frontstage and backstage without causing the same sort of disruption that an ‘outsider’ might. Goffman’s (1963) work on Stigma adds a great deal of theory building on comparable concepts.

The Spotter: Undercover government or company ‘agents’ who act as a member or the public or team in order to check up on the conduct of employees or officials.

The Shopper:

… is the one who takes an unremarked, modest place in the audience… but when he leaves he goes to his employer, a competitor of the team whose performance he has witnessed, to report what he has seen. He is the professional shopper—the Gimbel’s man in Macy’s and the Macy’s man in Gimbel’s; he is the fashion spy and the foreigner at National Air Meets. [He] has a technical right to see the show but ought to have the decency, it is sometimes felt, to stay in his own back region, for his interest in the show is from the wrong perspective… (Goffman, 1959, pp. 148-149)

The Mediator: An individual who has access to both sides of a dispute but gives each side the impression that they are more loyal to them than to the other. Examples Goffman (1959) suggests are arbiters of labour disputes (negotiating between each side of the dispute), factory foremen (advancing the directives of upper management whilst maintaining the respect and willingness of workers) and chairmen or formal meetings (who are to moderate the meeting and ensure everyone is treated fairly). Goffman is amusingly cynical of ‘mediators’, concluding that they are essentially a ‘double-shill’:

When a go-between operates in the actual presence of the two teams of which he is a member, we obtain a wonderful display, not unlike a man desperately trying to play tennis with himself. Again we are forced to see that the individual is not the natural unit for our consideration but rather the team and its members. As an individual, the go-between’s activity is bizarre, untenable, and undignified, vacillating as it does from one set of appearances and loyalties to another. As a constituent part of two teams, the go-between’s vacillation is quite understandable. The go-between can be thought of simply as a double-shill. (Goffman, 1959, p. 149)

5. Communication out of Character

The discussion so far has outlined many of the ways in which a performer maintains their performance. There are, however, times when an actor may step ‘out of character’, revealing aspects of themselves that are not part of, and may be incompatible with, a given performance. For example, an actor who is unexpectedly startled or frightened while giving a performance may shout out “Good Lord” or “My God!” (Goffman, 1959, p. 169). Goffman outlines four forms this communication out of character may take:

• Treatment of the Absent: While backstage, performers may derogate and talk negatively about the audience, toward whom they speak about favourably whilst frontstage. Goffman gives an example of salespeople:

… customers who are treated respectfully during the performance are often ridiculed, gossiped about, caricatured, cursed, and criticized when the performers are backstage; here, too, plans may be worked out for “selling” them, or employing “angles” against them, or pacifying them. (Goffman, 1959, p. 170)

While it is asserted that derogative speech is most the common treatment of the absent, backstage performers may also talk positively about their audience in ways they would not whilst frontstage.

• Staging Talk: Backstage discussion between teams about various aspects of the performance, possible adjustments are considered, potential disruptions are explored, “wounds are licked, and morale is strengthened for the next performance” (Goffman, 1959, p. 176).
• Team Collusion: Communication between fellow performers and those backstage who are involved in maintaining the performance. One example of team collusion is instructions given through the in-ear piece of a television news anchor. However, team collusion can also be more subtle, such as through “unconsciously learned vocabulary of gestures and looks by which collusive staging cues can be conveyed” (Goffman, 1959, p. 181).
• Realigning Actions: Unofficial communication directed at the audience, often in an attempt to redefine the situation. Realigning actions may include “innuendo, mimicked accents, well-placed jokes, significant pauses, veiled hints, purposeful kidding, expressive overtones, and many other sign practices” (Goffman, 1959, p. 190). In the event that a performer is accused of unacceptable or improper communication out of character, through realigning actions they may attempt to claim that they did not ‘mean anything’ by their out of character communication and the audience is given a chance to disregard the outburst or mistake.

6. The Arts of Impression Management

It is a reality that performances have the potential to be disrupted. Audience members or outsiders may find their way backstage, for example, or communication out of character may result in a particular performance becoming irreconcilably contradictory with what the audience has witnessed.  ‘Impression management’ is a term used to describe the ways in which performers may plan and prepare ‘corrective practices’ for such disruptions (Goffman, 1959). These ‘dramaturgical disciplines’ may include techniques for covering up for teammates, suppressing emotions and spontaneous feelings, and maintaining self-control during performances.

Performers often rely on the “tactful tendency of the audience and outsiders to act in a protective way in order to help the performers save their own show (Goffman, 1959, p. 229). However, the tactfulness of the audience may not be enough to recover the situation, which may result in embarrassing and socially awkward consequences. As Goffman explains in his wonderfully Goffman way:

Whenever the audience exercises tact, the possibility will arise that the performers will learn that they are being tactfully protected. When this occurs, the further possibility arises that the audience will learn that the performers know they are being tactfully protected. And then, in turn, it becomes possible for the performers to learn that the audience knows that the performers know they are being protected. Now when such states of information exist, a moment in the performance may come when the separateness of the teams will break down and be momentarily replaced by a communion of glances through which each team openly admits to the other its state of information. At such moments, the whole dramaturgical structure of social interaction is suddenly and poignantly laid bare, and the line separating the teams momentarily disappears. Whether this close view of things brings shame or laughter, the teams are likely to draw rapidly back into their appointed character. (Goffman, 1959, 233)

Summary Conclusion

Here we will conclude this summary of Presentation of Self . It is a fairly extensive summary in comparison to many currently available and is focused principally on helping students to engage in the core ideas found throughout the book. As has become usual on this website, I have used extensive quotations with the aim of encouraging readers to explore this key text more directly. While I consider this summary to be fairly extensive, it does not nearly cover everything. My hope is that there is enough here to provide a relatively clear outline of what Goffman (1959) is trying to say. That said, it should be noted that Goffman’s theories are notoriously considered to be tricky to understand structurally. His work can be difficult to neatly condense and summarise. At the same time, something about his work changes the way we view the world. As Lemert (1997) puts it:

The experience Goffman effects is that of colonizing a new social place into which the reader enters, from which to exit never quite the same. To have once, even if only once, seen the social world from within such a place is never after to see it otherwise, ever after to read the world anew. In thus seeing differently, we are other than we were. (Lemert, 1997 – cited in Scheff, 2003, p.52)

Scheff (2003) adds:

Our vision of the world, and even of ourselves, is transformed by reading Goffman. (Scheff, 2003, p.52)

We will now move on to some critical analysis of the book.

Critical Analysis

Goffman provides us with an interesting and useful framework within which to think about social interaction through the framework of dramaturgical analysis. As we shall see, this is not a theory which claims to explain all of society or all aspects of social interaction. What it does provide is a framework that we can apply in studying social groups and their interaction between and among one another. It is a method of analysis.

The various principles he outlines offer a range of complexities that may apply in any particular social situation. One very obvious type of social space with which the dramaturgical perspective may be useful is in the workplace – (probably) any workplace. Some questions we might want to consider in studying social interaction within such an environment include:

• What are individual performers hoping to achieve through their performances?
• How do team dynamics apply in various situations?
• Where do front and back regions exist and how clear are the lines between each?
• How do performers respond to informers, or feel about spotters and how well do they work with mediators? Are there any strategies in place to guard against such discrepant intruders?
• What contexts or situations may inspire communication out of character?
• What methods of impression management are utilised in the event a performance is disrupted or exposed?

This is just one, very brief example, but hopefully it makes the point. Other settings I personally would be interested to explore through dramaturgical analysis include homeless hostels, educational establishments, prisons (which has been done, to an extent – start with Goffman’s (1961) Asylums if you find this interesting) and hospitals.

Goffman (1959) gives us a language to explore social interaction through dramaturgical analysis. The book, like much of Goffman’s work, is filled with specific examples from autobiographies and first-hand accounts of individuals experiences. Goffman is considered by many as a “brilliant maverick” (Manning, 1992, p. 1). However, he does not follow any of the clearly defined, systematic approaches used by other notable social theorists, and this has left many Sociologists in a position where they do not know how to replicate his approach:

Part of these limits of Goffman’s impact can be attributed to the daunting perception of his idiosyncratic brilliance. Few wish to place themselves in comparison with this master sociologist, particularly since his approach lacks an easily acquired method. How can one learn to do what Goffman did? Methodological guidelines do not exist. This has the effect of leaving the work both sui generis and incapable of imitation. The belief (and perhaps the reality) is that Goffman created a personalistic sociology that was virtually mimic-proof. (Fine & Manning, 2003, p. 56)

On the other hand, while few (if any) have been able to replicate Goffman’s work, some of the most influential and successful Sociologists are indebted to his writing (Fine & Manning, 2003). Goffman’s mark on Sociology is enormous. This is both the case for his theories, as well as his writing style – as Fine & Manning (2003, p. 57) put it,“Goffman’s sardonic, satiric, jokey style has served to indicate that other genres and tropes can be legitimate forms of academic writing”. Goffman’s style is interesting, humorous and natural. Presentation of Self in Everyday Life is, at the very least, an incredibly readable and engaging book.

Giddens (2009) summary of his rereading of Presentation of Self outlines and reflects on some of the main criticisms of the book. One of these is that Goffman (1959) ignores power structures throughout his discussion. Giddens (2009) correctly recognises that Goffman does explore how we ‘do’ power, but notes that he neglects any sort of systematic discussion around how power is institutionally structured. His discussion of ‘non-persons’, for example, would have benefited greatly from a focus on institutional differentials of power. Furthermore, Goffman avoids providing any historical context to his ideas. While many of the examples and citations Goffman presents are historically diverse, his analysis is intrinsically grounded in the here and now. Social interaction is very much a product of historical development, and Goffman makes no attempt to investigate this. Treviño (2003) agrees,  arguing that grounding his ideas in a more ‘recognisable theoretical tradition’ would have resulted in ‘greater coherence’ in Goffman’s work.

These criticisms are valid. However, this should not be understood to undermine the value of Goffman’s ideas. While Giddens (2009) views it as ultimately inadequate, he offers Goffman a defence – Goffman’s work is concerend with analysis of interpersonal interaction within social situations rather than macro-structural theory. He takes a micro-sociological approach and this comes with limitations. While issues of power differentiation and historical context certainly would add extra value to Goffman’s work here, it is just that – added value. Indeed, Giddens (2009) makes reference to work such as Elias (1969) and Scheff (1999), who have incorporated and connected some of Goffman’s ideas with issues of power and sociohistorical development. Whilst recognising that there will always be areas that can be (and maybe should have been) explored further, be wary of allowing such criticism to detract from the usefulness of any valuable body of work. After all, there is no reason these issues cannot be explored later and/or by other scholars.

Furthermore, according to Scheff (2006, p. viii), Goffman’s work is ‘fully original’. He deliberately evades traditional social scientific methodology and practice, seeking to get…

… outside the box, beyond the conventions of our society and of social science… Goffman’s main focus was what might be called the microworld of emotions and relationships (ERW). We all live in it every day of our lives, yet we have been trained not to notice. Since Goffman noticed it, he was the discoverer of a hidden world. His work, if properly construed, provides a window into that otherwise invisible place… it is important in its own right, since it constitutes the moment-by-moment texture of our lives. Second, it is intimately connected to the larger world; it both causes and is caused by that world. If we are to have more than a passing understanding of ourselves and our society, we need to become better acquainted with the emotional/relational world… Conventional social science mostly ignores emotions and relationships in favour of behaviour and cognition. Goffman’s recognition of the existence of an ERW is the foundation of his whole approach. He realized, at some level, that conventional social and behavioural science was blind to the ERW, and might as well be blind in many other arenas as well… Following Goffman’s lead, if we are going to advance in our understanding of the human condition, we need to build a new approach. This approach would not only include the ERW, but other hitherto unrecognized structures and processes as well, such as the filigree of emotions and relationships that underlies large-scale behaviour, as in the case of collective cooperation and conflict. (Scheff, 2006, p. vii – ix)

Following Scheff (2006) then, we can turn the criticism that Goffman ignores other aspects of traditional Sociology on its head. Indeed, we can argue that Goffman is exploring aspects of social life that have remained largely hidden to the rest of the field. To quote Treviño (2003, p. 36), Presentation of Self was “the first sociological effort to truly treat face-to face interaction as a subject of study, as an order, in its own right, at its own level”. Those issues of macro social structure, those of institutional power differentials and of sociohistorical development were not revealed and communicated even nearly in full by any one body of work or by one sole theorist. As ‘discoverer’ of this aspect of the social world, it would be unreasonable to expect Goffman to combine his ideas with all available aspects of social science into one unifying theory of all social life and social structure. All science is collaborative, and Goffman provides us with one more addition to a dizzying array of diverse social science. Nonetheless, it is worth taking these criticisms seriously, if only as a recognition that Goffman, like any other social theorist, provides us with just one perspective with which to view the world. His theories should be used alongside, rather than in isolation from, other perspectives in Sociology.

Another reasonable criticism briefly mentioned earlier in this discussion is that Goffman’s view of the ‘self’ is grounded in what Manning (1992) calls the ‘two selves thesis’. It is argued here that Goffman takes a cynical view of the ‘self’, which he inherently suggests has two sides – one, the careful performer, the other the ‘cynical manipulator’ guiding the performance. It is fair to claim that human beings and their interactions are far more complex, far more multifaceted, than Goffman seems to suggest. Manning (1992) points out that Goffman recognised and attempted to distance himself from this thesis with small additions to the second 1959 edition of the book as well as in subsequent work. It seems that Goffman does not want us to view the dramaturgical analogy as a complete and full description of the self or as a tool to accurately understand all aspects of social interaction. Indeed, he uses the final few paragraphs of Presentation of Self in Everyday Life to reinforce this. We shall therefore conclude this summary as Goffman (1959) choses to end his book :

And now a final comment. In developing the conceptual framework employed in this report, some language of the stage was used. I spoke of performers and audiences; of routines and parts; of performances coming off or falling flat; of cues, stage settings and backstage; of dramaturgical needs, dramaturgical skills, and dramaturgical strategies. Now it should be admitted that this attempt to press a mere analogy so far was in part a rhetoric and a maneuver. The claim that all the world’s a stage is sufficiently commonplace for readers to be familiar with its limitations and tolerant of its presentation, knowing that at any time they will easily be able to demonstrate to themselves that it is not to be taken too seriously . An action staged in a theater is a relatively contrived illusion and an admitted one; unlike ordinary life, nothing real or actual can happen to the performed characters—although at another level of course something real and actual can happen to the reputation of performers qua professionals whose everyday job is to put on theatrical performances. And so here the language and mask of the stage will be dropped . Scaffolds, after all, are to build other things with, and should be erected with an eye to taking them down . This report is not concerned with aspects of theater that creep into everyday life. It is concerned with the structure of social encounters—the structure of those entities in social life that come into being whenever persons enter one another’s immediate physical presence. The key factor in this structure is the maintenance of a single definition of the situation , this definition having to be expressed, and this expression sustained in the face of a multitude of potential disruptions. A character staged in a theatre is not in some ways real, nor does it have the same kind of real consequences as does the thoroughly contrived character performed by a confidence man; but the successful staging of either of these types of false figures involves use of real techniques—the same techniques by which everyday persons sustain their real social situations. Those who conduct face to face interaction on a theatre’s stage must meet the key requirement of real situations; they must expressively sustain a definition of the situation: but this they do in circumstances that have facilitated their developing an apt terminology for the interactional tasks that all of us share. (Goffman, 1959, pp. 254-255, emphasis added )

Goffman (1959) intends his dramaturgical methaphor to be used as a scaffold. It is not all-emcompassing and is not adequate as an approach used in isolation. Rather, it is a means to an end. It is a method of highlighting and teasing out aspects of social interaction which, once identified, must be analysed further through the use of other Sociological methologies and perspectives. Nonetheless, the analogy of the theatre to describe everyday life is fascinating and has had substantial impact on the field.

Elias, N., 1969. The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.

Fine, G. A. & Manning, P., 2003. Erving Goffman. In: The Blackwell Companion to Major Contemporary Social Theorists. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 34-62.

Giddens, A., 2009. On Rereading The Presentation of Self: Some Reflections. Social Psychology Quarterly, 72(4), pp. 290-295.

Goffman, E., 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor.

Goffman, E., 1961. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and other Inmates. New York: Anchor.

Goffman, E., 1963. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. London: Penguin.

International Sociological Association, 1998. Books of the Century. [Online] Available at: https://www.isa-sociology.org/en/about-isa/history-of-isa/books-of-the-xx-century

Manning, P., 1992. Erving Goffman and Modern Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Scheff, T. J., 1999. Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.

Scheff, T. J., 2003. The Goffman Legacy: Deconstructing/Reconstructimg Social Science. In: Goffman’s Legacy. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., pp. 50-70.

Scheff, T. J., 2006. Goffman Unbound! A New Paradigm for Social Science. Routledge: Oxon.

Treviño, A. J., 2003. Introduction: Erving Goffman and the Interaction Order. In: Goffman’s Legacy. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., pp. 1-49.

Self-Presentation Theory

Self-Presentation Theory: Understanding the Art of Impression Management

In the grand theater of life, where every social interaction is a stage and we are both the actors and the audience, self-presentation theory takes center stage. It whispers the secrets of our performances, the subtle art of crafting personas, and the intricate dance between authenticity and impression. As we pull back the curtain on this psychological narrative, we delve into the depths of human behavior, exploring how the masks we wear and the roles we play are not merely acts of deception but profound expressions of our deepest desires to connect, belong, and be understood in the ever-unfolding drama of existence.

Self-presentation theory, originating from the field of social psychology, delves into the intricate ways individuals strategically convey and portray their desired image to others. This theory explores the underlying motivations and cognitive processes governing how people present themselves in social situations, aiming to understand the dynamics of impression management.

Key Definition:

Self-presentation theory refers to the behavior and strategies individuals use to shape the perceptions that others form about them. This theory suggests that individuals strive to convey a favorable impression to others by managing their public image. It encompasses various aspects such as impression management, identity, and social interaction, and is often associated with social psychology and communication studies. According to this theory, individuals may engage in behaviors such as self-disclosure, performance, and conformity to influence how others perceive them.

Origins and Development

The concept of self-presentation theory was initially formulated by sociologist Erving Goffman, in his seminal work The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life , originally published in 1956. Goffman’s was first to create a specific theory concerning self-presentation, laying the foundation for what is now commonly referred to as impression management. His book became widely known after its publication in the United States in 1959.

Goffman’s theory draws from the imagery of theater to portray the importance of human social interaction. He proposed that in social interactions, individuals perform much like actors on a stage, managing the impressions others form of them by controlling information in various ways. This process involves a “front” where the individual presents themselves in a certain manner, and a “back” where they can step out of their role.

His work has been influential in sociology, social psychology, and anthropology, as it was the first to treat face-to-face interaction as a subject of sociological study. Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis observes a connection between the kinds of acts people put on in their daily life and theatrical performances. The theory has had a lasting impact on our understanding of social behavior and continues to be a significant reference point in studies of social interaction.

Impression Management Strategies

Much of Goffman’s early work suggests that “avoidance of shame is an important, indeed a crucial, motive in virtually all social behavior.” Goffman posits that impression management is typically a greater motivation than rational and instrumental goals. Thomas J. Scheff explains that “one tries to control the impression one makes on others, even others who are not significant to one’s life” ( Scheff, 1997. Kindle location: 4,106 ).

Self-presentation theory encompasses a spectrum of strategies employed by individuals to shape others’ perceptions of them. Impression management strategies in social interaction theory are the various techniques individuals use to influence how others perceive them. Individuals employ these strategies to present themselves in a favorable light. The motivation is to achieve specific goals or maintain certain relationships. Here are some key impression management strategies:

• Self-Promotion : Highlighting one’s own positive qualities, achievements, and skills to be seen as competent and capable.
• Ingratiation : Using flattery or praise to make oneself likable to others, often to gain their favor or approval.
• Exemplification : Demonstrating one’s own moral integrity or dedication to elicit respect and admiration from others.
• Intimidation : Projecting a sense of power or threat to influence others to comply with one’s wishes.
• Supplication : Presenting oneself as weak or needy to elicit sympathy or assistance from others.

These strategies can be assertive, involving active attempts to shape one’s image, or defensive, aimed at protecting one’s image. The choice of strategy depends on the individual’s goals, the context of the interaction, and the nature of the relationship.

The Game of Presentation

In many ways, self-presentation opposes other psychology concepts such as authenticity. We adapt to ur environments, and present ourselves accordingly. We act much different at grandma’s house than we do when out drinking with our friends. Perhaps, authenticity is context dependent. However, we can present ourselves differently in different situations without violating core self-values. The presentations may differ but the self remains unchanged.

Carl Jung mused in reflection of his childhood interactions with his friends that, “I found that they alienated me from myself. When I was with them I became different from the way I was at home.” He continues, “it seemed to me that the change in myself was due to the influence of my schoolfellows, who somehow misled me or compelled me to be different from what I thought I was” ( Jung, 2011 ).

Jonathan Haidt suggests that it is merely game. He wrote, “to win at this game you must present your best possible self to others. You must appear virtuous, whether or not you are, and you must gain the benefits of cooperation whether or not you deserve them.” He continues to warn “but everyone else is playing the same game, so you must also play defense—you must be wary of others’ self-presentations, and of their efforts to claim more for themselves than they deserve” ( Haidt, 2003. Kindle location: 1,361 ).

Healthy and Unhealthy Modes of Self-Presentation

We all self-present, creating images that fit the context. While seeking a partner, we self-present a person who is worthy of investing time in. Only in time, do some of these masks begin to fade. Impression management is essential to build new relationships, get the job, and prevent social rejection. Mahzarin R, Banaji and Anthony G. Greenwald wrote, “honesty may be an overrated virtue. If you decided to report all of your flaws to friends and to apply a similar standard of total honesty when talking to others about their shortcomings, you might soon find that you no longer have friends.” they continue, “our daily social lives demand, and generally receive, repeated lubrication with a certain amount of untruthfulness, which keeps the gears of social interaction meshing smoothly” ( Banaji & Greenwald, 2016, pp. 28-29 ).

However, this healthy practice morphs into something sinister when the presented self has nothing to do with the real self. Daniel Goleman refers to individuals that engage in unhealthy deceitful presentations as social chameleons. He wrote, “the social chameleon will seem to be whatever those he is with seem to want. The sign that someone falls into this pattern…is that they make an excellent impression, yet have few stable or satisfying intimate relationships” ( Golman, 2011. Kindle location: 2,519 ).

Goleman explains that “a more healthy pattern, of course, is to balance being true to oneself with social skills, using them with integrity.” He adds, “social chameleons, though, don’t mind in the least saying one thing and doing another, if that will win them social approval” ( Goleman, 2011. Kindle location: 2,523 ).

Situational Influences

The application of self-presentation strategies is contingent upon the social context and the specific goals an individual pursues. In professional settings, individuals may engage in self-promotion to advance their careers, while in personal relationships, they might prioritize authenticity and sincerity. The ubiquity of social media further complicates self-presentation, as individuals navigate the curation of online personas and the management of digital identities.

In the professional realm, the strategic presentation of oneself can play a crucial role in career development and success. This may involve showcasing one’s achievements, skills, and expertise to stand out in a competitive environment. However, it’s important to strike a balance between self-promotion and humility to maintain credibility and foster positive professional relationships.

On the other hand, personal relationships often thrive on genuine connections and authenticity. In these contexts, individuals may choose to present themselves in a sincere manner, emphasizing vulnerability and openness to establish meaningful connections with others. While occasional self-promotion may still occur, the emphasis is more on building trust and rapport.

Social Media and Self-Presentation

The rise of social media has introduced a new layer of complexity to self-presentation. Platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and LinkedIn offer opportunities for individuals to craft their virtual identities. This process involves selective sharing of information, curation of posts and images, and the management of online interactions. The challenge lies in maintaining a balance between projecting an aspirational image and staying true to one’s authentic self in the digital sphere.

In Goffman’s lengthy comparison between actors and audience suggests that anyone could perform, presenting a certain image. However, he points out that if the actor is a known criminal the audience would not be able to accept their performance, knowing it is a fraud. The actor may enjoy success by going on the road, performing to audiences that are not aware of the actor’s criminal past ( Goffman, 1956, p. 223 ). The internet allows the individual with a shady past to bring their show on the road to an unsuspecting audience who can buy their deceitful performance.

Navigating these diverse self-presentation strategies requires individuals to be mindful of the specific social contexts and their underlying goals. Whether it’s in the professional arena or personal relationships, the nuanced art of self-presentation continues to evolve in the digital age, shaping how individuals perceive and position themselves in the world.

Self-Presentation and Emotional Labor

The intersection of self-presentation theory with emotional labor is a topic of significant interest. Emotional labor pertains to the management of one’s emotions to meet the demands of a particular role or job. Individuals often engage in self-presentation to display appropriate emotions in various settings, leading to a convergence between impression management and emotional regulation. One of the key aspects of this intersection is the impact it has on employee well-being.

Research has shown that the need to regulate emotions in the workplace can lead to emotional exhaustion and burnout. Additionally, there are important implications for organizations, as they have a vested interest in understanding and managing the emotional labor of their employees. Effective programs may enhance employee well-being and improve the quality of service provided to customers. Moreover, the intersection of self-presentation and emotional labor can also be examined through the lens of gender and cultural differences. These examination may highlight the complexities and nuances of this phenomenon in diverse contexts. Understanding this intersection is crucial for creating supportive work environments and fostering healthy, sustainable emotional practices.

See Emotional Labor for more on this topic

Implications and Future Directions

Understanding self-presentation theory has widespread implications, spanning from interpersonal relationships to organizational dynamics. By acknowledging the nuanced strategies individuals employ to shape perceptions, psychologists and practitioners can better grasp human behavior in diverse contexts. Future research may delve into the interplay between self-presentation and cultural factors. In addition, further research may cast light on the psychological effects of sustained impression management on individuals’ well-being.

As individuals, we can understand that we, as well as others, use impression management. Before investing significant resources, we would be wise to try to unmask the presenter and make a decision based on reality rather than expertely presented deceptions.

A List of Practical Implications

Understanding the concepts related to self-presentation theory, such as impression management, self-concept, and social identity, has several practical implications in everyday life:

• Enhanced Social Interactions : By being aware of how we present ourselves, we can navigate social situations more effectively, tailoring our behavior to suit different contexts and relationships.
• Improved Professional Relationships : In the workplace, understanding self-presentation can help in managing professional personas, leading to better workplace dynamics and career advancement.
• Personal Development : Recognizing the strategies we use for impression management can lead to greater self-awareness and personal growth, as we align our external presentation with our internal values.
• Conflict Resolution : Awareness of self-presentation strategies can aid in resolving conflicts by understanding the motivations behind others’ behaviors and addressing the underlying issues.
• Mental Health : Understanding the effort involved in emotional labor and impression management can help in identifying when these efforts are leading to stress or burnout, prompting us to seek support or make changes.
• Authentic Relationships : By balancing self-presentation with authenticity, we can foster deeper and more genuine connections with others.
• Cultural Competence : Recognizing the role of social identity in self-presentation can enhance our sensitivity to cultural differences and improve cross-cultural communication.

Overall, these concepts can empower us to be more intentional in our interactions, leading to more fulfilling and effective communication in our personal and professional lives.

Associated Psychological Concepts to Self-Presentation Theory

Self-presentation theory is intricately connected to a variety of psychological concepts that help explain the behaviors and motivations behind how individuals present themselves to others. Here are some related concepts:

• Self-Concept : This refers to how people perceive themselves and their awareness of who they are. Self-presentation is often a reflection of one’s self-concept, as individuals attempt to project an image that aligns with their self-perception.
• Impression Management : This is the process by which individuals attempt to control the impressions others form of them. It involves a variety of strategies to influence others’ perceptions in a way that is favorable to the individual.
• Social Identity : The part of an individual’s self-concept derived from their membership in social groups. Self-presentation can be used to highlight certain aspects of one’s social identity.
• Cognitive Dissonance : This occurs when there is a discrepancy between one’s beliefs and behaviors. Self-presentation strategies may be employed to reduce cognitive dissonance by aligning one’s outward behavior with internal beliefs.
• Role Theory : Suggests that individuals behave in ways that align with the expectations of the social roles they occupy. Self-presentation can be seen as performing the appropriate role in a given context.
• Self-Es teem : The value one places on oneself. Self-presentation can be a means to enhance or protect one’s self-esteem by controlling how others view them.
• Self-Efficacy : One’s belief in their ability to succeed. Through self-presentation, individuals may seek to project confidence and competence to others, thereby reinforcing their own sense of self-efficacy.

These concepts are interrelated and contribute to the understanding of self-presentation theory as a whole, providing insight into the complex nature of social interactions and the motivations behind individuals’ efforts to influence how they are perceived by others.

A Few Words by Psychology Fanatic

In essence, self-presentation theory captures the multifaceted nature of human interaction, shedding light on the conscious and subconscious processes governing how individuals present themselves in the social arena. By unraveling the intricacies of impression management, researchers continue to unveil the complexities of human behavior and the underlying motivations that propel our interactions with others.

Last Update: April 29, 2024

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References:

Goffman, Erving (1956/ 2021 ). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Anchor

Goleman, Daniel ( 2005 ). Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ. Bantam Books . Read on Kindle Books.

Haidt, Jonathan ( 2003 ). The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom. Basic Books ; 1st edition.

Jung, Carl Gustav (1961/ 2011 ). Memories, Dreams, Reflections. Vintage ; Reissue edition.

Banaji, Mahzarin R.; Greenwald, Anthony G. ( 2016 ). Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People.  Bantam ; Reprint edition.

Scheff, Thomas J. ( 1997 ). Shame in Social Theory. Editors Lansky, M. R. and Morrison, A. P. In The Widening Scope of Shame. ​ Routledge ; 1st edition.

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Self-Presentation

Self-presentation definition.

Self-presentation refers to how people attempt to present themselves to control or shape how others (called the audience) view them. It involves expressing oneself and behaving in ways that create a desired impression. Self-presentation is part of a broader set of behaviors called impression management. Impression management refers to the controlled presentation of information about all sorts of things, including information about other people or events. Self-presentation refers specifically to information about the self.

Self-Presentation History and Modern Usage

Early work on impression management focused on its manipulative, inauthentic uses that might typify a used car salesperson who lies to sell a car, or someone at a job interview who embellishes accomplishments to get a job. However, researchers now think of self-presentation more broadly as a pervasive aspect of life. Although some aspects of self-presentation are deliberate and effortful (and at times deceitful), other aspects are automatic and done with little or no conscious thought. For example, a woman may interact with many people during the day and may make different impressions on each person. When she starts her day at her apartment, she chats with her roommates and cleans up after breakfast, thereby presenting the image of being a good friend and responsible roommate. During classes, she responds to her professor’s questions and carefully takes notes, presenting the image of being a good student. Later that day, she calls her parents and tells them about her classes and other activities (although likely leaving out information about some activities), presenting the image of being a loving and responsible daughter. That night, she might go to a party or dancing with friends, presenting the image of being fun and easygoing. Although some aspects of these self-presentations may be deliberate and conscious, other aspects are not. For example, chatting with her roommates and cleaning up after breakfast may be habitual behaviors that are done with little conscious thought. Likewise, she may automatically hold the door open for an acquaintance or buy a cup of coffee for a friend. These behaviors, although perhaps not done consciously or with self-presentation in mind, nevertheless convey an image of the self to others.

Although people have the ability to present images that are false, self-presentations are often genuine; they reflect an attempt by the person to have others perceive him or her accurately, or at least consistent with how the person perceives himself or herself. Self-presentations can vary as a function of the audience; people present different aspects of themselves to different audiences or under different conditions. A man likely presents different aspects of himself to his close friends than he does to his elderly grandmother, and a woman may present a different image to her spouse than she does to her employer. This is not to say that these different images are false. Rather, they represent different aspects of the self. The self is much like a gem with multiple facets. The gem likely appears differently depending on the angle at which it is viewed. However, the various appearances are all genuine. Even if people present a self-image that they know to be false, they may begin to internalize the self-image and thereby eventually come to believe the self-pres

entation. For example, a man may initially present an image of being a good student without believing it to be genuine, but after attending all his classes for several weeks, visiting the professor during office hours, and asking questions during class, he may come to see himself as truly being a good student. This internalization process is most likely to occur when people make a public commitment to the self-image, when the behavior is at least somewhat consistent with their self-image, and when they receive positive feedback or other rewards for presenting the self-image.

Self-presentation is often directed to external audiences such as friends, lovers, employers, teachers, children, and even strangers. Self-presentation is more likely to be conscious when the presenter depends on the audience for some reward, expects to interact with the audience in the future, wants something from the audience, or values the audience’s approval. Yet self-presentation extends beyond audiences that are physically present to imagined audiences, and these imagined audiences can have distinct effects on behavior. A young man at a party might suddenly think about his parents and change his behavior from rambunctious to reserved. People sometimes even make self-presentations only for themselves. For instance, people want to claim certain identities, such as being fun, intelligent, kind, moral, and they may behave in line with these identities even in private.

Self-Presentation Goals

Self-presentation is inherently goal-directed; people present certain images because they benefit from the images in some way. The most obvious benefits are interpersonal, arising from getting others to do what one wants. A job candidate may convey an image of being hardworking and dependable to get a job; a salesperson may convey an image of being trustworthy and honest to achieve a sale. People may also benefit from their self-presentations by gaining respect, power, liking, or other desirable social rewards. Finally, people make certain impressions on others to maintain a sense of who they are, or their self-concept. For example, a man who wants to think of himself as a voracious reader might join a book club or volunteer at a library, or a woman who wishes to perceive herself as generous may contribute lavishly to a charitable cause. Even when there are few or no obvious benefits of a particular self-presentation, people may simply present an image that is consistent with the way they like to think about themselves, or at least the way they are accustomed to thinking about themselves.

Much of self-presentation is directed toward achieving one of two desirable images. First, people want to appear likeable. People like others who are attractive, interesting, and fun to be with. Thus, a sizable proportion of self-presentation revolves around developing, maintaining, and enhancing appearance and conveying and emphasizing characteristics that others desire, admire, and enjoy. Second, people want to appear competent. People like others who are skilled and able, and thus another sizable proportion of self-presentation revolves around conveying an image of competence. Yet, self-presentation is not so much about presenting desirable images as it is about presenting desired images, and some desired images are not necessarily desirable. For example, schoolyard bullies may present an image of being dangerous or intimidating to gain or maintain power over others. Some people present themselves as weak or infirmed (or exaggerate their weaknesses) to gain help from others. For instance, a member of a group project may display incompetence in the hope that other members will do more of the work, or a child may exaggerate illness to avoid going to school.

Self-Presentation Avenues

People self-present in a variety of ways. Perhaps most obviously, people self-present in what they say. These verbalizations can be direct claims of a particular image, such as when a person claims to be altruistic. They also can be indirect, such as when a person discloses personal behaviors or standards (e.g., “I volunteer at a hospital”). Other verbal presentations emerge when people express attitudes or beliefs. Divulging that one enjoys backpacking through Europe conveys the image that one is a world-traveler. Second, people self-present nonverbally in their physical appearance, body language, and other behavior. Smiling, eye contact, and nods of agreement can convey a wealth of information. Third, people self-present through the props they surround themselves with and through their associations. Driving an expensive car or flying first class conveys an image of having wealth, whereas an array of diplomas and certificates on one’s office walls conveys an image of education and expertise. Likewise, people judge others based on their associations. For example, being in the company of politicians or movie stars conveys an image of importance, and not surprisingly, many people display photographs of themselves with famous people. In a similar vein, high school students concerned with their status are often careful about which classmates they are seen and not seen with publicly. Being seen by others in the company of someone from a member of a disreputable group can raise questions about one’s own social standing.

Self-Presentation Pitfalls

Self-presentation is most successful when the image presented is consistent with what the audience thinks or knows to be true. The more the image presented differs from the image believed or anticipated by the audience, the less willing the audience will be to accept the image. For example, the lower a student’s grade is on the first exam, the more difficulty he or she will have in convincing a professor that he or she will earn an A on the next exam. Self-presentations are constrained by audience knowledge. The more the audience knows about a person, the less freedom the person has in claiming a particular identity. An audience that knows very little about a person will be more accepting of whatever identity the person conveys, whereas an audience that knows a great deal about a person will be less accepting.

People engaging in self-presentation sometimes encounter difficulties that undermine their ability to convey a desired image. First, people occasionally encounter the multiple audience problem, in which they must simultaneously present two conflicting images. For example, a student while walking with friends who know only her rebellious, impetuous side may run into her professor who knows only her serious, conscientious side. The student faces the dilemma of conveying the conflicting images of rebellious friend and serious student. When both audiences are present, the student must try to behave in a way that is consistent with how her friends view her, but also in a way that is consistent with how her professor views her. Second, people occasionally encounter challenges to their self-presentations. The audience may not believe the image the person presents. Challenges are most likely to arise when people are managing impressions through self-descriptions and the self-descriptions are inconsistent with other evidence. For example, a man who claims to be good driver faces a self-presentational dilemma if he is ticketed or gets in an automobile accident. Third, self-presentations can fail when people lack the cognitive resources to present effectively because, for example, they are tired, anxious, or distracted. For instance, a woman may yawn uncontrollably or reflexively check her watch while talking to a boring classmate, unintentionally conveying an image of disinterest.

Some of the most important images for people to convey are also the hardest. As noted earlier, among the most important images people want to communicate are likeability and competence. Perhaps because these images are so important and are often rewarded, audiences may be skeptical of accepting direct claims of likeability and competence from presenters, thinking that the person is seeking personal gain. Thus, people must resort to indirect routes to create these images, and the indirect routes can be misinterpreted. For example, the student who sits in the front row of the class and asks a lot of questions may be trying to project an image of being a competent student but may be perceived negatively as a teacher’s pet by fellow students.

Finally, there is a dark side to self-presentation. In some instances, the priority people place on their appearances or images can threaten their health. People who excessively tan are putting a higher priority on their appearance (e.g., being tan) than on their health (e.g., taking precautions to avoid skin cancer). Similarly, although condoms help protect against sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancy, self-presentational concerns may dissuade partners or potential partners from discussing, carrying, or using condoms. Women may fear that carrying condoms makes them seem promiscuous or easy, whereas men may fear that carrying condoms makes them seem presumptuous, as if they are expecting to have sex. Self-presentational concerns may also influence interactions with health care providers and may lead people to delay or avoid embarrassing medical tests and procedures or treatments for conditions that are embarrassing. For example, people may be reluctant to seek tests or treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, loss of bladder control, mental disorders, mental decline, or other conditions associated with weakness or incompetence. Finally, concerns with social acceptance may prompt young people to engage in risky behaviors such as excessive alcohol consumption, sexual promiscuity, or juvenile delinquency.

References:

• Jones, E. E., Pittman, T. S. (1982). Toward a general theory of strategic self-presentation. In J. Suls (Ed.), Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 1, pp. 231-260). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
• Leary, M. R. (1996). Self-presentation: Impression management and interpersonal behavior. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
• Leary, M. R., Tchividjian, L. R., & Kraxberger, B. E. (1994). Self-presentation can be hazardous to your health: Impression management and health risk. Health Psychology, 13, 461-470.
• Schlenker, B. R. (1980). Impression management: The self-concept, social identity, and interpersonal relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Self-Presentation

In subject area: Psychology

Self-presentation has been defined as regulating one's own behavior to create a particular impression on others (DePaulo, 1992; Goffman, 1959).

From: Detecting Concealed Information and Deception , 2018

Chapters and Articles

You might find these chapters and articles relevant to this topic.

The relationship between Instagram use and indicators of mental health: A systematic review

Lien Faelens , ... Ernst H.W. Koster , in Computers in Human Behavior Reports , 2021

3.3.4 Self-presentation

Self-presentation refers to the strategic presentation of components of your identity so that other people find you more attractive, likeable, or competent ( Kim & Dindia, 2016 , pp. 156–180). Through Instagram individuals gain much freedom to manipulate the impression that they create on others. As deceptive self-presentation is also linked to depressive symptomatology it is important to investigate self-presentation as mediator in the relationship between Instagram use and wellbeing ( Lamp et al., 2019 ). However, as to date only four cross-sectional studies have examined the association between self-presentation on Instagram and well-being (4% of all identified studies).

Intensity of Instagram Use . Two studies focused specifically on the relationship between intensity of Instagram use and (motivation for) self-presentation. For example, Lee & Borah (2020) found a small positive association between time spent on Instagram and frequency of Instagram use and self-presentation. In line with this, Al-Kandari et al. (2017) also reported a small positive association between frequency of Instagram use and Instagram use for self-presentation purposes.

3.3.4.1 Type of Use and Instagram Content

Self-presentation on Instagram has also been linked to certain well-being outcomes. An example of a link between Instagram and a positive outcome is the positive correlation between strategic self-presentation and Instagram friendship development ( Lee & Borah, 2020 ). However, people who use more deceptive strategies of self-presentation report more body surveillance and depressive symptomatology. In particular, Lamp et al. (2019) showed that deception on Instagram mediates the relationship between body surveillance and depressive symptomatology, with body surveillance being positively associated with deception on Instagram and deception on Instagram being positively associated with depressive symptomatology. Finally, whereas real self-presentation is linked to less self-criticism and less negative affect, deception on Instagram is linked with more self-criticism and negative affect. Moreover, deception on Instagram mediates the relationship between self-criticism and negative affective responses ( Jackson & Luchner, 2018 ).

Intermediate Conclusion. These cross-sectional studies suggest that individuals who have the tendency to strategically present themselves on Instagram, may use Instagram more intensively, like and comment more on pictures. The relationship between Instagram posting and self-presentation was less clear and therefore requires further investigation. Indeed, deceptive posting behavior seems to be linked to both positive (e.g., friendship development) and negative outcomes (e.g., psychopathology). Future cross-sectional, longitudinal, and experimental research will be needed to explore the (dis-)advantages linked to these self-enhancement strategies and the specific working mechanisms.

Sport psychology

Christopher Mesagno , Juergen Beckmann , in Current Opinion in Psychology , 2017

Self-presentation model

Fundamental to the self-presentation model is that certain personality factors predispose athletes to choking susceptibility (see Ref. [ 11 • ] for a review) and a greater propensity toward increased cognitive state anxiety. Mesagno [ 12,13 ] conducted research to indicate that self-presentation may be why anxiety intensifies under pressure, especially for athletes who possess choking-susceptible personality characteristics and are uncomfortable being in the elite sport ‘spotlight’. Self-presentation is the process by which people attempt to monitor and control how they are perceived and evaluated by others [ 14 ]. Leary and Kowalski [ 15 ] explained that people engage in self-presentation as a means of creating their identity. Mesagno [ 12,13 ] argued that athletic identity ( i.e. , the degree to which individuals identify with the role of an athlete [ 16 ]) is important in determining athletes’ self-presentation concerns because competitions create worries about making a good impression. Self-presentation likely plays a significant role in choking because individuals attempt to create a public image that will support their preferred beliefs about themselves [ 14,17,18 ]. If athletic identity is under threat ( e.g. , when performance is poor), then anxiety increases because of the possibility for sport-specific relational devaluation. Leary [ 18 ] explained that relational devaluation leads to increased social anxiety when impressions made will lead others to devalue or avoid relationships with them. If the athlete performs unsuccessfully they fear their public image as an athlete will be devalued. To minimize an anxiety increase, attentional shifts during high-pressure situations occur to possibly control for a devalued public image toward the goal of successful performance [ 12 ]. Empirically, Mesagno et al. [ 12 ] found that pressure situations that involve public evaluation increased athletes’ anxiety and decreased performance more than motivational pressure manipulations. In a follow-up study, Mesagno et al. [ 13 ] found that individuals high in fear of negative evaluation (a positive correlate of self-presentation), compared to those low in fear of negative evaluation, exhibited choking with cognitive anxiety partially mediating the fear-performance relationship. Thus, the researchers [ 12,13 ] argued (albeit indirectly) that self-presentation exacerbated the choking experience.

Scholarship on well-being and social media: A sociotechnical perspective

Nicole B. Ellison , ... Jessica Vitak , in Current Opinion in Psychology , 2022

Self-presentation on and across online platforms

Self-presentation speaks to how we “perform” differently to different audiences in order to manage others’ impressions [ 40 ]. While this core insight remains salient today, nuances of self-presentation require re-examination in the social media age. For instance, when Goffman developed the dramaturgical approach, audiences and “performers” were typically co-located in space and time, like the theatrical performances the perspective leverages as a key analytic construct. On social media platforms, however, users must contend with the challenges of crafting geographically and temporally distributed performances, impression formation practices that cannot be tailored on the fly to visible others, and potentially ego-threatening commentary from their network [ 41–45 ].

Social media platforms vary significantly in ways that have implications for self-presentation and, by extension, well-being. A prime example of this is content persistence, which varies across and within platforms. For instance, users' posts on Facebook likely differ from more ephemeral platforms like Snapchat, where content typically disappears after some time [ 46 , 47 ]. Platforms have experimented with different levels of ephemerality, ranging from Instagram's Stories, which allow users to share content for 24 hours [ 48 ], to WeChat's Time Limit setting, which makes content “private” after a specified period of time [ 49 ]. Research that treats technology use as either present or not, without distinguishing between specific user practices and platform affordances (e.g., privacy settings or the persistence of any shared content) or the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and societal-level factors motivating users to share, will be ill-equipped to interrogate important aspects of self-presentation and the decision to share—or not share—a particular piece of content with a particular audience.

Privacy and Disclosure, Online and in Social Interactions

Ann E Schlosser , in Current Opinion in Psychology , 2020

Do social media increase self-disclosure or self-presentation?

Self-disclosure is defined as “verbally communicating personal information about the self to another person” [ 12 ] (p. 449), and reflects communicating a factual representation of oneself, regardless of its effect on one’s public self-image [ 13 ]. In contrast, self-presentation is defined as “the goal-directed activity of controlling information to influence the impressions formed by an audience about the self” [ 14 ] (p. 871).

One way that researchers have examined whether people disclose an accurate version of the self or present an ideal self is to examine the effect of personal websites (such as Facebook profiles) on being able to predict the target person’s personality ratings and idealized self-ratings [ 7 •• , 15 • , 16 ]. Among the five factors of personality, observer accuracy was highest for openness to experience [ 7 •• , 16 ] and extraversion [ 15 • , 16 ]. Likewise, in a recent survey, over half of participants (59%) felt that the ad preferences identified for them by Facebook captured their real-life interests, whereas less than a third (27%) said it was inaccurate [ 17 ]. Yet, not all personality traits (e.g. neuroticism) were accurately predicted [ 15 • ]. It may be that observers are more accurate when more cues are present [ 7 •• ]. For example, people who are very open to experiences might post more pictures of themselves on adventures, while those who are very extraverted might post more events and pictures of themselves entertaining or hanging out with others. Still, ideal self-ratings did not predict observer ratings, thereby casting some doubt on whether people present their ideal selves on social media [ 15 • ].

Yet, self-disclosure and self-presentation are not mutually exclusive [ 13 ]. Whereas self-disclosure involves communicating facts about oneself regardless of the impression created, self-presentation involves communication designed to project a desirable public representation of the self, which may be true or false depending on whether the truth would convey a desired public self-image [ 13 ]. For example, telling others, “I go out with friends five times a week” could reflect self-disclosure by being a true statement about oneself that is expressed regardless of its effect on the audience’s perceptions of oneself. However, it could also be a true (or false) statement that is expressed to impress upon others that he/she is extraverted, social, and well-liked. Thus, expressing true information about the self is not necessarily evidence of self-disclosure; people may reveal true information about themselves because it promotes a desirable public self-image.

One way to disentangle self-disclosure from self-presentation is to compare the expressions of one’s actual self and true self. The actual self are true aspects of the self that are expressed in one’s social life, whereas one’s true self are true aspects of the self that are not expressed to others [ 18 •• , 19 ]. There is some evidence that the true self-concept is more accessible during online interactions, whereas the actual self-concept is more accessible during face-to-face interactions, and that people express their true self more online than face-to-face [ 18 •• ]. Another way of detecting whether people are telling the truth or not is to use reaction-time measures, which is based on the assumption that lying is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth [ 20 ]. Yet, because self-presentation can also occur automatically [ 14 ], a third way is to examine responses that convey that the person has generally favorable (versus unfavorable) characteristics, such as being socially intelligent [ 14 ], physically attractive [ 21 ], or unique [ 22 • ], or whether the person admits to engaging in social taboos (e.g. regularly watching porn, taking illegal drugs [ 23 ]). In the next section, I review the evidence of self-disclosure versus self-presentation across five characteristics that distinguish online communication from offline communication.

Moving from research on message framing to principles of message matching: The use of gain- and loss-framed messages to promote healthy behavior

Alexander J. Rothman , ... Richie L. Lenne , in Advances in Motivation Science , 2020

4.2 Self-presentation and impression management

People are often concerned with and attempt to manipulate the impression they make on others, particularly in interpersonal communication ( Jones & Pittman, 1982 ). Self-presentation can be used to achieve desired goals ( Leary & Allen, 2011 ), and it can also involve efforts to convey an “accurate portrait of oneself” ( Schlenker, 2012 ) or attempts to get along with others and respect their “face” needs ( Goffman, 1955 ). Motivations to appear warm and competent have emerged as two critical factors guiding self-presentation ( Nezlek, Schütz, & Sellin, 2007 ), perhaps because communicators are tacitly aware that people form impressions along these dimensions ( Abele & Wojciszke, 2007 ; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007 ). So too may warmth and competence guide how people frame behavioral advice to one another. In particular, a person's motivation to come off as warm may be especially relevant to the use of gain- and loss-framed language, because warmth is diagnostic of impression valence (i.e., whether the communicator is perceived positively or negatively; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008 ; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998 ; Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993 ). Because gain-framed language emphasizes the benefits of action, and loss-framed language emphasizes the costs of inaction, the greater use of a particular frame in one's communication may be a subtle means by which the valence of one's character (warm or cold, positive or negative) is conveyed. Furthermore, there is evidence that communicators recognize that perceivers tend to rate them higher in competence when they are being less warm, and thus communicators strategically temper presentations of warmth to increase perceptions of competence ( Holoien & Fiske, 2013 ; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005 ). Perhaps then, communicators who are motivated to appear competent strategically use framed language that reduces perceptions of warmth, and thus increase perceptions of competence. In an initial experimental test of this proposition, Lenne et al. (2019) found that communicators who were motivated to appear warm (as opposed to competent) used more gain-framed (relative to loss-framed) language in communicating about the environmental consequences of behavior. For example, communicators with warmth motives were more likely to suggest that “installing efficient windows helps the environment” (gain-framed), whereas those with competence motives were more likely to suggest that “failing to weatherproof your windows harms the environment” (loss-framed).

Social Anxiety as an Early Warning System

Mark R. Leary , in Social Anxiety (Second Edition) , 2010

The Link to Self-Presentation

Sociometer theory views social anxiety as the subjective output of a psychological system that helps people manage their interpersonal relationships. Although the role of self-presentational concerns is less obvious in this conceptualization than in the original self-presentation theory ( Schlenker & Leary, 1982 ), in fact, self-presentation is fundamentally involved.

People devalue and reject one another primarily on the basis of the impressions that they have formed ( Leary, 1995 ). Whether accurate or inaccurate, certain impressions lead us to like, value, and accept an individual, whereas other impressions lead to disliking, devaluation, and rejection. Thus, the proximal cause of low relational value is that one person holds an undesirable impression of another. People know this, of course, which is precisely why they are frequently concerned with the impressions that other people form of them and why they feel anxious when they do not believe they can make desired impressions.

Most instances in which people are ignored, shunned, excluded, or otherwise devalued center around four themes. Stated differently, people are most likely to devalue their relationships with those who make one of four general kinds of impressions on them. First, people are devalued when they appear to be inept, incompetent, or unskilled. Competence is particularly important when one's value to other people depends on being able to perform certain tasks. The primitive hunter who misses the kill, the athlete who misses the shot, and the stockbroker who misses the financial projection are less likely to be valued as members of their respective groups (as well as by the constituents of those groups) than a more highly skilled hunter, athlete, or financial analyst. Although we do not necessarily reject people who are incompetent, all other things being equal, people value their relationships with reasonably competent individuals more highly than their relationships with incompetent ones.

Second, relational value is often influenced by a person's physical appearance. Physically attractive people are liked better than unattractive ones, and people tend to devalue relationships with unattractive individuals ( Feingold, 1992 ). Knowing this, most people work to meet the minimum standards of attractiveness in their social groups (through grooming, keeping their weight within acceptable bounds, and so on), and, of course, many individuals strive to present a highly attractive image.

Third, people's acceptance may be jeopardized when they violate important group rules or standards. Minor violations of social norms lead people to be seen as inconsiderate or unsocialized; violations of important ethical guidelines result in being seen as immoral. In either case, people who deviate from group standards are typically devalued, and extreme deviants may even be ostracized ( Schachter, 1951 ).

Finally, people may be ignored, avoided, or rejected when they are simply unappealing as social interactants. We do not value our relationships with people whom we view as disagreeable, abrasive, boring, or otherwise unpleasant as much as our relationships with people with whom it is more pleasant to interact ( Jensen-Campbell et al., 2002 ).

Given the role that competence, attractiveness, adherence to group norms, and social desirability play in acceptance and rejection, people are understandably motivated to be perceived as competent, physically attractive, norm-abiding, and otherwise socially desirable. Most of the impressions that people try to convey of themselves can be subsumed within one of these four categories. Because these domains have the greatest implications for relational appreciation and devaluation, self-presentational doubts regarding whether one can successfully convey these kinds of images are most often associated with social anxiety. People appear to worry most about projecting images of being incompetent, unattractive, normatively deviant, and socially undesirable.

Although no research has examined the effects of people's self-presentational concerns across these different domains on social anxiety, we might expect that the kinds of impressions that people most want to convey and, thus, the specific self-presentational predicaments that are likely to arouse social anxiety, vary across contexts and individuals. For example, one person may be quite anxious when she thinks others see her as incompetent but relatively unfazed if others regard her as nonconforming or unattractive. Another person may become socially anxious when others regard him as physically unappealing but worry little about maintaining appearances of being particularly competent. Counselors and psychotherapists dealing with a socially anxious client may wish to consider whether the client's self-presentations involve his or her global image or only particular kinds of impressions.

Social Media Lies and Rumors

Pavica Sheldon , ... James M. Honeycutt , in The Dark Side of Social Media , 2019

Self-Presentation Lies

In his book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life , Goffman (1959) described social life by using theatrical metaphors. According to the metaphors, we are all performers who take on unique roles in different situations. He distinguished between the signals that we “give” intentionally and those we “give off” unintentionally. Intentional signals are used to convey a particular impression to others. Computer-mediated communication allows us to present ourselves more selectively than is possible face-to-face. Internet has been described as a playground where people can try on different personalities ( Rheingold, 1993 ).

In an online dating context, for example, users try to present themselves as attractive as possible. In a Hancock, Toma, and Ellison’s (2007) study, 81% of online dating users lied about their age, weight, or height. Ellison, Heino, and Gibbs (2006) argued that such deceptions are not always intentional, as users might subconsciously describe their “ideal self.” According to Walther’s theory of hyperpersonal interaction, asynchronous messages and reduced communication cues contribute to selective self-presentation in computer-mediated settings. Not only do users have more time for message construction, but they also have more control over what cues are sent ( Walther, 2007 ).

Vishwanath (2014) conducted an experiment to discover if the factor of habitual Facebook uses impacted an individual’s likelihood to be deceived on social media. To test this, 150 senior undergraduate students from the University of Buffalo were studied. At the beginning of the semester, the students were given a survey that asked the students about their technology use. The survey included questions about their Facebook use: how often or habitually had they used it, the size of their social network on Facebook, if they had any concerns about privacy, their attitudinal commitment, and if they were able to self-regulate time spent on Facebook. Six weeks after the pertinent background survey was completed, a fake Facebook account for a fictitious person was created and friend requests from this fake account were sent to each of the student participants. The experimenters wanted to see which of the students fell for the deceit and accepted the false friend request ( Vishwanath, 2014 ). Though in this case the fake account was controlled by the experimenters who had no malicious intent, other fake Facebook accounts exist and are used by Phishers, catfishers, and scammers, and can be dangerous when people allow fake account holders to follow their social media accounts. In this study the student participants were unaware that the fake account had been created merely to complete the study and that there would be no consequences to accepting the request. This is why the act of sending friend requests from this fake profile is perceived as deceptive, and, if the sender intended ill will, could be seen as a social media attack.

The experiment continued with yet another phase. An e-mail designed to look like a Phishing attempt was sent to the participants. The e-mail claimed that the students were eligible for an internship opportunity, and all the students had to do was respond with their full name, student identification number, and full birthdate. The e-mail included purposeful grammatical errors and a time limit which the e-mail recipient had to respond, by to make it look like common Phishing attempts. The purpose was to see which of the students would respond to the e-mail and divulge the personal information that was requested of them. The experimenters concluded from their study that those who fell for the deception and were more often victims of social media attacks were habitual Facebook users. Vishwanath (2014) defined being a habitual Facebook user as someone who uses Facebook frequently, has a large social network of people on Facebook, and is not good at or is unable to regulate their social media behaviors. He explains why these young, highly educated students fell for the social media attacks. “…Once a media behavior becomes habitual, it usually leads to patterned actions that are enacted whenever the situation or urge presents itself, without further reflection on the merits of the behavior” ( Vishwanath, 2014 , p. 87). It appears that the more one uses social media, the more of a habit it becomes, and the less one thinks about the decisions that come with participating actively on social media. If a fake friend request is sent to a user’s account, a habitual Facebook user may accept their request without a second thought. With one click, he can grant a stranger total access to his Facebook page and all his and his friends’ information, with no regard for the requestors intent on how they will use this information.

Literature review on self-disclosure and self-presentation across five unique characteristics of online communication.

Compares empirical evidence of whether people present their true selves or manage impressions on social media.

Self-disclosure and self-presentation are not mutually exclusive.

Results are mixed regarding the effect of anonymity and reduced information richness on self-disclosure.

Asynchronicity, multiple audiences, and audience feedback appears to favor self-presentation.

Measures of Concerns with Public Image and Social Evaluation

Mark R. Leary , ... Kate J. Diebels , in Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Constructs , 2015

Self-Presentation Tactics Scale (SPTS)

( Lee et al., 1999 ).

Self-presentation tactics are the specific behaviors in which people engage to make particular impressions of themselves on other people.

Initial item selection was based on responses of 206 college students (96 men, 107 women, 3 unknown) and then validated on a sample of 395 students (179 men, 212 women, 4 unknown) ( Lee et al., 1999 ).

Description

The SPTS contains 63 items that were developed to assess the use of 12 self-presentation tactics that have been identified in previous theory and research: excuses (verbal statements that deny responsibility for negative events), justifications (statements that offer reasons that an undesirable behavior was justified), disclaimers (preemptive explanations that are offered before image-damaging events occur), self-handicapping (creating obstacles to one’s success to obfuscate attributions for possible failure), apologies (expressions of remorse and guilt for harmful behaviors), ingratiation (actions that promote others’ liking of the individual), intimidation (actions that convey an impression of being powerful and dangerous), supplication (actions that convey an impression of being weak and in need of others’ support), entitlement (actions that claim responsibility for positive outcomes), enhancement (actions that foster the perceived positivity of the outcomes of one’s behavior), blasting (actions that derogate people or groups with which one is associated), and exemplification (actions that convey an impression of being moral and having integrity). All subscales contain five items except ingratiation, which contains eight. Respondents rate how frequently they engage in each behavior on a scale ranging from 1 ( very infrequently ) to 9 ( very frequently ).

In addition to providing scores for 12 self-presentation tactics, the subscale scores may be combined to provide global measures of defensive and assertive self-presentation tactics. Defensive self-presentation tactics are used to defend or restore public images that have been damaged, and include excuses, justification, disclaimers, self-handicapping, and apologies. Assertive self-presentation tactics are used to foster public images proactively and include ingratiation, intimidation, supplication, entitlement, enhancement, blasting, and exemplification.

An initial set of 90 items was administered to 206 respondents. After refining the item set on the basis of item-total correlations and inter-item reliability, 73 items were administered to a second sample of 395 individuals.

Reliability

Internal consistency.

Lee et al. (1999) reported that Cronbach’s alpha coefficient exceeded 0.70 for all tactics subscales except self-handicapping (α=0.58), supplication (α=0.60), and blasting (α=0.68). Even so, these alpha coefficients are probably adequate for 5-item scales.

Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was 0.86 for the defensive self-presentation tactic subscale and 0.91 for the assertive self-presentation tactic subscale. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the whole Self-presentation Tactics Scale was found to be 0.93.

Test–Retest

The 3-week test-retest correlations ( n= 77 college students) for the total scale, defensive tactic subscale, and assertive tactic subscale were 0.89, 0.88, and 0.89, respectively. The test-retest correlations for all 12 subscales were also acceptable (0.70< r <0.85) ( Lee et al., 1999 ).

Convergent/Concurrent

All subscales except apology correlated significantly with self-monitoring (0.14< r <0.35). The defensive tactics subscale ( r =0.29), the assertive tactics subscale ( r =0.35), and the total scale score ( r =0.35) also correlated significantly with self-monitoring. The Self-handicapping Scale correlated significantly more highly with the defensive tactics subscale ( r =0.44) than with the assertive tactics subscale ( r =0.19).

Given that social anxiety arises from people’s concerns with how they are perceived and evaluated by others, Lee et al. (1999) examined correlations between social anxiety and the self-presentational tactics. Social anxiety correlated weakly with the subscales that assess the use of excuses ( r =0.22), justifications ( r =0.14), disclaimers ( r =0.26), self-handicapping ( r =0.31), and supplication ( r =0.31), as well as with the defensive tactics subscale ( r= 0.26) and the total scale score ( r =0.19), but not the assertive tactics subscale ( r =0.08).

Divergent/Discriminant

Two questions arise regarding the divergent validity of the SPTS. The first is whether the various subscales tap into distinct self-presentational tactics. The answer appears to be no; although Lee et al. (1999) did not present correlations between each pair of subscales, factor analyses suggest that the structure is two-dimensional, with the various subscales falling on two factors that reflect assertive versus defensive tactics. The second question is whether the overall scale, and the individual subscales, assess something distinct from measures of related constructs. Evidence regarding divergent validity is scarce, although data show that, with one exception, the subscales do not generally correlate with locus of control ( Lee et al., 1999 ). With the exception of the apology subscale (which correlated positively with social desirability, r =0.24), scores on the 12 tactics subscales correlated negatively with scores on the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale (−0.21< r <−0.38). Negative correlations were also obtained between social desirability scores and the defensive tactics subscale ( r =−0.27), the assertive tactics subscale ( r =−0.30), and the total scale score ( r =−0.31).

Construct/Factor Analytic

Lee et al. (1999) conducted confirmatory factor analyses showing that a two-factor model that distinguished between the defensive and assertive factors was superior to a one-factor model. This finding suggests that the total scale score should rarely, if ever, be used. However, the fit for the two factor solution was still not high (CFI=0.88), and Lee et al. did not test alternative models.

Criterion/Predictive

No evidence on criterion or predictive validity is currently available.

Lee, S., Quigley, B.M., Nesler, M.S., Corbett, A.B., & Tedeschi, J.T. (1999). Development of a self-presentation tactics scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 26 , 701–722.

Results and Comments

The Self-Presentation Tactics Scale shows promise as a measure of impression-management tactics, but it has not yet been widely used. Inspection of item content suggests that some subscales may assess self-presentational tactics whereas other subscales assess general approaches to influencing other people. For example, some items explicitly reference self-presentational or social-evaluative goals (e.g., to avoid being blamed, I let others know that I did not intend any harm; I lead others to believe that I cannot do something in order to get help), whereas others refer to interpersonal behaviors that might or might not bear any relationships to people’s self-presentational goals or tactics (e.g., I threaten others when I think it will help me get what I want from them; I act in ways I think others should act). Of course, people’s general approach to influencing others is probably related to the ways in which they tend to manage their impressions, but work is needed to show that all of the subscales assess self-presentational tactics as opposed to general social influence strategies.

Self-Presentation Tactics Scale

39. When I am blamed for something, I make excuses.

48. I make up excuses for poor performance.

36. When things go wrong, I explain why I am not responsible.

62. To avoid being blamed, I let others know that I did not intend any harm.

35. I try to convince others that I am not responsible for negative events.

Justification

44. I offer socially acceptable reasons to justify behavior that others might not like.

64. After a negative action, I try to make others understand that if they had been in my position they would have done the same thing.

61. I offer good reasons for my behavior no matter how bad it may seem to others.

45. When others view my behavior as negative, I offer explanations so that they will understand that my behavior was justified.

05. I justify my behavior to reduce negative reactions from others.

04. I offer explanations before doing something that others might think is wrong

17. I try to get the approval of others before doing something they might perceive negatively.

10. When I believe I will not perform well, I offer excuses beforehand.

25. I justify beforehand actions others may not like.

49. I offer an excuse for possibly not performing well before taking a very difficult test.

Self-handicapping

58. Anxiety interferes with my performances.

53. I do not prepare well enough for exams because I get too involved in social activities.

57. I put obstacles in the way of my own success.

12. I get sick when under a lot of pressure to do well.

42. Poor health has been responsible for my getting mediocre grades in school.

13. I apologise when I have done something wrong.

29. I accept blame for bad behavior when it is clearly my fault.

50. I express remorse and guilt when I do something wrong.

18. I try to make up for any harm I have done to others.

03. If I harm someone, I apologise and promise not to do it again.

Ingratiation

52. When I want something, I try to look good.

38. I tell others about my positive qualities.

11. I use flattery to win the favor of others.

63. I compliment people to get them on my side.

09. I express the same attitudes as others so they will accept me.

33. I express opinions that other people will like.

28. I do favors for people in order to get them to like me.

43. I help others so they will help me.

Intimidation

51. I intimidate others.

01. I behave in ways that make other people afraid of me.

59. I do things to make people afraid of me so that they will do what I want.

02. I use my size and strength to influence people when I need to.

32. I threaten others when I think it will help me get what I want from them.

Supplication

08. I ask others to help me.

54. I tell others they are stronger or more competent than me in order to get others to do things for me.

14. I lead others to believe that I cannot do something in order to get help.

31. I hesitate and hope others will take responsibility for group tasks.

07. I use my weaknesses to get sympathy from others.

Entitlement

55. I claim credit for doing things I did not do.

40. I point out the positive things I do which other people fail to notice.

23. I tell people about my positive accomplishments.

46. When working on a project with a group I make my contribution seem greater than it is.

22. When telling someone about past events, I claim more credit for doing positive things than was warranted by the actual events.

Enhancement

60. When I succeed at a task, I emphasize to others how important the task was.

30. I exaggerate the value of my accomplishments.

06. I tell people when I do well at tasks others find difficult.

19. In telling others about things that I own, I also tell them of their value.

41. I do correct people who underestimate the value of gifts that I give to them.

56. I make negative statements about people belonging to rival groups.

27. I have put others down in order to make myself look better.

34. I say negative things about unpopular groups.

20. I point out the incorrect positions of the opposing political party.

47. I exaggerate the negative qualities of people who compete with me.

Exemplification

24. I try to set an example for others to follow.

15. I try to serve as a model for how a person should behave.

26. I try to get others to act in the same positive way I do.

37. I act in ways I think others should act.

21. I try to induce imitation by others by serving as a positive example.

Item numbers refer to the order in which items are listed when the full SPT Scale is used.

Reproduced with permission.

Impression (mis)management: When what you say is not what they hear

Ovul Sezer , in Current Opinion in Psychology , 2022

Self-presentation research has shown just how difficult it is to solve self-presentation paradox [ 9 , 20 , 45 ]. People often try to take ‘short-cuts’ to form a favorable impression of what they say or choose not to say. Two distinct processes, interpersonal and intrapsychic motives, can lead individuals to engage in impression (mis)management behaviors. One way to avoid these mistakes would be to pay attention to perceived sincerity, because the success of any impression management strategy depends critically on target's perceptions of sincerity and lack of ulterior motive from the actor. Perceived sincerity and perceived intent are fundamentally important in social judgments, and strategies that signal insincerity, lack of emotional care, or paternalism have increased risk of impression (mis)management.

Related terms:

• Self-Report
• Social Anxiety
• Perfectionism
• Social Interaction
• Self-Esteem
• Adolescents
• Impression Management
• Self-Disclosure

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Self-Presentation: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by the Audiences We Have

It is interesting to note that each of the social influences on our sense of self that we have discussed can be harnessed as a way of protecting our self-esteem. The final influence we will explore can also be used strategically to elevate not only our own esteem, but the esteem we have in the eyes of others. Positive self-esteem occurs not only when we do well in our own eyes but also when we feel that we are positively perceived by the other people we care about.

Because it is so important to be seen as competent and productive members of society, people naturally attempt to present themselves to others in a positive light. We attempt to convince others that we are good and worthy people by appearing attractive, strong, intelligent, and likable and by saying positive things to others (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Schlenker, 2003). The tendency to present a positive self-image to others, with the goal of increasing our social status , is known as self-presentation , and it is a basic and natural part of everyday life.

A big question in relation to self-presentation is the extent to which it is an honest versus more strategic, potentially dishonest enterprise. The sociologist Erving Goffman (1959) developed an influential theory of self-presentation and described it as a mainly honest process, where people need to present the parts of themselves required by the social role that they are playing in a given situation. If everyone plays their part according to accepted social scripts and conventions, then the social situation will run smoothly and the participants will avoid embarrassment. Seen in this way, self-presentation is a transparent process, where we are trying to play the part required of us, and we trust that others are doing the same. Other theorists, though, have viewed self-presentation as a more strategic endeavor, which may involve not always portraying ourselves in genuine ways (e.g., Jones & Pittman, 1982). As is often the case with two seemingly opposing perspectives, it is quite likely that both are true in certain situations, depending on the social goals of the actors.

Different self-presentation strategies may be used to create different emotions in other people, and the use of these strategies may be evolutionarily selected because they are successful (Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 2008). Edward Jones and Thane Pittman (1982) described five self-presentation strategies, each of which is expected to create a resulting emotion in the other person:

• The goal of ingratiation is to create liking by using flattery or charm.
• The goal of intimidation is to create fear by showing that you can be aggressive.
• The goal of exemplification is to create guilt by showing that you are a better person than the other.
• The goal of supplication is to create pity by indicating to others that you are helpless and needy.
• The goal of self-promotion is to create respect by persuading others that you are competent.

No matter who is using it, self-presentation can easily be overdone, and when it is, it backfires. People who overuse the ingratiation technique and who are seen as obviously and strategically trying to get others to like them are often disliked because of this. Have you ever had a slick salesperson obviously try to ingratiate him- or herself with you just so you will buy a particular product, and you end up not liking the person and making a hasty retreat from the premises? People who overuse the exemplification or self-promotion strategies by boasting or bragging, particularly if that boasting does not appear to reflect their true characteristics, may end up being perceived as arrogant and even self-deluded (Wosinska, Dabul, Whetstone-Dion, & Cialdini, 1996). Using intimidation can also often backfire; acting more modestly may be more effective. Again, the point is clear: we may want to self-promote with the goal of getting others to like us, but we must also be careful to consider the point of view of the other person. Being aware of these strategies is not only useful for better understanding how to use them responsibly ourselves, it can also help us to understand that other people’s behaviors may often reflect their self-presentational concerns. This can, in turn, facilitate better empathy for others, particularly when they are exhibiting challenging behaviors (Friedlander & Schwartz, 1985). For instance, perhaps someone’s verbally aggressive behavior toward you is more about that person being afraid rather than about his or her desire to do you harm.

Now that we have explored some of the commonly used self-presentation tactics, let’s look at how they manifest in specific social behaviors. One concrete way to self-promote is to display our positive physical characteristics. A reason that many of us spend money on improving our physical appearance is the desire to look good to others so that they will like us. We can also earn status by collecting expensive possessions such as fancy cars and big houses and by trying to associate with high-status others. Additionally, we may attempt to dominate or intimidate others in social interactions. People who talk more and louder and those who initiate more social interactions are afforded higher status. A businessman who greets others with a strong handshake and a smile, and people who speak out strongly for their opinions in group discussions may be attempting to do so as well. In some cases, people may even resort to aggressive behavior, such as bullying, in attempts to improve their status (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996).

Self-promotion can also be pursued in our online social behaviors. For example, a study in Taiwan conducted by Wang and Stefanone (2013) used survey methodology to investigate the relationship between personality traits, self-presentation and the use of check-ins on Facebook. Interestingly, narcissism was found to predict scores on a measure of exhibitionistic, self-promoting use of Facebook check-ins, which included items like “I check in so people know that I am with friends,” and “I expect friends to like or leave comments on my check-in status on Facebook.”

Other studies have also found associations between narcissistic traits and self-promotional activity on Facebook. Mehdizadeh (2010), for example, found that narcissistic personality scores were positively correlated with the amount of daily logins on Facebook and the duration of each login. Furthermore, narcissistic traits were related to increased use of self-promotional material in the main photo, view photos, status updates, and notes sections of people’s Facebook pages.

Analysis of the content and language used in Facebook postings has also revealed that they are sometimes used by individuals to self-promote. Bazarova, Taft, Choi, and Cosley (2013) explored self-presentation through language styles used in status updates, wall posts, and private messages from 79 participants. The use of positive emotion words was correlated with self-reported self-presentation concern in status updates. This is consistent with the idea that people share positive experiences with Facebook friends partly as a self-enhancement strategy.

Online self-presentation doesn’t seem to be limited to Facebook usage. There is also evidence that self-promotional concerns are often a part of blogging behaviors, too. Mazur and Kozarian (2010), for example, analyzed the content of adolescents’ blog entries and concluded that a careful concern for self-presentation was more central to their blogging behavior than direct interaction with others. This often seems to apply to micro-blogging sites like Twitter. Marwick and Boyd (2011) found that self-presentational strategies were a consistent part of celebrity tweeting, often deployed by celebrities to maintain their popularity and image.

You might not be surprised to hear that men and women use different approaches to self-presentation. Men are more likely to present themselves in an assertive way, by speaking and interrupting others, by visually focusing on the other person when they are speaking, and by leaning their bodies into the conversation. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to be modest; they tend to create status by laughing and smiling, and by reacting more positively to the statements of others (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keation, 1988).

These gender differences are probably in large part socially determined as a result of the different reinforcements that men and women receive for using particular self-presentational strategies. For example, self-promoting by speaking out and acting assertively can be more effective for men than it is for women, in part because cross-culturally consistent stereotypes tend to depict assertiveness as more desirable in men than in women. These stereotypes can have very important consequences in the real world. For instance, one of the reasons for the “glass ceiling” existing in some occupations (where women experience discrimination in reaching top positions in organizations) may be attributable to the more negative reactions that their assertive behaviors, necessary for career advancement, receive than those of their male colleagues (Eagly & Carli, 2007).

There are also some cultural differences in the extent to which people use self-presentation strategies in social contexts. For instance, when considering job interviews, Konig, Haftseinsson, Jansen, & Stadelmann (2011) found that individuals from Iceland and Switzerland used less self-presentational behavior than people from the United States. Differences in self-presentation have also been found in job interviews involving individuals from Ghana, Turkey, Norway, and Germany, with the former two groups showing higher impression management scores than the latter two (Bye et al., 2011).

So far we have been talking about self-presentation as it operates in particular situations in the short-term. However, we also engage in longer-term self-presentational projects, where we seek to build particular reputations with particular audiences. Emler & Reicher (1995) describe the unique capacity humans have to know one another by repute and argue that, accordingly, we are often engaged in a process of reputation management , which is a form of long-term self-presentation, where individuals seek to build and sustain specific reputations with important audiences . According to this perspective, our behaviors in current social situations may not only be to serve our self-presentational goals in that moment, but also be based on a consideration of their longer-term repercussions for our reputations. As many politicians, for example, know only too well, a poor decision from their past can come back to haunt them when their reputation is being assessed during a campaign.

The concept of reputation management can be used to help explain a wide variety of social and antisocial behaviors, including corporate branding (Smith, Smith, & Wang, 2010), sociomoral debate (Emler, Tarry, & St. James, 2007), and teenage criminal activity (Lopez-Romero & Romero, 2011). In the last example, it is argued that a lot of teenage antisocial behavior results from a desire to build a reputation for toughness and rebelliousness with like-minded peer audiences (Emler & Reicher, 1995). Similarly, antisocial and self-destructive online actions, like people posting to Facebook their involvement in illegal acts during riots, or individuals engaging in life-threatening activities in Internet crazes like Neknominate, may make more sense if they are considered partly as stemming from a desire to project a particular reputation to specific audiences. Perhaps the perceived social kudos from doing these things outweighs the obvious personal risks in the individuals’ minds at the time.

People often project distinct reputations to different social audiences. For example, adolescents who engage in antisocial activity to build reputations for rebelliousness among their peers will often seek to construct very different reputations when their parents are the audience (Emler & Reicher, 1995). The desire to compartmentalize our reputations and audiences can even spill over into our online behaviors. Wiederhold (2012) found that, with some adolescents’ Facebook friends numbering in the hundreds or thousands, increasing numbers are moving to Twitter in order to reach a more selective audience. One critical trigger for this has been that their parents are now often friends with them on Facebook, creating a need for young people to find a new space where they can build reputations that may not always be parent-friendly (Wiederhold, 2012).

Although the desire to present the self favorably is a natural part of everyday life, both person and situation factors influence the extent to which we do it. For one, we are more likely to self-present in some situations than in others. When we are applying for a job or meeting with others whom we need to impress, we naturally become more attuned to the social aspects of the self, and our self-presentation increases.

There are also individual differences. Some people are naturally better at self-presentation—they enjoy doing it and are good at it—whereas others find self-presentation less desirable or more difficult. An important individual-difference variable known as self-monitoring has been shown in many studies to have a major impact on self-presentation. Self-monitoring refers to the tendency to be both motivated and capable of regulating our behavior to meet the demands of social situations (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). High self-monitors are particularly good at reading the emotions of others and therefore are better at fitting into social situations—they agree with statements such as “In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons,” and “I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.” Low self-monitors, on the other hand, generally act on their own attitudes, even when the social situation suggests that they should behave otherwise. Low self-monitors are more likely to agree with statements such as “At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like,” and “I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.” In short, high self-monitors use self-presentation to try to get other people to like them by behaving in ways that the others find desirable, whereas low self-monitors tend to follow their internal convictions more than the demands of the social situation.

In one experiment that showed the importance of self-monitoring, Cheng and Chartrand (2003) had college students interact individually with another student (actually an experimental confederate) whom they thought they would be working with on an upcoming task. While they were interacting, the confederate subtly touched her own face several times, and the researchers recorded the extent to which the student participant mimicked the confederate by also touching his or her own face.

The situational variable was the status of the confederate. Before the meeting began, and according to random assignment to conditions, the students were told either that they would be the leader and that the other person would be the worker on the upcoming task, or vice versa. The person variable was self-monitoring, and each participant was classified as either high or low on self-monitoring on the basis of his or her responses to the self-monitoring scale.

As you can see in Figure 3.12 , Cheng and Chartrand found an interaction effect: the students who had been classified as high self-monitors were more likely to mimic the behavior of the confederate when she was described as being the leader than when she was described as being the worker, indicating that they were “tuned in” to the social situation and modified their behavior to appear more positively. Although the low self-monitors did mimic the other person, they did not mimic her more when the other was high, versus low, status. This finding is consistent with the idea that the high self-monitors were particularly aware of the other person’s status and attempted to self-present more positively to the high-status leader. The low self-monitors, on the other hand—because they feel less need to impress overall—did not pay much attention to the other person’s status.

High self-monitors imitated more when the person they were interacting with was of higher (versus lower) status. Low self-monitors were not sensitive to the status of the other. Data are from Cheng and Chartrand (2003).

This differential sensitivity to social dynamics between high and low self-monitors suggests that their self-esteem will be affected by different factors. For people who are high in self-monitoring, their self-esteem may be positively impacted when they perceive that their behavior matches the social demands of the situation, and negatively affected when they feel that it does not. In contrast, low self-monitors may experience self-esteem boosts when they see themselves behaving consistently with their internal standards, and feel less self-worth when they feel they are not living up to them (Ickes, Holloway, Stinson, & Hoodenpyle, 2006).

Key Takeaways

• Our self-concepts are affected by others’ appraisals, as demonstrated by concepts including the looking-glass self and self-labeling.
• The self-concept and self-esteem are also often strongly influenced by social comparison. For example, we use social comparison to determine the accuracy and appropriateness of our thoughts, feelings, and behavior.
• When we are able to compare ourselves favorably with others through downward social comparison, we feel good about ourselves. Upward social comparison with others who are better off than we are leads to negative emotions.
• Social identity refers to the positive emotions that we experience as a member of an important social group.
• Normally, our group memberships result in positive feelings, which occur because we perceive our own groups, and thus ourselves, in a positive light.
• Which of our many category identities is most accessible for us will vary from day to day as a function of the particular situation we are in.
• In the face of others’ behaviors, we may enhance our self-esteem by “basking in the reflected glory” of our ingroups or of other people we know.
• If other people’s actions threaten our sense of self according to self-evaluation maintenance theory, we may engage in a variety of strategies aimed at redefining our self-concept and rebuilding our self-esteem.
• The tendency to present a positive self-image to others, with the goal of increasing our social status, is known as self-presentation, and it is a basic and natural part of everyday life. Different self-presentation strategies may be used to create different emotions in other people.
• We often use self-presentation in the longer term, seeking to build and sustain particular reputations with specific social audiences.
• The individual-difference variable of self-monitoring relates to the ability and desire to self-present.

Exercises and Critical Thinking

• Describe some aspects of your self-concept that have been created through social comparison.
• Describe times when you have engaged in downward and upward social comparison and the effects these comparisons have had on your self-esteem. To what extent do your experiences fit with the research evidence here?
• What are your most salient social identities? How do they create positive feelings for you?
• Outline a situation where someone else’s behavior has threatened your self-concept. Which of the strategies outlined in relation to self-evaluation maintenance theory did you engage in to rebuild your self-concept?
• Identify a situation where you basked in the reflected glory of your ingroup’s behavior or peformance. What effect did this have on your self-esteem and why?
• Describe some situations where people you know have used each of the self-presentation strategies that were listed in this section. Which strategies seem to be more and less effective in helping them to achieve their social goals, and why?
• Consider your own level of self-monitoring. Do you think that you are more of a high or a low self-monitor, and why? What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages for you of the level of self-monitoring that you have?

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• 26059 reads
• Authors & Informations
• About the Book
• The History of Social Psychology
• The Person and the Social Situation
• Evolutionary Adaptation and Human Characteristics
• Self-Concern
• Other-Concern
• Social Psychology in the Public Interest
• Social Influence Creates Social Norms
• Different Cultures Have Different Norms Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Social Cognition: Thinking and Learning about Others
• Social Affect: Feelings about Ourselves and Others
• Social Behavior: Interacting with Others Key Takeaways Exercise and Critical Thinking
• The Importance of Scientific Research
• Measuring Affect, Behavior, and Cognition
• Social Neuroscience: Measuring Social Responses in the Brain
• Observational Research
• The Research Hypothesis
• Correlational Research
• Experimental Research
• Factorial Research Designs
• Deception in Social Psychology Experiments
• Interpreting Research Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Chapter Summary
• Our Knowledge Accumulates as a Result of Learning
• Operant Learning
• Associational Learning Video
• Observational Learning Video
• Schemas as Social Knowledge
• How Schemas Develop: Accommodation and Assimilation
• How Schemas Maintain Themselves: The Power of Assimilation Research Focus: The Confirmation Bias Research Focus: Schemas as Energy Savers Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Automatic versus Controlled Cognition Research Focus: Behavioral Effects of Priming
• Salience and Accessibility Determine Which Expectations We Use
• Cognitive Accessibility
• The False Consensus Bias Makes Us Think That Others Are More Like Us Than They Really Are
• Perceptions of What “Might Have Been” Lead to Counterfactual Thinking
• Anchoring and Adjustment Lead Us to Accept Ideas That We Should Revise
• Overconfidence
• The Importance of Cognitive Biases in Everyday Life
• Social Psychology in the Public Interest Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Affect Influences Cognition
• The Power of Positive Cognition
• Cognition About Affect: The Case of Affective Forecasting Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about Social Cognition
• Development and Characteristics of the Self-Concept
• Self-Complexity and Self-Concept Clarity
• Overestimating How Closely and Accurately Others View Us Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Self-Esteem The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
• Maintaining and Enhancing Self-Esteem Research Focus: Processing Information to Enhance the Self
• The Looking-Glass Self: Our Sense of Self is Influenced by Others’ Views of Us
• Social Comparison Theory: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by Comparisons with Others Research Focus: Affiliation and Social Comparison
• Upward and Downward Comparisons Influence Our Self-Esteem
• Social Identity Theory: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by the Groups We Belong To A Measure of Social Identity
• Self-Presentation: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by the Audiences We Have Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about the Self
• Attitudes Are Evaluations
• Some Attitudes Are Stronger Than Others
• When Do Our Attitudes Guide Our Behavior? Research Focus: Attitude-Behavior Consistency Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Choosing Effective Communicators
• Creating Effective Communications
• Spontaneous Message Processing
• Thoughtful Message Processing
• Which Route Do We Take: Thoughtful or Spontaneous?
• Self-Perception Involves Inferring Our Beliefs from Our Behaviors Research Focus: Looking at Our Own Behavior to Determine Our Attitudes
• Creating Insufficient Justification and Overjustification
• The Experience of Cognitive Dissonance Can Create Attitude Change
• We Reduce Dissonance by Decreasing Dissonant or by Increasing Consonant Cognitions
• Cognitive Dissonance in Everyday Life
• Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about Attitudes, Behavior, and Persuasion
• Nonverbal Behavior
• Detecting Danger by Focusing on Negative Information Social Psychology in the Public Interest: Detecting Deception
• Judging People by Their Traits
• Combining Traits: Information Integration
• The Importance of the Central Traits Warm and Cold
• First Impressions Matter: The Primacy Effect Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Making Inferences about Personality
• Detecting the Covariation between Personality and Behavior
• Attributions for Success and Failure Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Are Our Attributions Accurate?
• The Fundamental Attribution Error
• The Actor-Observer Bias
• Self-Serving Biases
• Group-Serving Biases
• Victim-Blaming Biases Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Perceiver Characteristics Research Focus: How Our Attributions Can Influence Our School Performance
• Attributional Styles and Mental Health Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about Person Perception
• Informational Social Influence: Conforming to Be Accurate
• Normative Social Influence: Conforming to Be Liked and to Avoid Rejection
• Majority Influence: Conforming to the Group
• Minority Influence: Resisting Group Pressure
• The Size of the Majority
• The Unanimity of the Majority
• The Importance of the Task Research Focus: How Task Importance and Confidence Influence Conformity Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Reward Power
• Coercive Power
• Legitimate Power
• Referent Power
• Expert Power Research Focus: Does Power Corrupt?
• Personality and Leadership
• Leadership as an Interaction between the Person and the Situation Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Person Differences
• Gender Differences
• Cultural Differences
• Psychological Reactance Key Takeaways Exercise and Critical Thinking
• Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about Social Influence
• Physical Attractiveness
• Why Is Physical Attractiveness So Important?
• Why Does Similarity Matter?
• Status Similarity
• Affect and Attraction Research Focus: Arousal and Attraction Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Closeness and Intimacy
• Communal and Exchange Relationships
• Interdependence and Commitment
• What Is Love? Research Focus: Romantic Love Reduces Our Attention to Attractive Others
• Making Relationships Last
• When Relationships End Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about Liking and Loving
• Reciprocity and Social Exchange
• Social Reinforcement and Altruism: The Role of Rewards and Costs
• Social Norms for Helping Research Focus: Moral Hypocrisy Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Positive Moods Increase Helping
• Relieving Negative Emotions: Guilt Increases Helping
• Personal Distress and Empathy as Determinants of Helping Research Focus: Personal Distress versus Empathy as Determinants of Helping Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Latané and Darley’s Model of Helping
• Interpreting
• Taking Responsibility
• Implementing Action Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Some People Are More Helpful Than Others: The Altruistic Personality
• Who Do We Help? Attributions and Helping
• Reactions to Receiving Help
• Cultural Issues in Helping
• Increasing Helping Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about Altruism
• Is Aggression Evolutionarily Adaptive?
• The Role of Biology in Aggression
• Hormones Influence Aggression: Testosterone and Serotonin
• Drinking Alcohol Increases Aggression
• Negative Emotions Cause Aggression Research Focus: The Effects of Provocation and Fear of Death on Aggression
• Can We Reduce Negative Emotions by Engaging in Aggressive Behavior? Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Social Learning and Modeling: Is Aggression Learned?
• Violence Creates More Violence: Television, Video Games, and Handguns Research Focus: The Effects of Violent Video Games on Aggression
• Why Does Viewing Violence Lead to Aggression? Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Individual Differences in Aggression
• Gender Differences in Aggression
• Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about Aggression
• Communication, Interdependence, and Group Structure
• Social Identity
• The Stages of Group Development Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Social Facilitation and Social Inhibition
• Person Variables: Group Member Characteristics
• The Importance of the Social Situation: Task Characteristics
• Social Loafing Research Focus: Differentiating Coordination Losses from Social Loafing Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Process Gains in Group versus Individual Decision Making
• Process Losses Due to Group Conformity Pressures: Groupthink
• Cognitive Process Losses: Lack of Information Sharing Research Focus: Poor Information Sharing in Groups
• Cognitive Process Losses: Ineffective Brainstorming
• Motivating Groups to Perform Better by Appealing to Self-Interest
• Cognitive Approaches: Improving Communication and Information Sharing
• Setting Appropriate Goals
• Group Member Diversity: Costs and Benefits Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about Social Groups
• Spontaneous Social Categorization
• The Benefits of Social Categorization
• Liking “Us” More Than “Them”: Ingroup Favoritism
• The Outcomes of Ingroup Favoritism
• Ingroup Favoritism Has Many Causes
• When Ingroup Favoritism Does Not Occur
• Personality and Cultural Determinants of Ingroup Favoritism Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Reducing Discrimination by Changing Social Norms
• Reducing Prejudice through Intergroup Contact Research Focus: The Extended-Contact Hypothesis
• Moving Others Closer to Us: The Benefits of Recategorization Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination
• Competition and Conflict
• Social Fairness
• How the Social Situation Creates Conflict: The Role of Social Dilemmas Learning Objectives
• Characteristics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
• Variations on the Prisoner’s Dilemma
• Resource Dilemma Games Research Focus: The Trucking Game
• Who Cooperates and Who Competes? Research Focus: Self- and Other-Orientations in Social Dilemmas
• Gender and Cultural Differences in Cooperation and Competition Key Takeaways Exercises and Critical Thinking
• Task Characteristics and Perceptions
• Privatization
• The Important Role of Communication
• The Tit-for-Tat Strategy
• Formal Solutions to Conflict: Negotiation, Mediation, and Arbitration Key Takeaways Exercise and Critical Thinking
• Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about Cooperation and Competition
•  Back Matter

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Module 3: The Self

Module Overview

Human beings, by their very nature, are prone to focus on the self and to engage in behavior to protect it. Module 3 will cover some of the ways this occurs. We will start by focusing on the self-concept or who we are and self-schemas. We will also discuss self-perception theory, possible selves, the self-reference effect, self-discrepancies, how others affect our sense of self, and cultural differences of the self. Then we will tackle the issue of self-esteem and its two forms – global and domain specific. Self-esteem across the life span and gender and cross-cultural differences will be examined. We will discuss how self-esteem is affected, and protected, when mortality is made salient, self-efficacy and locus of control, self-regulation, self-awareness, and self-enhancement. Our third section will cover self-presentation and specific strategies we use such as self-promotion, ingratiation, false modesty, self-verification, and self-monitoring. Finally, we will discuss cognitive biases and heuristics used to defend the self, such as the self-serving bias, false consensus effect, false uniqueness effect, and unrealistic optimism and defensive pessimism.

Module Outline

3.1. The Self-Concept

3.2. self-esteem, 3.3. self-presentation, 3.4. cognitive biases and heuristics used to bolster the self.

Module Learning Outcomes

• Define the self-concept and clarify how we learn about the self.
• Define self-esteem and describe efforts we engage in to protect or improve it.
• Describe ways we make ourselves appear in a more positive light to others.
• Outline cognitive biases and heuristics used to defend the self.

Section Learning Objectives

• Define self-concept and clarify whether it is stable or malleable.
• Define and exemplify self-schemas.
• Describe self-perception theory and how it helps us learn about the self.
• Clarify the importance of possible selves.
• Describe the self-reference effect.
• Define self-discrepancy theory.
• Describe Cooley’s concept of the looking-glass self.
• Define reflected appraisal.
• Describe the social comparison theory and how it helps us to learn about the self.
• Clarify the importance of the two-factor-theory of emotion for the self.
• Describe cultural differences in the conception of the self.

3.1.1. The Age-Old Question – Who Are You?

Quite possibly the fundamental question of human existence is who we are. If asked who you are by another person, how would you describe yourself? Are you smart, resourceful, compassionate, petty, empathetic, self-serving, or optimistic? Are you good at sports or do you write poetry well? Should any singing you do be reserved for the shower? These descriptors are what make up our self-concept or the way we see ourselves. This view is probably clear most of the time. If you are not talented at writing, you will likely avoid writing intensive classes as a student. Some classes you cannot avoid, and so in these instances you will seek out extra help so that you are successful with the class. If you are incredibly talented at football, you may go out for the team but will not likely try out for the baseball team. But are there times when you are not so sure about who you are? The answer is likely yes. Maybe you and your spouse are considering adopting. Though you consider yourself a compassionate person, you are not sure you can open your heart up to another child the same way you would to a biological child. In this case, you have no prior experience to reference to determine who you are in this situation.

3.1.1.1. Is self-concept stable or malleable? There are two contradictory views of the self. Though our self-concept is relatively stable and people resist any information that contradicts their view of themselves (Greenwald, 1980), specific social environments can cause different selves to appear (Martindale, 1980). Markus and Kunda (1986) explored this dual nature of the self-concept in a study of 40 female students at the University of Michigan who participated to earn credit in their introductory psychology class (recall our discussion in Module 2 of convenience samples and issues with generalizability as a result). The participants were run one at a time and with three female confederates who were also undergraduate students but paid for their involvement. The researchers used minimal deception and led the participants to believe the study was on attitudes and opinions. They were first shown posters in a series of three trials. The posters had three items on them, either three colors, cartoons, or greeting cards, and the participant was asked to record for each poster the number of the item she liked best (of the three). The experimenter then explained that she had to transfer the responses to a computer coding sheet and that it would make life easier if all participants (the actual participant and the three confederates) could read their responses out loud. On each trial the participant went first, followed by the confederates. Her responses determined what the confederates would say. In the uniqueness condition, on all but 3 of the 18 trials the confederates all disagreed with the participant but agreed with one another. So if the participant preferred Color A the confederates all chose C. On the other three trials, the first confederate agreed with the participant while the other two disagreed with her and with each other. In the similarity condition, on all but 3 of the trials, the confederates agreed with the participant. If she chose Color C, then so did the three confederates. On the other three trials, none of the confederates agreed with the participant and two agreed with each other (meaning if the participant chose C, one chose A and two chose B, for instance). The participant then completed a series of dependent measures to include judgments of similarity to reference groups, self-categorization judgments, and word association. There was also a manipulation check such that participants were asked what percentage of the time they thought other participants agreed with their preference judgment in the first part of the study. Debriefing then occurred.

Results showed that for the manipulation check, subjects were aware of the extent to which participants agreed with them. The uniqueness group stated that the others agreed with them just 8% of the time while the similarity subjects estimated 77% of the time. The authors note that there was actually 17% and 83% agreement, respectively. In terms of how stable self-concept is, results showed that neither group appeared to have been influenced by the information about their similarity or uniqueness. In terms of the malleability of self-concept, the differences in the latencies between the two conditions for self-categorization judgments (i.e. their reaction times), suggests that different types of self-conceptions were mediating these judgments. This was also seen in the similarity to reference groups task such that both conditions felt more similar to in-groups than out-groups. It should be noted that the effect was not as strong for the similarity condition as their mean judgment of similarity to the in-group ( M = 4.93) was not as strong as the uniqueness condition ( M = 5.13), and their judgment of out-groups was higher ( M = 2.26) than the uniqueness condition ( M = 1.82).

Markus and Kunda (1986) conclude that both the stability and malleability of the self-concept were demonstrated in their study, though if one only looked at the results of the first part of the study (the showing of the posters with the three items to choose from) “one would tend to infer that the self-conceptions of these individuals were relatively unresponsive to the self-relevant information provided by the study” (pg. 864). Further examination of the word association, latency, and similarity tasks show that “…underlying these similar general self-descriptions were very different temporary self-conceptions” (pg. 864). When individuals were led to feel unique, they became disturbed by this and following the preference manipulation viewed their uniqueness as negative while the state of similarity to others became positive and desirable. They recruited conceptions of themselves as similar to others and made these endorsements relatively quickly (as shown through shorter latencies). Those made to feel extremely similar to others responded in the exact opposite way.

Finally, they say that the self-concept is a set of self-conceptions and from it, “the individual constructs a working self-concept that integrates the core self-conceptions with those elicited by the immediate context. In this sense, the self-concept becomes similar to that suggested by the symbolic interactionists. Thus, for Mead (1934) there was no fixed self-concept, only the current self-concept that was negotiated from the available set of self-conceptions” (Markus and Kunda, 1986, pg. 865).

3.1.2. Self-Schemas

As we interact with our world, we gather information that we need to organize in a way that we can obtain it again when needed. Basically, we store it away in memory and retrieve it when we encounter the person, object, or concept at a later time. This element of cognition is called a schema and as we can have schemas concerning external objects or ideas, we too can have them about ourselves, called a self-schema. These self-schemas make up our self-concept in much the same way that the words on this page make up the module you are reading, and this module is just one of many in the textbook. Markus (1977) defined self-schemata as, “cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of the self-related information contained in an individual’s social experiences (pg. 64).”

Self-schemas represent a person’s domain specific attributes or abilities and experiences as they relate to that domain. This allows for quicker encoding, more confident evaluation, accurate retrieval of domain-relevant information, and the ability to adapt to different information processing goals (Carpenter, 1988; Greenwald, 1980; Markus, 1977). Individuals with a self-schema in a domain are said to be schematic while those lacking one are aschematic for that ability (Cross & Markus, 1994). According to Markus (1977), aschematic individuals are not able to recognize their ability in a given domain and do not assign their ability any critical personal importance.

They can also help to shape social perception when the description of person is ambiguous. One study showed that when a target (Chris) is described as equally likely to be independent or dependent, participants classified as independence-schematics rated Chris as more independent and dependence-schematics rated him as more dependent or less likely to act independently compared to aschematics. The authors say that self-schemas serve a motivational role such that they help to foster the self-system’s stability, validation, and perpetuation (Green & Sedikides, 2001).

3.1.2.1. Types of self-schemas. Prieto, Cole, and Tageson (1992) compared depressed, clinic-referred children; nondepressed, clinic-referred children; and nondepressed, non-clinic referred children on three cognitive measures of positive and negative self-schemas. On a word recognition measure and an incidental word recall measure, depressed individuals had a less positive self-schema compared to the other two groups. Only non-depressed groups recalled significantly more positive words than negative ones. The results suggest that such negative self-schemas affect how new information is stored and accessed. Another study found that depressive self-schemas were a result of peer victimization such that individuals who experienced relational and verbal victimization more so than physical victimization by their peers had stronger negative and weaker positive self-cognitions and an elimination of the “normative memorial bias for recall of positive self-referential words” (Cole et al., 2014).

Self-schemas have also been identified for race-ethnicity (Oyserman, 2008; Oyserman et al., 2003), body weight (Altabe & Thompson, 1996; Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987), gender (Markus, Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982), exercise (Kendzierski, 1990), religion (McIntosh, 1995), and illness (Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997), to name a few. Lodge and Hamill (1986) even propose a partisan schema related to political knowledge and interest. Those described as schematics are high in interest and knowledge and show a “consistency bias” such that they recall more policy statements consistent with a congressman’s party affiliation than those inconsistent with it. They also can classify campaign statements as Republican or Democrat. Aschematics, or those low in interest and knowledge, perform at no better than chance levels in the same task. The authors note that the restructuring of memory shown by schematics, and in particular those scoring especially high on interest and knowledge which they call sophisticates, demonstrates a serious bias in how political information is processed.

3.1.2.2. Self-perception theory. One way we gain knowledge about ourselves is through observing ourselves, called introspection or looking inward. We notice food preferences, particular music genres we like, the types of clothing we prefer to wear, and the type of person we consider to be a friend. But what we gain self-knowledge about tends to be things that are not central or critical (Bem, 1972). Why is that? The things about us that are most important make up the attitudes we express, the beliefs we hold, the traits we display, and the emotions we prefer to display and so are at our core. Self-perception helps us to learn about the more secondary aspects of the self.

3.1.2.3. Possible selves. Not only are we concerned about the person we are right now, but we focus on the person we might become, which Markus and Nurius (1986) call possible selves . These could be positive conceptions of our future self, but likewise, they could be something we are afraid of becoming and could elicit guilt and anxiety in the individual (Carver et al., 1999). According to Inglehart, Markus, and Brown (1988) our possible selves allow us to focus attention on specific, task-relevant cognitions, emotions and actions, thereby allowing us to move from our current state to the desired one (Oyserman & Markus, 1990a), especially when a possible self is seen as a self-regulator (i.e. a student who spends more time on homework, improved grades, and participated in class more because they realize they are not doing well now, but could in the future if they engage in specific types of behaviors; Oyserman et al., 2004). Across two studies, Cross and Markus (1994) showed that schematic individuals were better able to direct their attention to the problem at hand and concentrate on it while aschematic individuals were quicker to endorse negative possible selves related to logical reasoning ability. Hence, self-schemas can help foster competence by “providing a foundation for the development of possible selves related to that ability” (pg. 434). They continue, “…the possible self may link effective steps and strategies for solving reasoning problems with beliefs about one’s ability and competence in the domain. Bringing to mind a positive, desired view of oneself in the future as logical and analytical may also help the student dispel anxiety or worry during the task” (pg. 435). Research has also shown that when balance between feared and expected possible selves does not exist, the outcomes can be negative such as the initiation and maintenance of delinquent activity in adolescents (Oyserman and Markus, 1990b).

3.1.2.4. The self-reference effect. Would it surprise you to learn that humans have a tendency to more efficiently process, and recall more accurately, information about ourselves? Probably not. This is called the self-reference effect (Higgins & Bargh, 1987). Craik and Lockhart (1972) proposed the depth of processing (DOP) framework which says that how well a memory trace is retained is determined by the nature of the encoding operations such that deep, meaningful analyses result in a more durable trace than shallow, structural analyses of a stimulus. Up to 1977 it was believed that better retention could be achieved by semantic encoding though Rogers, Kuiper, and Kriker (1977) showed that self-referent encoding produced even better recall. The self-reference effect has since been replicated in numerous studies (for an overview of this research, please see Symons & Johnson, 1997).

Since the self-reference effect is a property of memory, we might expect that it is affected by the aging process. Across three studies, Gutchess, et al., (2007) showed that under some circumstances, older adults can benefit from self-referencing as much as young adults can but in general, they are more limited in their application of it. The authors speculate that “older adults may be limited in their application of self-referencing due to its demand on cognitive resources and their diminished ability to apply the strategy flexibly and broadly in other types of evaluative judgments” (pg. 834).

In terms of what area of the brain might control the self-reference effect, research using lesioning has found a role for the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Patients with focal brain damage to the mPFC were given a standard trait judgment paradigm and damage to this area was found to abolish the self-reference effect, suggesting that the structure is important for self-referential processing and the neural representation of the self (Philippi et al., 2012). The implications of this research go beyond social psychology, too. The authors write, “The ability to detect and encode information for self-relevance might contribute not only to the formation of a self-concept, but also more broadly to psychological and social functioning. Across a variety of psychopathological conditions and personality disorders, self-referential processing appears to be dysfunctional, making it a major target for psychotherapy.” To read this article yourself, please visit: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3297026/ .

3.1.3. Self-Discrepancies

Self-discrepancy theory was postulated by Higgins (1987) to distinguish between the various self-states proposed by sociology, psychology, and even philosophy. Higgins says there are two cognitive dimensions which underlie the various self-state representations. The first is the domains of the self , numbering three total – the actual, ideal, and ought selves. The actual self includes the attributes that you are believed to possess, whether by yourself or another person. The ideal self includes all attributes that someone, whether you or another person, hope or wishes for you to possess. The ought self are the attributes that someone (yourself or another person) believes you should possess (i.e. linked to a sense of duty, obligation, or responsibility). Higgins exemplifies the ideal and ought self through the example of the conflict a hero faces between their personal wishes and their sense of duty.

The second cognitive dimension is what he calls standpoints on the self , or whose perspective on the self is involved. The two basic standpoints are your own personal standpoint and the standpoint from a significant other such as a spouse, parent, sibling, or close friend. A person can have a self-state representation for any number of these significant others.

The two cognitive dimensions can then be combined to form six basic types of self-state representations: actual/own, actual/other, ideal/own, ideal/other, ought/own, and ought/other. Our self-concept is derived from the first two, while the last four are self-directive standards or acquired guides for being, or as he calls them, self-guides . Self-discrepancy theory therefore proposes that people differ as to which self-guide they are motivated to meet, and that people do not necessarily possess all four (we might have only ought or ideal self-guides). We are motivated to “reach a condition where our self-concept matches our personally relevant self-guides” (pg. 321).

If this does not happen, we can experience sadness, disappointment, fear, dissatisfaction, apprehension, or feel threatened. For instance, if a discrepancy exists between the actual/own and ideal/own states, meaning the person feels their personal hopes or wishes have not been fulfilled, they will be vulnerable to dejected-related emotions such as disappointment, frustration, and dissatisfaction. If the discrepancy is between actual/own and ideal/other, meaning they have failed to obtain a significant other’s hopes or wishes for them, they may feel shame, embarrassment, or feel downcast. If the discrepancy is between actual/own and ought/other, meaning the current state of our attributes from our standpoint does not match the state the person believes some significant other considers to be our duty or obligation to obtain, then we might experience agitation-related emotions and feel fear or threatened. Finally, an actual/own and ought/own discrepancy occurs when the current state of our attributes, from our standpoint, do not match the state we believe is our duty or obligation to obtain and so we feel self-contempt, guilt, and uneasiness (Higgins, 1987).

In sum, self-discrepancy theory helps us to understand discrepancies between our view of our self and who we would ideally like to be or believe other people think we should be.

3.1.4. How Others Affect Our Sense of Self

3.1.4.1. The looking-glass self. Sociologist Charles Cooley (1902) stated that people based their sense of self on how they think others see them. This social interaction serves as a sort of mirror in which people use the judgments of others to measure their own worth, behavior, and values. He calls this the looking-glass self , and it occurs in three steps. First, we imagine how we appear to others when in a social situation. Second, we imagine what others think of our appearance. Third, we form opinions and feelings about this perceived judgment and then respond to it. Let’s say for instance you are assigned to a small group in your social psychology class and are asked to discuss the topic of self-discrepancy theory. You have not interacted with these individuals thus far this semester, and so you want to demonstrate to these fellow students that you are knowledgeable of the concept. As you discuss the material, you take note of how your fellow classmates respond to your thoughts and applications of the concept of self-discrepancy theory. What is their body language? Do they maintain eye contact with you? Do they seem to be distracted or are they focused? What words do they use in response to your comments? If your classmates generally have positive feedback such as commenting constructively on your thoughts or listening intently, you will feel confident that they see you as competent and knowledgeable. If, on the other hand, they look away often, are playing a game on their phone, or have negative comments, you will likely feel that they do not see you as knowledgeable. To make matters more complicated, in the future your professor has you work with a different group of classmates for a different activity. The new task provides a different context for the interaction and the new set of students changes the nature of those involved. So, how you use the information obtained from this new group of individuals will likely be different than the first group. And of course, not all feedback carries the same weight. Maybe you know one of your group members is an A student and doing very well in the class. If they provide positive feedback this will mean more to you than a student praising your analysis who you know is struggling.

3.1.4.2. Reflected appraisals. Building off Cooley’s work, Felson (1985) said that we come to see ourselves as those important to us see us, called a reflected appraisal. In an interesting study of adolescents from the Netherlands, Verkuyten (1988) found that the general self-esteem of ethnic minorities was relatively high, despite the fact that they have low status, experience discrimination and prejudice, and have little power to influence policymakers. So why was their self-esteem higher than expected? As support for the reflected appraisal process, they derived their self-esteem from fellow family members who regarded them highly.

3.1.4.3. Social comparison theory. Oftentimes, we are uncertain of our abilities and so look to others for a clue. A college baseball player may compare his batting average against those of his teammates to see how well he is doing. Festinger (1954) called this the social comparison theory . We make such comparisons as a way to bring about self-improvement or to motivate us to be better. If the players’ batting average is not the lowest, but close, he may ask for additional batting practice or tips from the batting coach. We also compare ourselves to others to enhance our positive self-image. If the player learns that his batting average is better than most of his teammates, he will feel good about his hitting ability. Of course, he might also develop a superior attitude or become biased or judgmental.

How might social media affect the social comparisons we make? Social networking sites such as Facebook give the impression that others are doing better than they are which can be detrimental to how we view ourselves. In a study of 231 adults aged 18-25, Facebook use was found to lead to greater levels of negative social comparison which resulted in seeing oneself as less socially competent and less physically attractive. This effect was weaker among happier individuals (de Vries & Kuhne, 2015).  A similar study of Instagram “likes” found that exposing female undergraduates to thin-ideal images led to greater levels of body and facial dissatisfaction than average images and that greater investment in Instagram likes led to higher levels of appearance comparison and facial dissatisfaction (Tiggerman et al., 2018).

The benefit of social comparison is that it can lead to efforts to self-improve. How so? We could make a specific type of social comparison called an upward social comparison in which we compare our traits and abilities against someone who is more skilled than we are. This can lead us to engage in motivated behavior to improve, but it could also leave us feeling incompetent, shameful, or jealous (Collins, 1996).

3.1.4.4. Arousal as information about us. Stimuli are forever present in our sensory world and we have perceptions of them. These perceptions lead us to respond. For example, if you are walking down a street and hear footsteps behind you, you might perceive this as a threat if it is late at night and you thought you were alone on the street. This could lead you to walk quicker to your car or house or turnaround to confront the person behind you. What if you heard footsteps but is the middle of the day, on campus, and in between classes? You would likely perceive this as just another student going to class and have no reaction. Schachter (1964) proposed his two-factor theory of emotion which states that how we perceive our own emotions depends on two factors: 1) how much physiological arousal we experience such as rapid breathing, sweating, and/or a pounding heart, and 2) the cognitive interpretation or label we apply such as angry, scared, or happy. Others help us with the second factor such that we will examine their reactions to a given situation to help us interpret the arousal we are experiencing. Say for instance we are at a movie and out of nowhere the killer jumps out and attacks the protagonist. When this happens, we jump in our seat and scream, and notice that other moviegoers have the same reaction. We thus realize we experienced a high level of arousal and label the emotion as scared. Soon after we likely laugh at ourselves since we knew all along the event was not real but a mere fiction on the screen.

3.1.5. The Self and Culture

The self does not exist on an island but in the context of the society and culture in which it lives. As such, there is a great deal of variability in terms of what the self-concept is from culture to culture. First, culture includes all the beliefs, customs, institutions, experience, values, attitudes, art, religion, etc. of a group of people. Each culture establishes norms , or rules, for how its members should behave. For instance, Western cultures view the self as independent or individualistic , meaning that individuals reject conformity, focus on individual traits and goals, and seek personal achievement while Asian cultures are interdependent or collectivistic and identify the self in a social context, believe in blending in, focus on group goals, promote solidarity, and are against egotism.  According to Markus and Kitayma (1991) the independent construal of self is bounded, unitary, and stable; focuses on being unique, realizing internal attributes, and promoting ones’ goals; and sees the role of others as self-appraisal and linked to social comparison and reflected appraisal. In terms of the interdependent self, they say the structure is flexible; the task is to belong and fit in, occupy one’s place and promote other’s goals; and our relationships with others in specific contexts define the self. The independent is internal and private, focused on one’s abilities, thoughts, and feelings while the interdependent is external and public, and focused on statuses, roles, and relationships (Markus & Kitayma, 1991).

Research shows that East Asians, namely those from Korea, have more flexibility in their self-concept compared to Americans (Choi & Choi, 2002) and that Asian Americans, compared to European Americans, show variability across relationship contexts but stability within them (English & Serena, 2007). In another study, when trait self-perceptions across different relationships were inconsistent, relationship quality and authenticity was lower for European Americans but not East Asian Americans. When there was inconsistency within the same relationship, both ethnic groups showed negative outcomes (English & Chen, 2011).

• Describe how self-esteem is a need.
• Identify and define types of self-esteem.
• Clarify what happens to self-esteem across the life span.
• Clarify if there are gender and cross-cultural differences in self-esteem.
• Define Terror Management Theory and clarify its relevance to self-esteem.
• Describe self-efficacy and locus of control and how they relate to the self.
• Define self-regulation.
• Define self-awareness and describe issues related to it.
• Differentiate public and private self-consciousness.
• Define self-enhancement and describe strategies used in it.

3.2.1. Self-Esteem Defined and Described

3.2.1.1. Self-esteem as a need. Psychologist Abraham Maslow described a hierarchy of needs as one way to understand motivation and specifically the push of motivated behavior (contrasted with the pull that comes from outside us). According to Maslow, there are five types of needs arranged in a hierarchy, or more so in a pyramid formation. Lower level needs must be fulfilled before higher level ones can be. At the bottom are the physiological needs which are what we need to survive. They include food, water, sex, temperature, oxygen, etc. At the next level are needs centered on our safety and security , or living in a safe environment, being safe from Mother Nature, and having enough money to pay the bills. With this level satisfied, we can next focus on feeling socially connected to others and being in mature relationships, which he called the love and belonginess needs . Fourth are our self-esteem needs or being independent, gaining mastery, how we feel about ourselves, and being responsible. At the pinnacle of the pyramid are our self-actualization needs , which Carl Rogers and other humanistic psychologists discussed. This level focuses on realizing our full potential, feeling fulfilled and satisfied, and seeking personal growth. We also pursue interests out of intrinsic interest and not extrinsic demands. For our purposes, Maslow’s fourth level will be focused on and self-esteem can be defined as how we see ourselves, including both positive and negative evaluative components.

3.2.1.2. Types of self-esteem. Is self-esteem a unitary concept though? Rosenberg (1979) proposed a global self-esteem and subsequent research has supported domain specific self-esteem such as for academic matters (Rosenberg et al., 1995). So, which causes which? Does global self-esteem lead to specific or vice versa? The authors propose that global could be the result of specific self-esteem since it is “based on the judgments of various parts of the self, the parts (specifics) might be seen as responsible for the whole (global)” (pg. 148). In terms of the specific arising from global, they say, “assessments of particular facets of the self may well be based on one’s overall feelings of self-worth” (pg. 148). They conclude that global and specific self-esteem are in fact neither equivalent nor interchangeable, global appears to be heavily affective in nature and associated with psychological well-being while specific is more judgmental and evaluative arising from a cognitive component; specific facets of the self vary in their level of abstraction and some types such as academic self-esteem affect global self-esteem more than other types; the degree to which we value our behavior affects how much specific self-esteem affects global; and finally, in the case of school performance it is affected by self-esteem but in terms of the specific type and not global (Rosenberg et al., 1995).

What are some of the specific types of self-esteem.? According to Gentile et al. (2009) they might include:

• Physical appearance – what we look like
• Athletics – how good we are in sports
• Academics – our general performance in school
• Social Acceptance – our friendships, peer relationships, and social approval
• Family – Our family can serve as a source support and help affirm our beliefs about our own self-worth
• Behavioral conduct – includes our perception of how socially unacceptable our behavior is
• Affect – Feeling happy, satisfied, and free from anxiety which lead to better emotional well-being
• Personal self – Our evaluation of our personality independent from the physical body or others
• Self-satisfaction – Our measure of happiness with oneself as a person
• Moral-ethical self-concept – Our perception of moral-ethical attributes and how satisfied we are with our religion or lack of one

3.2.1.3. Self-esteem across the life span. Our next question centers on whether self-esteem can change throughout our life. Trzesniewski et al., (2003) tested this very question across two studies and found that, “stability is relatively low during early childhood, increases through adolescence and young adulthood, and then declines during midlife and old age” (pg. 215). This effect held across gender, nationality, and ethnicity. How can we account for these trends? First, self-esteem was least stable during childhood, though the authors question whether self-esteem measures are valid for young children as they may not fully understand the meaning of questions on such scales or cannot form abstract concepts of themselves, such as being good or bad. Second, self-esteem is lower in early adolescence and increases after this likely due to the turmoil puberty brings about in terms of rapid maturational changes. By late adolescence and early adulthood, the individual has the resources and autonomy necessary to deal with these changes. Finally, self-esteem stability decreases from midlife to old age likely because in midlife there are few environmental changes but as we transition into late adulthood, there are a great deal of life changes and shifting social circumstances such as children moving out, retirement, health problems and the death of loved ones. In regard to late adulthood, they add, “Another possibility is that as individuals age they may begin to review their lifelong accomplishments and experiences, leading in some cases to more critical self-appraisals and in other cases to greater acceptance of their faults and limitations” (pg. 216).

Interestingly, data from 187 newlywed couples shows that the birth of the first child does affect self-esteem over the first five years of marriage. Changes mostly affect the mother and are negative in nature with a sudden decline in self-esteem the first year after the child’s birth and a gradual decline continuing over the next four years. The study utilized a control group of parents who had no child during the same period and for which there was no change in self-esteem. This suggests that the change in self-esteem of the parents with a child was likely due to the birth of their first child (Bleidorn et al., 2016).

3.2.1.4. Gender and cross-cultural differences in self-esteem. Gentile et al. (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of 115 studies and assessed the 10 different domains of self-esteem mentioned at the end of the previous section. They found that gender differences vary greatly across the different domains of self-esteem. In some cases, there was no difference at all (i.e. academic, social acceptance, family, and affect), while other domains showed a moderate amount of variation (i.e. males higher on physical appearance, athletics, personal, and self-satisfaction; females higher on behavioral conduct and moral-ethical).

But are there cross-cultural differences in gender and self-esteem? Bleidorn et al. (2016) tackled the issue in an Internet sample of 985,937 individuals from 48 nations and found that self-esteem increased from late adolescence to middle adulthood, there were significant gender gaps, and that males consistently report higher self-esteem than females. These findings are important as they show that the trends, which are consistent with the literature but previous studies only examined Western samples, are in fact cross-culturally valid and suggest universal mechanisms at least in part. These mechanisms might include biological sources including genetics or hormones or universal sociocultural factors such as socially learned gender roles and stereotypes.

Despite these cross-cultural similarities, there was a difference across nations in terms of the magnitude of gender-specific trajectories, suggesting that universal explanations may not be at work but culture-specific influences such as a nation’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita, mean age at marriage, and HDI (Human Development Index; measures of living a long life, being educated, and having a decent standard of living) are responsible. Their data suggests that wealthy, developed, egalitarian, and individualistic nations had relatively large gender differences in self-esteem, though they decrease throughout early and middle adulthood. In contrast, collectivistic, poorer, developing nations marked by greater gender inequality and an earlier age at marriage show smaller gender gaps, though these increase during early and middle adulthood.

Bleidorn et. al. (2016) conclude that universal influences on self-esteem do not tell the whole story, and that “systematic cultural differences in the magnitude and shape of gender and age differences in self-esteem provide evidence for contextual influences on the self-esteem development in men and women” (pg. 408).

3.2.2. Terror Management Theory (TMT)

3.2.2.1. What is TMT? Ernest Becker (1962, 1973, & 1975) stated that it is the human capacity for intelligence, to be able to make decisions, think creatively, and infer cause and effect, that leads us to an awareness that we will someday die. This awareness manifests itself as terror and any cultural worldviews that are created need to provide ways to deal with this terror, create concepts and structures to understand our world, answer cosmological questions, and give us a sense of meaning in the world.

Based on this notion, Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon, 1986) posits that worldviews serve as a buffer against the anxiety we experience from knowing we will die someday. This cultural anxiety buffer has two main parts. First, we must have faith in our worldviews and be willing to defend them. Second, we derive self-esteem from living up to these worldviews and behaving in culturally approved ways. So, culture supports a belief in a just world and meeting the standards of value of the culture provides us with immortality in one of two ways. Literal immortality is arrived at via religious concepts such as the soul and the afterlife. Symbolic immortality is provided by linking our identity to something higher such as the nation or corporation and by leaving something behind such as children or cultural valued products. It has also been linked to the appeal of fame (Greenberg, Kosloff, Solomon, Cohen, and Landau, 2010).

Finally, based on whether death thoughts are in focal attention or are unconscious, we employ either proximal or distal defenses. Proximal defenses involve the suppression of death-related thoughts, a denial of one’s vulnerability, or participating in behavior that will reduce the threat of demise (i.e. exercise) and occur when thought of death is in focal attention. On the other hand, distal defenses are called upon when death thoughts are unconscious and involve strivings for self-esteem and faith in one’s worldview and assuage these unconscious mortality concerns through the symbolic protection a sense of meaning offers.

3.2.2.2. The typical mortality salience study. In a typical mortality salience (MS) study, participants are told they are to take part in an investigation of the relationship between personality traits and interpersonal judgments. They complete a few standardized personality assessments which are actually filler items to sustain the cover story. Embedded in the personality assessments is a projective personality test which consists of two open ended questions which vary based on which condition the participant is in. Participants in the MS condition are asked to write about what they think will happen to them when they die and the emotions that the thought of their own death arouses in them. Individuals in the control condition are asked to write about concerns such as eating a meal, watching television, experiencing dental pain, or taking an exam. Next, they complete a self-report measure of affect, typically the PANAS (Positive-Affect, Negative-Affect Scale), to determine the effect of MS manipulation on their mood. Finally, they are asked to make judgments about individuals who either directly or indirectly threaten or bolster their cultural worldviews.

3.2.2.3. Worldview defense. General findings on TMT have shown that when mortality is made salient, we generally display unfavorable attitudes toward those who threaten our worldview and celebrate those who uphold our view. This effect has been demonstrated in relation to anxious individuals even when part of one’s in-group (Martens, Greenberg, Schimel, Kosloff, and Weise, 2010) such that mortality reminders led participants to react more negatively toward an anxious police liaison from their community (Study 1) or to a fellow university student who was anxious (Study 2). Mortality salience has also been found to elevate preference for political candidates who are charismatic and espouse the same values associated with the participant’s political worldview, whether conservative or liberal (Kosloff, Greenberg, Weise, and Solomon, 2010).

Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Lyon (1989) examined reactions of participants to those who violated or upheld cultural worldviews across a series of six experiments. In general, they hypothesized that when people are reminded of their own mortality, they are motivated to maintain their cultural anxiety buffer and are punitive toward those who violate it and benevolent to those who uphold it. Experiments 1 and 3 provided support for the hypothesis that subjects induced to think about their own mortality increased their desire to punish the moral transgressor (i.e. to recommend higher bonds for an accused prostitute) while rewarding the hero (Experiment 3). Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and extended them by showing that increasing MS does not lead subjects to derogate just any target as it had no effect on evaluations of the experimenter. Also, MS increased punishment of the transgressor only among subjects who believed the target’s behavior was truly immoral.

Experiments 4 – 6 tested alternative explanations for the findings. First, self-awareness could lead individuals to behave in a manner consistent with their attitudes and standards.  The results of Study 4 showed that unlike MS, self-awareness does not encourage harsher bond recommendations and in fact, heightened self-awareness reduces how harshly a prostitute is treated among individuals with positive attitudes toward prostitution. In Study 5, physiological arousal was monitored and MS was found not to arise from mere heightened arousal. Finally, Experiment 6 showed that particular features of the open-ended death questionnaire did not lead to the findings of Studies 1-5, but rather to requiring subjects to think about their own deaths.

McGregor, Lieberman, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, Simon, and Pyszcznski (1998) tested the hypothesis that MS increases aggression against those who threaten one’s worldview by measuring the amount of hot sauce allocated to the author of a derogatory essay. In the study, politically conservative and liberal participants were asked to think about their own death (MS) or their next important exam (control). They were then asked to read an essay that was derogatory toward either conservatives or liberals. Finally, participants allocated a quantity of very spicy hot sauce to the author of the essay, knowing that the author did not like spicy foods and would have to consume the entire sample of hot sauce. As expected, MS participants allocated significantly more hot sauce to the author of the worldview-threatening essay than did control participants.

In a second study, participants thought about their own mortality or dental pain and were given an opportunity to aggress against someone who threatened their worldview. Half of the MS participants allocated the hot sauce before evaluating the target while the other half evaluated the target before allocating the hot sauce. Results of Study 2 showed that MS participants allocated significantly more hot sauce when they were not able to verbally derogate the targets prior to the administration of hot sauce. However, when MS participants were able to first express their attitudes toward the target, the amount of hot sauce allocated was not significantly greater than for the controls. This finding suggests that people will choose the first mode of worldview defense provided to them.

3.2.2.4. Self-esteem. According to the anxiety buffer hypothesis, if a psychological structure provides protection against anxiety, then strengthening that structure should make an individual less prone to displays of anxiety or anxiety related behavior in response to threats while weakening that structure should make a person more prone to exhibit anxiety or anxiety related behavior in response to threats. In support of this, Greenberg et al. (1992) showed that by increasing self-esteem, self-reported anxiety in response to death images and physiological arousal in response to the threat of pain could be reduced. Furthermore, the authors found no evidence that this effect was mediated by positive affect. Additional support for the function of self-esteem in reducing anxiety was provided by Harmon-Jones, Simon, Greenberg, Pyszcynski, Solomon, and McGregor (1997) who showed that individuals with high self-esteem, whether induced experimentally (Experiment 1) or dispositionally (Experiment 2), did not respond to MS with increased worldview defense and that this occurred due to the suppression of death constructs (Experiment 3).

3.2.3. Self-Efficacy and Locus of Control

Self-Efficacy (Bandura, 1986) is our sense of competence and feeling like we can deal with life’s problems. It includes our beliefs about our ability to complete a task and affects how we think, feel, and motivate ourselves. When our self-efficacy is high, we feel like we can cope with life events and overcome obstacles. Difficult tasks are seen as challenges and we set challenging goals. In contrast, if it is low, we feel hopeless, helpless, and that we cannot handle what life throws at us. We avoid difficult tasks and throw in the towel quickly when things get tough. These individuals are easily depressed and stressed.

Our sense of competence is affected by the degree to which we blame internal or external forces for our success and failures. Using Julian Rotter’s (1973) concept of locus of control, we have an internal locus of control if we believe we are in control of our own destiny, but if we believe outside forces determine our life, we have an external locus of control.

So how do self-efficacy and locus of control intersect with one another. A study of students from a mid-sized public university in the northeastern area of the United States showed that students with an external locus of control and who are low in academic self-efficacy should be identified as they enter college and interventions directed at them to help them perform better in their classes (Drago, Rheinheimer, & Detweiler, 2018). A study of 147 women with type 1 diabetes examined the relationship between self-efficacy, locus of control, and what their expectations were of preconception counseling (Grady & Geller, 2016). Using the Diabetes-Specific Locus of Control (DLC) measure which assesses beliefs about internal, chance, and powerful others loci of control in terms of how diabetes is managed (the measure has 5 subscales: internal-autonomy, internal-blame, chance, powerful other – health professionals, and powerful other – nonmedical), a measure to assess preconception planning, and sociodemographic data,  the researchers tested the hypothesis that expectations of preconception counseling would be associated with beliefs about disease control and self-efficacy. The results showed that self-efficacy for planning a healthy pregnancy predicted outcome expectations of preconception counseling. The authors write, “…women’s self-efficacy was positively associated with their perceived usefulness of preconception counseling and birth control use, whereas self-blame about disease management negatively correlated with these views” (pg. 41). The authors suggest that efforts should be taken to improve self-efficacy and empower women with diabetes to confidently control their disease” (Grady & Geller, 2016).

3.2.4. Self-Regulation

We cannot always act or say what we feel. At times, we have to practice what social psychologists call self-regulation or controlling and directing our thoughts, feelings, and actions so that we can achieve a societal or personal goal. The good news is that much of our self-regulation occurs outside of conscious awareness but if we are trying to engage in meaningful behavioral change, we might have to focus much of our energy into self-control. One study linked successful self-regulation to executive functions to include updating, inhibiting, and shifting, which results in the ability to take goal-direction action such as losing weight (Dohle, Diel, & Hofmann, 2018).

Do concerted efforts at self-regulation reduce the amount of energy available for such activities in subsequent tasks? The question implies that self-regulation is a limited resource. Baumeister, Bratslasky, Muraven, and Tice (1998) tested this over four experiments and described this temporary reduction in the self’s ability to engage in volitional action caused by engaging in a volitional act previously ego depletion . The researchers first attempted to show that exerting self-control in terms of resisting temptation (Experiment 1) or a preliminary act of choice and responsibility (Experiment 2) would reduce the person’s ability to self-regulate on a subsequent, frustrating and difficult task. Results showed that people asked to resist eating chocolates and to make themselves eat radishes instead gave up much faster when next asked to complete a difficult puzzle than those who could indulge and eat the chocolate. Likewise, people who freely and deliberately consented to make a counterattitudinal or proattitudindal speech gave up quickly when asked to do the puzzle while those who expected to make the counterattitudinal speech under low-choice conditions showed no reduction in self-control. They state that it was the act of responsible choice, and not the behavior itself, that depleted the self and reduced persistence on the subsequent task. Experiments 3 and 4 further confirmed the finding that an initial act of volition leads to ego depletion in subsequent tasks. The good news is that this resource is replenished with time and specific factors could hasten or delay this replenishment (Baumeister et al., 1998).

3.2.5. Self-Awareness

Duval and Wicklund (1972) proposed that our self-regulation can either be directed inward and toward the self or directed outward and toward the environment. We are usually focused outward, but there are times when our attention is turned inward. For instance, if you walk by a mirror you might stop to see how you look in your new jeans. If we see a video of ourselves, are asked to talk about ourselves in an interview, or are required to give a presentation in our social psychology class, we experience an increased level of self-awareness and compare ourselves against a high standard which leads to reduced self-esteem since we realize we do not meet the standard. We then engage in motivated behavior to meet the standard, reassess whether we have, and then continue making adjustments until we finally meet the standard or give up and turn away from the self (Carver & Scheier, 1981). As you might expect, the process is aversive and so we want to resolve it (Flory et al., 2000). If we do not, we could experience depression (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987), engage in binge eating (Heatherton & Baumeister), and engage in counternormative behavior such as cheating (Diener & Wallbom, 1976) to name a few of the negative effects. Two recent studies found that when male participants were exposed to an intervention designed to focus their attention onto inhibitory, self-awareness cues, they engaged in significantly less alcohol-related physical aggression behaviors toward a female confederate compared to controls (Gallagher & Parrott, 2016) but for men with an internal and not an external locus of control (Purvis, Gallagher, & Parrott, 2016).

It is possible that some individuals are more self-focused than others, a distinction referred to as public vs. private self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Public self-consciousness refers to an individual who focuses on themselves as a social object and is concerned by how they appear to others. In contrast, private self-consciousness refers to an individual who focuses on the internal self, is introspective, and attends to one’s thoughts, feelings, and motives. Scheier, Buss, and Buss (1978) found that for those high in private self-consciousness, the correlation between aggressive behavior and self-report of aggressiveness was significantly higher than for those low in private self-consciousness or high or low public self-consciousness. Public self-consciousness has also been found to relate to social aspects of identity while private self-consciousness was related to personal aspects (Cheek & Briggs, 1982).

3.2.6. Self-Enhancement

Self-enhancement is a fundamental component of human nature and involves our tendency to see ourselves in a positive light. This often occurs after our self-esteem has been negatively affected in some way (Beauregard & Dunning, 1998).

According to Sedikides & Gregg (2008), self-enhancement can be done in one of several ways. First, we might self-advance or self-protect either by augmenting positivity or reducing the negativity of the self-concept. Second, self-enhancement can occur either publicly or privately whereby in the case of the former we engage in favorable self-presentation and the latter is an internal affair. Third, we tend to self-enhance in domains that matter most to us. Finally, self-enhancement is either candid or tactical, meaning “one can both seize an opportunity for overt and immediate self-advancement, or one can forgo it in favor of other activities liable to facilitate delayed self-enhancement” (pg. 104).

People can also engage in positive illusions (Taylor & Brown, 1988) in which they hold opinions of themselves that are exaggerated or falsely positive regarding abilities and skills. These positive illusions include inflating their perceptions of themselves (i.e. self-aggrandizement), believing they have more control over events than they do (i.e. exaggerated perceptions of control), and being overly optimistic about their future (i.e. unrealistic optimism). Positive illusions have been shown to lead to successful adjustment to stressful events (Taylor & Armor, 1996); increased satisfaction in close relationships when an individual idealized their partner and is in turn idealized by them (Barelds & Dijkstra, 2011; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996); and better outcomes for physical health later in life in terms of more satisfaction with leisure time, higher self-esteem, better perceived health, and less boredom proneness when retirees hold an exaggerated youthful bias (Gana, Alaphillippe, & Bailly, 2002). Positive illusions have been reported in parenting as well in which parents have a tendency to rate their own children as possessing more positive and less negative attributes than other children (Wenger & Fowers, 2008).

Have you ever worried about doing well on a test and so create an excuse to cover poor performance such as saying you were sick when you took it? If so, you engaged in behavioral self-handicapping (Jones & Berglas, 1978). We self-handicap when we are uncertain about our abilities and anticipate a threat to our self-esteem. Instead of saying we failed the exam because our ability was low or we did not study, we instead blame it on being sick or not sleeping well the night before. Self-handicapping can take two forms – behavioral and claimed. Behavioral self-handicapping occurs when we actively acquire an impediment such as drug or alcohol abuse (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985) or do not have enough time to practice (Baumeister, Hamilton, & Tice, 1985). Claimed self-handicapping occurs when a person only reports obstacles to their success such as suffering from test anxiety (Smith, Snyder, and Handelsman, 1982) or being in a bad mood (Baumgarder, Lake, and Arkin, 1985). Between the two, behavioral handicaps are more convincingly tied to performance and so more credible, while claimed handicaps serve as an excuse for failure but do not necessarily decrease the person’s chance of success (Zuckerman & Tsai, 2005). Finally, Stewart & Walker (2014) found that self-handicapping was predicted by perfectionism and an external locus of control in a study of 79 university students (they also found that perfectionism predicted low self-efficacy).

We might even engage in the social comparison process to feel better about ourselves. How so? Instead of comparing our performance to others to see where we rate, we will look for someone we know performs worse than we do or is worse off than we are, and then make a downward social comparison (Wills, 1981). This makes us feel better about ourselves because no matter how bad off we are at the time, that person is in a far worse predicament. Maybe we know we are in a batting slump over the past 10 games and have experienced a reduction in our self-esteem as a result. We might compare ourselves against another teammate who has underperformed all year and realize that our situation is temporary and not seemingly permanent like theirs.

People have a tendency to evaluate themselves much higher than they evaluate others. For instance, they are smarter, better looking, more capable, and more honest than other people. This is called the “better than average” ( BTA) effect. Across five studies, Brown (2012) showed that the BTA is stronger for important attributes than ones that do not matter and when participants experienced a threat to their feelings of self-worth. It has also been shown that the effect holds for easy tasks which produce underconfidence, but not for difficult ones which lead to overconfidence and making a worse-than-average bias (Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007). Finally, Kanten and Teigen (2008) asked 385 students to rate themselves or an acquaintance relative to their peers on several personality traits. The results showed that participants saw themselves as superior to most others at all points in time. The authors describe a better than average improvement effect such that participants said they were more superior now compared to the past and expected to be even more superior in the future.

Finally, Cialdini et al. (1976) said that people have a tendency to publicly announce their associations with successful others in a process they called “ bask in reflected glory ” (BIRG). In a series of three field experiments involving 300 university students across seven universities in the United States, Cialdini et al. (1976) found that participants strived to bask in the glory of successful others even though they were not the cause of their  success, such as wearing school apparel and saying ‘we’ after their team was victorious but not when they lost (in the case of a loss, participants often said ‘they lost’ instead of ‘we lost’).  In another study, two days before the 1999 general election in Flanders researchers counted and recorded houses displaying at least one poster or one removable lawn sign supporting a political party (a total of 462 addresses for posters and 177 addresses for lawn signs). The day after the elections, the houses were checked to see if the poster or lawn sign (s) was/were still present. The results showed that the better the election result, the more houses that still displayed the sign/poster. Winners flaunted their association with the winning party, supporting BIRG while supporters of the losing party tried to conceal their association (Boen et al., 2002).

• Define self-presentation.
• Define self-promotion and describe how it is used in self-presentation.
• Define ingratiation and describe how it is used in self-presentation.
• Define false modesty and describe how it is used in self-presentation.
• Define self-verification and describe how it is used in self-presentation.
• Define self-monitoring and describe how it is used in self-presentation.

3.3.1. Self-Presentation Defined

Think about the last date you went on, especially a first date. What did you do beforehand? You likely showered and groomed yourself, maybe even rehearsed what you would say in the mirror. You also likely took great care to pick your clothes out to make a good first impression. Any strategies we use to make ourselves appear in a more positive light to others is called self-presentation. We intentionally try to control or shape their impressions of us (Schlenker, 2012). First impressions are especially important. Oftentimes, if we make a bad first impression it can be virtually impossible to overcome even if subsequent interactions are much more positive.

3.3.2. Specific Strategies Used in Self-Presentation

So that we can successfully shape the view others have of us to be positive, we need to engage in effortful behavior. How so? One strategy is to use self-promotion or engaging in behaviors or saying positive things about oneself. We often engage in this type of behavior on a first date or in an interview. Research has also shown that individuals higher in narcissism and lower in self-esteem engage in greater levels of online activity on social networking sites such as Facebook and use more self-promotional content to include About Me, Main Photo, View Photos, and status updates. The study also found gender differences insofar as males engaged in more self-promotion in the About Me and Notes sections while females displayed more self-promotional main photos (Mehdizadeh, 2010).

Another strategy is called ingratiation or complimenting, flattering, or engaging in other acts that lead a person to do things for you or like you. This is a typical strategy used by salespeople to have you engage in one clear behavior – buy a car or other product. Politicians are known to use the strategy also so that you come to like them while they are campaigning and then subsequently vote for them on election day. Cialdini (2007) writes in his book Influence: The Power of Persuasion , “Apparently we have such an automatically positive reaction to compliments that we can fall victim to someone who uses them in an obvious attempt to win our favor” (pg. 176).

Maybe you have been on a team at work before and had an idea that completely revolutionized the way your company completed a service for its clients. Did you gloat about your performance? Not likely. You were more likely to downplay your performance and talk about the contributions of your fellow teammates instead. The end result is that you will be seen as likeable and competent by others but for what is called false modesty , you must have been successful in your performance and others must know about it already (i.e. a fan was watching the big game and saw the wide receiver catch the game winning touchdown).

Another strategy is to choose situations or interpret behavior in ways that confirm already held beliefs or to avoid situations and criticism that might contradict these beliefs. Essentially, we want to confirm our existing self-concept but from the eyes of others. This behavior can best be described as self-verification .

Finally, we engage in self-monitoring or observing our own behavior so that we can make adjustments to produce the impression we desire in others and to meet the demands of the situation (Snyder, 1987). For instance, a literature review of self-monitoring through paper diaries, the internet, personal digital assistants, and digital scales in relation to weight loss, found that more frequent self-monitoring of diet, physical activity, or weight led to more successful outcomes for weight management (Burke, Wang, & Sevick, 2011).

• Define the self-serving bias.
• Describe how social desirability is a form of the self-serving bias.
• Contrast the false consensus and false uniqueness effects.
• Outline the benefits, and perils, of optimism and pessimism.

Our final section covers cognitive biases and heuristics used to increase our sense of self, though we have discussed others already throughout this module.

3.4.1. The Self-Serving Bias

First, the self-serving bias is our tendency to see ourselves in a favorable light. We take credit for our successes but blame failures on outside forces. This bias is often displayed by students who are quicker to explain a bad grade on a test as the instructor creating a test that was too difficult or testing on information not in the study guide. When the student does well, though, it is due to their skill and time spent studying, and not necessarily to the test being extra easy.

We even have a tendency to see ourselves as less likely to exhibit a self-serving bias than others (Friedrich, 1996; Myers, 1990). Friedrich (1996) documented this effect across two studies. First, 47 upper level undergraduates enrolled in either a statistics or industrial/organizational psychology course completed an anonymous survey at the beginning of class having them read a paragraph about the results of a SAT survey and then respond to a paragraph describing the self-serving bias. At the end they were asked, “How often do you think (you; the average person) make this kind of mistake when judging or evaluating (yourself; him- or herself)?” and indicated their answer on a 9-point scale (1 meaning almost never and 9 indicating nearly all the time). The results showed that students generally saw themselves as significantly less likely to distort their self-perceptions. In the second study, 38 introductory psychology students were lectured on research related to the self-serving bias during the last third of a regularly scheduled class. At the beginning of the next class they were given a questionnaire asking them to what degree they thought that they or the average person (depending on the condition they were in) would make the mistake. The same 9-point scale was used. Results of the second study were consistent with the first such that students believed others are more likely to commit the self-serving bias than they are.

Another way we see the self-serving bias play out in research is through the social desirability effect or when participants only provide information that appears to be what is expected by society or is desirable. If asked questions about sexual activity, some may report lower levels of activity than is true or not mention acts of sexual impropriety. Though our society has become sexually charged, there are still limits to what is acceptable. We will talk more about self-serving behavior when we discuss attribution theory in Module 4.

3.4.1.1. Explaining self-serving bias. So, what are potential causes of the self-serving bias? In a 2008 article, Shepperd, Malone, and Sweeny cite a few different classes of explanations. First, the previously discussed self-enhancement and self-presentation are offered as motivation-driven reasons (please see the previous sections for a discussion).

Second, they offer cognitive-driven explanations. The outcomes might be inconsistent with expectations such that our expectations are grounded in experience and we utilize cognitive mechanisms that might mute, dampen, or even erase previous negative experiences but not positive ones. Our outcomes may also not be consistent with our self-schema meaning that our views of our skills and abilities are often overly positive and that we view ourselves as the kind of person who produces positive outcomes, not negative ones. Positive outcomes are consistent with our self-schema while negative outcomes lead to two possible conclusions: the negative outcome had an internal cause and our positive self-schema is not correct, or the negative outcome had an external cause and our positive self-schema remains intact. A third possibility is that outcomes are inconsistent with actions . Positive expectations usually lead to goal-directed behavior. The authors offer the example of a boy who prepares to ask a girl out on a date by rehearsing what he will say, dressing nice, and acting charming. If she accepts his offer, he will see it as due to his efforts but if she rejects him, he will likely regroup and try again a few times. If the answer continues to be ‘no’ then he will believe the cause is not with him but something external.

A fourth cognitive explanation is called biased hypothesis-testing . When failure occurs in place of expected success, we are likely to ask ‘why did this happen?’ Like scientist’s, people form hypotheses to answer the question and then collect data to test it. But they are often not good scientists and engage in confirmation bias and see only information that confirms rather than disconfirms their hypothesis. People also find case-positive information more diagnostic than case-negative. Finally, people engage in different standards of proof in which they form a proposition or hypothesis and proceed to evaluate evidence. Unlike biased hypothesis-testing though, they consider all information and do not omit disconfirming evidence. How much information is needed to accept or reject their hypothesis also varies insofar as they require more information to accept an undesired hypothesis and less for a desired hypothesis.  For instance, the specific hypothesis tested (i.e. ‘Am I smart?’ or ‘Am I stupid?’) determines what information is sought out in biased hypothesis testing while in different standards of proof the exact hypothesis determines how much information is required to draw a conclusion (more proof for the question centered on whether they are stupid and less for if they are smart).

Shepperd, Malone, and Sweeny (2008) conclude that the self-serving bias can only be understood using both motivational and cognitive driven explanations.

3.4.2. Overestimating Our Opinions and Skills

People often overestimate to what degree their opinion is shared by others. This tendency is called the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). It may occur because people are biased in viewing their own positions as what everyone else subscribes to as well, or because they overgeneralize from case information with their opinion serving as one salient type of case information (Alicke & Largo, 1995). The false consensus effect has been demonstrated in regard to smoking behavior (thinking that half or more than half of adults or peers smoked led to the most smoking involvement; Botvin et al., 1992); drug use (Wolfson, 2000); engaging in health protective or defeating behaviors (Suls, Wan, & Sanders, 1988); a willingness to escalate a disturbance (Russell & Arms, 1995); presidential preferences such that supporters of a candidate predicted a higher percentage of support for the candidate than other candidates (Brown, 1982); determining the extent to which other voters would vote like you (Koestner et al., 1995); and illicit drug use by elite athletes (Dunn, Thomas, Swift, & Burns, 2011).

Likewise, we tend to underestimate to what degree others share our abilities and skills. This tendency is called the false uniqueness effect . We might see our math ability as rare, our future to be brighter, or our opinion of a social matter to be more desirable. One study found that participants believed their first name to be unique, whether it was rare or common. The effect held for both male and female names and the researchers also found that when we consider making a name change, rare names are often considered (Kulig, 2013).

3.4.3. Optimism…to the Extreme

Of course, seeing the jar as half full and not half empty has obvious benefits for mental health. This is the essence of the difference between being optimistic and pessimistic.  Scheier and Carver (1985) offered a theory of dispositional optimism which defines it as, “a stable individual difference that reflects the general perception that future positive outcomes will be common and future negative outcomes will be rare” (Gallagher, Lopez, & Pressman, 2012). Research has shown that being optimistic results in higher levels of subjective well-being for college students (Gallagher & Lopez, 2009) and adults (Isaacowitz, 2005), leads to more adaptive coping mechanisms (Carver et al., 2009; Nes & Segerstrom, 2006), can bring about greater success on the job (Seligman & Schulman, 1986), results in goal attainment (Segerstrom & Nes, 2006), and brings about better physical health (Giltay et al., 2004).

Is optimism universal? Gallagher, Lopez, and Pressman (2012) conducted a study using representative samples from 142 countries numbering over 150,000 participants and found that individuals of all ages, races, education levels, and socioeconomic backgrounds and most countries are optimistic and that this optimism leads to better subjective well-being and health. Optimism is not merely a benefit of living in an industrialized nation either.

But is there such a thing as being too optimistic to the point of being unrealistic? The answer is yes and Weinstein (1980) identified a tendency people have to think they are invulnerable and that others will be the victims of misfortune but not themselves. He called this error in judgment, which results in a bias towards favorable outcomes, unrealistic optimism . For instance, college students in one study were unrealistically optimistic about the likelihood they would develop alcohol related problems in the future such as having a hangover, missing classes, or having an argument with a friend over their drinking. The negative consequences of unrealistic optimism were found to be both proximal and distal (Dillard, Midboe, & Klein, 2009). Another study found that patient’s participating in early-phase oncology trials display the unrealistic optimism bias in relation to their expectation of the therapeutic benefit of the trial and that this tendency can undermine the informed consent of participants (Jansen et al., 2011).

Everything is not always roses and so expressing some pessimism can actually help us to be realistic. Defensive pessimism can help us manage our anxiety and pursue our goals by setting low expectations and mentally exploring possible outcomes of goal-relevant tasks (Norem, 2008; Norem & Cantor, 1986). Hazlett, Molden, and Sackett (2011) found that participants who were focused on growth and advancement preferred optimistic forecasts and perform better when they express an optimistic outlook while those who were concerned with safety and security preferred pessimistic forecasts and perform better when they express a pessimistic outlook.

Module Recap

That’s it. We spent an entire module talking about our – self and should feel no guilt over it. Kidding. To be serious though, we all try and answer the question of who we are and philosophers have been tackling issues related to what it means to be human and matters of human existence since the dawn of time. Our discussion focused on the self-concept, self-esteem, self-presentation, and biases and heuristics we make/use to protect our sense of self. We hope you enjoyed the wide array of issues we covered and with this topic out of the way, we can now continue our discussion in Part II of how we think about ourselves and others by focusing on ‘others.’ After this, we will round out Part II by discussing the attitudes we have about ourselves, others, and things in our world.

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the blind self Choose matching term 1 Pedro always knew when his daughter Maria had a good day at school by the way her voice became higher when she started talking. Maria wasn't even aware that her vocal inflection changed. This is an example of which of the panes of the Johari window? 2 Perfectionism is an example of _____. 3 Damon isn't prepared for his math exam. He stays out late the night before the exam, and if he fails, he figures that he can blame it on his lack of sleep rather than his lack of preparation. This is an example of a ________ strategy. 4 Because Andrew was attractive, well-spoken, polite, and witty, his professor viewed him as a good student despite the fact that he skipped class once a week and struggled on his essay tests. This is an example of ________. Don't know?

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Article contents

Self and identity.

• Sanaz Talaifar Sanaz Talaifar Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin
• , and  William Swann William Swann Department of Psychology, University of Texas
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.242
• Published online: 28 March 2018

Active and stored mental representations of the self include both global and specific qualities as well as conscious and nonconscious qualities. Semantic and episodic memory both contribute to a self that is not a unitary construct comprising only the individual as he or she is now, but also past and possible selves. Self-knowledge may overlap more or less with others’ views of the self. Furthermore, mental representations of the self vary whether they are positive or negative, important, certain, and stable. The origins of the self are also manifold and can be considered from developmental, biological, intrapsychic, and interpersonal perspectives. The self is connected to core motives (e.g., coherence, agency, and communion) and is manifested in the form of both personal identities and social identities. Finally, just as the self is a product of proximal and distal social forces, it is also an agent that actively shapes its environment.

• self-concept
• self-representation
• self-knowledge
• self-perception
• self-esteem
• personal identity
• social identity

Introduction

The concept of the self has beguiled—and frustrated—psychologists and philosophers alike for generations. One of the greatest challenges has been coming to terms with the nature of the self. Every individual has a self, yet no two selves are the same. Some aspects of the self create a sense of commonality with others whereas other aspects of the self set it apart. The self usually provides a sense of consistency, a sense that there is some connection between who a person was yesterday and who they are today. And yet, the self is continually changing both as an individual ages and he or she traverses different social situations. A further conundrum is that the self acts as both subject and object; it does the knowing about itself. With so many complexities, coupled with the fact that people can neither see nor touch the self, the construct may take on an air of mysticism akin to the concept of the soul (Epstein, 1973 ).

Perhaps the most pressing, and basic, question psychologists must answer regarding the self is “What is it?” For the man whom many regard as the father of modern psychology, William James, the self was a source of continuity that gave individuals a sense of “connectedness” and “unbrokenness” ( 1890 , p. 335). James distinguished between two components of the self: the “I” and the “me” ( 1910 ). The “I” is the self as agent, thinker, and knower, the executive function that experiences and reacts to the world, constructing mental representations and memories as it does so (Swann & Buhrmester, 2012 ). James was skeptical that the “I” was amenable to scientific study, which has been borne out by the fact that far more attention has been accorded to the “me.” The “me” is the individual one recognizes as the self, which for James included a material, social, and spiritual self. The material self refers to one’s physical body and one’s physical possessions. The social self refers to the various selves one may express and others may recognize depending on the social setting. The spiritual self refers to the enduring core of one’s being, including one’s values, personality, beliefs about the self, etc.

This article focuses on the “me” that will be referred to interchangeably as either the “self” or “identity.” We define the self as a multifaceted, dynamic, and temporally continuous set of mental self-representations. These representations are multifaceted in the sense that different situations may evoke different aspects of the self at different times. They are dynamic in that they are subject to change in the form of elaborations, corrections, and reevaluations (Diehl, Youngblade, Hay, & Chui, 2011 ). This is true when researchers think of the self as a sort of scientific theory in which new evidence about the self from the environment leads to adjustments to one’s self-theory (Epstein, 1973 ; Gopnick, 2003 ). It is also true when researchers consider the self as a narrative that can be rewritten and revised (McAdams, 1996 ). Finally, self-representations are temporally continuous because even though they change, most people have a sense of being the same person over time. Further, these self-representations, whether conscious or not, are essential to psychological functioning, as they organize people’s perceptions of their traits, preferences, memories, experiences, and group memberships. Importantly, representations of the self also guide an individual’s behavior.

Some psychologists (e.g., behaviorists and more recently Brubaker & Cooper, 2000 ) have questioned the need to implicate a construct as nebulous as the self to explain behavior. Certainly an individual can perform many complex actions without invoking his or her self-representations. Nevertheless, psychologists increasingly regard the self as one of the most important constructs in all of psychology. For example, the percentage of self-related studies published in the field’s leading journal, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , increased fivefold between 1972 and 2002 (Swann & Seyle, 2005 ) and has continued to grow to this day. The importance of the self becomes evident when one considers the consequences of a sense of self that is interrupted, damaged, or absent. Epstein ( 1973 ) offers a case in point with an example of a schizophrenic girl meeting her psychiatrist:

Ruth, a five year old, approached the psychiatrist with “Are you the bogey man? Are you going to fight my mother? Are you the same mother? Are you the same father? Are you going to be another mother?” and finally screaming in terror, “I am afraid I am going to be someone else.” [Bender, 1950 , p. 135]

To provide a more commonplace example, children do not display several emotions we consider uniquely human, such as empathy and embarrassment, until after they have developed a sense of self-awareness (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989 ). As Darwin has argued ( 1872 / 1965 ), emotions like embarrassment exist only after one has a developed a sense of self that can be the object of others’ attention.

The self’s importance also is evident when one considers that it is a pancultural phenomenon; all individuals have a sense of self regardless of where they are born. Though the content of self-representations may vary by cultural context, the existence of the self is universal. So too is the structure of the self. One of the most basic structural dimensions of the self involves whether the knowledge is active or stored.

Forms of Self-Knowledge

Active and stored self-knowledge.

Although i ndividuals accumulate immeasurable amounts of knowledge over their lifespans, at any given moment they can access only a portion of that knowledge. The aspects of self-knowledge held in consciousness make up “active self-knowledge.” Other terms for active self-knowledge are the working self-concept (Markus & Kunda, 1986 ), the spontaneous self-concept (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978 ), and the phenomenal self (Jones & Gerard, 1967 ). On the other hand, “stored self-knowledge” is information held in memory that one can access and retrieve but is not currently held in consciousness. Because different features of the self are active versus stored at different times depending on the demands of the situation, the self can be quite malleable without eliciting feelings of inconsistency or inauthenticity (Swann, Bosson, & Pelham, 2002 ).

Semantic and Episodic Representations of Self-Knowledge

People possess both episodic and semantic representations of themselves (Klein & Loftus, 1993 ; Tulving, 1983 ). Episodic self-representations refer to “behavioral exemplars” or relatively brief “cartoons in the head” involving one’s past life and experiences. For philosopher John Locke, the self was built of episodic memory. For some researchers interested in memory and identity, episodic memory has been of particular interest because it is thought to involve re-experiencing events from one’s past, providing a person with content through which to construct a personal narrative (see, e.g., Eakin, 2008 ; Fivush & Haden, 2003 ; Klein, 2001 ; Klein & Gangi, 2010 ). Recall of these episodic instances happens together with the conscious awareness that the events actually occurred in one’s life (e.g., Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997 ).

Episodic self-knowledge may shed light on the individual’s traits or preferences and how he or she will or should act in the future, but some aspects of self-knowledge do not require recalling any specific experiences. Semantic self-knowledge involves memories at a higher level abstraction. These self-related memories are based on either facts (e.g., I am 39 years old) or traits and do not necessitate remembering a specific event or experience (Klein & Lax, 2010 ; Klein, Robertson, Gangi, & Loftus, 2008 ). Thus, one may consider oneself intelligent (semantic self-knowledge) without recalling that he or she achieved stellar grades the previous term (episodic self-knowledge). In fact, Tulving ( 1972 ) suggested that the two types of knowledge may be structurally and functionally independent of each other. In support of this, case studies show that damage to the episodic self-knowledge system does not necessarily result in impairment of the semantic self-knowledge system. Evaluating semantic traits for self-descriptiveness is associated with activation in brain regions implicated in semantic, but not episodic, memory. In addition, priming a trait stored in semantic memory does not facilitate recall of corresponding episodic memories that exemplify the semantic self-knowledge (Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992 ). The tenuous relationship between episodic and semantic self-knowledge suggests that only a portion of semantic self-knowledge arises inductively from episodic self-knowledge (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002 ).

Recently some researchers have questioned the importance of memory’s role in creating a sense of identity. For example, at least when it comes to perceptions of others, people perceive a person’s identity to remain more intact after a neurodegenerative disease that affects their memory than one that affects their morality (Strohminger & Nichols, 2015 ).

Conscious and Nonconscious Self-Knowledge (Sometimes Confused With Explicit Versus Implicit)

Individuals may be conscious, or aware, of aspects of the self to varying degrees in different situations. Indeed sometimes it is adaptive to have self-awareness (Mandler, 1975 ) and other times it is not (Wegner, 2009 ). Nonconscious self-representations can influence behavior in that individuals may be unaware of the ways in which their self-representations affect their behavior (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995 ). Some researchers have even suggested that individuals can be unconscious of the contents of their self-representations (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2003 ). It is important to remember that consciousness refers primarily to the level of awareness of a self-representation, rather than the automaticity of a given representation (i.e., whether the representation is retrieved in an unaware, unintentional, efficient, and uncontrolled manner) (Bargh, 1994 ).

A key ambiguity in recent work on implicit self-esteem is defining its criterial attributes. One view contends that the nonconscious and conscious self reflect fundamentally distinct knowledge systems that arise from different learning experiences and have independent effects on thought, emotion, and behavior (Epstein, 1994 ). Another perspective views the self as a singular construct that may nevertheless show diverging responses on direct and indirect measures of self due to factors such as the opportunity and motivation to control behavioral responses (Fazio & Twoles-Schwen, 1999 ). While indirect measures such as the Implicit Association Test do not require introspection and as a result may tap nonconscious representations, this is an assumption that should be supported with empirical evidence (Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006 ).

Issues of direct and indirect measurement are a key consideration in research on the implicit and explicit self. Indirect measures of self allow researchers to infer an individual’s judgment about the self as a result of the speed or nature of their responses to stimuli that may be more or less self-related (De Houwer & Moors, 2010 ). Some researchers have argued that indirect measures of self-esteem are advantageous because they circumvent self-presentational issues (Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999 ), but other researchers have questioned such claims (Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007 ) because self-presentational strivings can be automatized (Paulhus, 1993 ).

Recent findings have raised additional questions regarding the validity of some key assumptions regarding research inspired by interest in implicit self-esteem (for a more optimistic take on implicit self-esteem, see Dehart, Pelham, & Tennen, 2006 ). Although near-zero correlations between individuals’ scores on direct and indirect measures of self (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000 ) are often taken to mean that nonconscious and conscious self-representations are distinct, other factors, such as measurement error and lack of conceptual correspondence, can cause these low correlations (Gawronski et al., 2007 ). Some researchers have also taken evidence of negligible associations between measures of implicit self-esteem and theoretically related outcomes to mean that such measures may not measure self-esteem at all (Buhrmester, Blanton, & Swann, 2011 ). A prudent strategy is thus to consider that indirect measures reflect an activation of associations between the self and other stimuli in memory and that these associations do not require conscious validation of the association as accurate or inaccurate (Gawronski et al., 2007 ). Direct measures, on the other hand, do require validation processes (Strack & Deutsch, 2004 ; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990 ).

Global and Specific Self-Knowledge

Self-views vary in scope (Hampson, John, & Goldberg, 1987 ). Global self-representations are generalized beliefs about the self (e.g., I am a worthwhile person) while specific self-representations pertain to a narrow domain (e.g., I am a nimble tennis player). Self-views can fall anywhere on a continuum between these two extremes. Generalized self-esteem may be thought of as a global self-representation at the top of a hierarchy with individual self-concepts nested underneath in specific domains such as academic, physical, and social (Marsh, 1986 ). Individual self-concepts, measured separately, combine statistically to form a superordinate global self-esteem factor (Marsh & Hattie, 1996 ). When trying to predict behavior it is important not to use a specific self-representation to predict a global behavior or a global self-representation to predict a specific behavior (e.g., Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005 ; Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007 ; Trzesniewski et al., 2006 ).

Actual, Possible, Ideal, and Ought Selves

The self does not just include who a person is in the present but also includes past and future iterations of the self. In addition, people tend to hold “ought” or “ideal” beliefs about the self. The former includes one’s beliefs about who they should be according to their own and others’ standards while the latter includes beliefs about who they would like to be (Higgins, 1987 ). In a related vein, possible selves are the future-oriented positive or negative aspects of the self-concept, selves that one hopes to become or fears becoming (Markus & Nurius, 1986 ). Some research has even shown that distance between one’s feared self and actual self is a stronger predictor of life satisfaction than proximity between one’s ideal self and actual self (Ogilvie, 1987 ). Possible selves vary in how far in the future they are, how detailed they are, and how likely they are to become an actual self (Oyserman & James, 2008 ). Many researchers have studied the content of possible selves, which can be as idiosyncratic as a person’s imagination is. The method used to measure possible selves (close-ended versus open-ended questions) will affect which possible selves are revealed (Lee & Oyserman, 2009 ). The content of possible selves is also socially and contextually grounded. For example, as a person ages, career-focused possible selves become less important while health-related possible selves become increasingly important (Cross & Markus, 1991 ; Frazier, Hooker, Johnson, & Kaus, 2000 ).

Researchers have been interested in not just the content but the function of possible selves. Thinking about successful possible selves is mood enhancing (King, 2001 ) because it is a reminder that the current self can be improved. In addition, possible selves may play a role in self-regulation. By linking present and future selves, they may promote desired possible selves and avoid feared possible selves. Possible selves may be in competition with each other and with a person’s actual self. For example, someone may envision one possible self as an artist and another possible self as an airline pilot, and each of these possible selves might require the person to take different actions in the present moment. Goal striving requires employing limited resources and attention, so working toward one possible self may require shifting attention and resources away from another possible self (Fishbach, Dhar, & Zhang, 2006 ). Possible selves may have other implications as well. For example, Alesina and La Ferrara ( 2005 ) show how expected future income affects a person’s preferences for economic redistribution in the present.

Accuracy of Self-Knowledge and Feelings of Authenticity

Most individuals have had at least one encounter with an individual whose self-perception seemed at odds with “reality.” Perhaps it is a friend who believes himself to be a skilled singer but cannot understand why everyone within earshot grimaces when he starts singing. Or the boss who believes herself to be an inspiring leader but cannot motivate her workers. One potential explanation for inaccurate self-views is a disjunction between episodic and semantic memories; the image of grimacing listeners (episodic memory) may be quite independent of the conviction that one is a skilled singer (semantic memory). Of course, if self-knowledge is too disjunctive with reality it ceases to be adaptive; self-views must be moderately accurate to be useful in allowing people to predict and navigate their worlds. That said, some researchers have questioned the desirability of accurate self-views. For example, Taylor and Brown ( 1988 ) have argued that positive illusions about the self promote mental health. Similarly, Von Hippel and Trivers ( 2011 ) have argued that certain kinds of optimistic biases about the self are adaptive because they allow people to display more confidence than is warranted, consequently allowing them to reap the social rewards of that confidence.

Studying the accuracy of self-knowledge is challenging because objective criteria are often scarce. Put another way, there are only two vantage points from which to assess a person: self-perception and the other’s perception of the self. This is true even of supposedly “objective” measures of the self. An IQ test is still a measure of intelligence from the vantage point of the people who developed the test. Both vantage points can be subject to error. For example, self-perceptions may be biased to protect one’s self-image or due to self-comparison to an inappropriate referent. Others’ perceptions may be biased because of a lack of cross-situational information about the person in question or lack of insight into that person’s motives. Because of the advantages and disadvantages of each vantage point, self-reports may be better for assessing some traits (e.g., those low in observability, like neuroticism) while informant reports may be better for others (such as traits high in observability, like extraversion) (Vazire, 2010 ).

Furthermore, self-perceptions and others’ perceptions of the self may overlap to varying degrees. The “Johari window” provides a useful way of thinking about this (Luft & Ingham, 1955 ). The window’s first quadrant consists of things one knows about oneself that others also know about the self (arena). The second quadrant includes knowledge one has about the self that others do not have (façade). The third quadrant consists of knowledge one does not have about the self but others do have (blindspot). The fourth quadrant consists of information about the self that is not known to oneself or to others (unknown).

Which of these quadrants contains the “true self”? If I believe myself to be kind, but others do not, who is right? Which is a reflection of the “real me”? One set of attempts to answer this question has focused on perceptions of authenticity. The authentic self (Johnson & Boyd, 1995 ) is alternatively termed the “true self” (Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014 ), “real self” (Rogers, 1961 ), “intrinsic self” (Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001 ), “essential self” (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014 ), or “deep self” (Sripada, 2010 ). Recent research has addressed both what aspects of the self other people describe as belonging to a person’s true self and how individuals judge their own authenticity.

Though authenticity has long been the subject of philosophical thought, only recently have researchers begun addressing the topic empirically, and definitional ambiguities abound (Knoll, Meyer, Kroemer, & Schroeder-Abe, 2015 ). Some studies use unidimensional measures that equate authenticity to feeling close to one’s true self (e.g., Harter, Waters, & Whitesell, 1997 ). A more elaborate and philosophically grounded approach proposes four necessary factors for trait authenticity: awareness (the extent of one’s self-knowledge, motivation to expand it, and ability to trust in it), unbiased processing (the relative absence of interpretative distortions in processing self-relevant information), behavior (acting consistently with one’s needs, preferences, and values), and relational orientation (valuing and achieving openness in close relationships) (Kernis, 2003 ). Authenticity is related to feelings of self-alienation (Gino, Norton, & Ariely, 2010 ). Being authentic is also sometimes thought to be equivalent to low self-monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1982 )— someone who does not alter his or her behavior to accommodate changing social situations (Grant, 2016 ). Authenticity and self-monitoring, however, are orthogonal constructs; being sensitive to environmental cues can be compatible with acting in line with one’s true self.

Although some have argued that the ability to behave in a way that contradicts one’s feelings and mental states is a developmental accomplishment (Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, 1996 ), feelings of authenticity have been associated with many positive outcomes such as positive self-esteem, positive affect, and well-being (Goldman & Kernis, 2002 ; Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008 ). One interesting line of research examines the interaction of authenticity, power, and well-being. Power can increase feelings of authenticity in social interactions (Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011 ), and that increased authenticity in turn can result in higher well-being (Kifer, Heller, Peruvonic, & Galinsky, 2013 ). Another line of research examines the relationship between beliefs about authenticity (at least in the West) and morality. Gino, Kouchaki, and Galinsky ( 2015 ) suggest that dishonesty and inauthenticity share a similar source: dishonesty involves being untrue to others while inauthenticity involves being untrue to the self.

Metacognitive Aspects of Self

Valence and importance of self-views.

Self-knowledge may be positively or negatively valenced. Having more positive self-views and fewer negative ones are associated with having higher self-esteem (Brown, 1986 ). Both bottom-up and top-down theories have been used to explain this association. The bottom-up approach posits that the valence of specific self-knowledge drives the valence of one’s global self-views (e.g., Marsh, 1990 ). In this view, someone who has more positive self-views in specific domains (e.g., I am intelligent and attractive) should be more likely to develop high self-esteem overall (e.g., I am worthwhile). In contrast, the top-down perspective holds that the valence of global self-views drive the valence of specific self-views such that someone who thinks they are a worthwhile person is more likely to view him or herself as attractive and intelligent (e.g., Brown, Dutton, & Cook, 2001 ). The reasoning is grounded in the view that global self-esteem develops quite early in life and thus determines the later development of domain-specific self-views.

A domain-specific self-view can vary not only in its valence but also in its importance. Domain-specific self-views that one believes are important are more likely to affect global self-esteem than those self-views that one considers unimportant (Pelham, 1995 ; Pelham & Swann, 1989 ). As James wrote, “I, who for the time have staked my all on being a psychologist, am mortified if others know much more psychology than I. But I am contented to wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek” ( 1890 / 1950 , p. 310). Of course not all self-views matter to the same extent for all people. A professor of Greek studies is likely to place a great deal of importance on his knowledge of Greek. Furthermore, changes to features that are perceived to be more causally central than others are believed to be more disruptive to identity (Chen, Urminsky, & Bartels, 2016 ). Individuals try to protect their important self-views by, for example, surrounding themselves with people and environments who confirm those important self-views (Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004 ; Swann & Pelham, 2002 ) or distancing themselves from close friends who outperform them in these areas (Tesser, 1988 ).

Certainty and Clarity of Self-Views

Individuals may feel more or less certain about some self-views as compared to others. And just as they are motivated to protect important self-views, people are also motivated to protect the self-views of which they are certain. People are more likely to seek (Pelham, 1991 ) and receive (Pelham & Swann, 1994 ) feedback consistent with self-views that are highly certain than those about which they feel less certain. They also actively resist challenges to highly certain self-views (Swann & Ely, 1984 ).

Another construct related to certainty is self-concept clarity. Not only are people with high self-concept clarity confident and certain of their self-views, they also are clear, internally consistent, and stable in their convictions about who they are (Campbell et al., 1996 ). The causes of low self-concept clarity have been theorized to be due to a discrepancy between one’s current self-views and the social feedback one has received in childhood (Streamer & Seery, 2015 ). Both high self-concept certainty and self-concept clarity are associated with higher self-esteem (Campbell, 1990 ).

Stability of Self-Views

The self is constantly accommodating, assimilating, and immunizing itself against new self-relevant information (Diehl et al., 2011 ). In the end, the self may remain stable (i.e., spatio-temporally continuous; Parfit, 1971 ) in at least two ways. First, the self may be stable in one’s absolute position on a scale. Second, there may be stability in one’s rank ordering within a group of related others (Hampson & Goldberg, 2006 ).

The question of the self’s stability can only be answered in the context of a specified time horizon. For example, like personality traits, self-views may not be particularly good predictors of behavior at a given time slice (perhaps an indication of the self’s instability) but are good predictors of behavior over the long term (Epstein, 1979 ). Similarly, more than others, some people experience frequent, transient changes in state self-esteem (Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993 ). Furthermore, there is a difference between how people perceive the stability of their self-views and the actual stability of their self-knowledge. Though previous research has explored the benefits of perceived self-esteem stability (e.g., Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000 ; Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989 ), a recent program of research on fixed versus growth mindsets explores the benefits of the malleability of self-views in a variety of domains (Dweck, 1999 , 2006 ). For example, teaching adolescents to have a more malleable (i.e., incremental) theory of personality that “people change” led them to react less negatively to an immediate experience of social adversity, have lower overall stress and physical illness eight months later, and better academic performance over the school year (Yeager et al., 2014 ). Thus, believing that the self can be unstable can have positive effects in that one negative social interaction, or an instance of poor performance is not an indication that the self will always be that way, and this may, in turn, increase effort and persistence.

Organization of Self-Views

Though we have already touched on some aspects of the organization of self (e.g., specific self-views nested within global self-views), it is important to consider other aspects of organization including the fact that some self-views may be more assimilated within each other. Integration refers to the tendency to store both positive and negative self-views together, and is thought to promote resilience in the face of stress or adversity (Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2007 ). Compartmentalization refers to the tendency to store positive and negative self-views separately. But both integration and compartmentalization can have positive and negative consequences and can interact with other metacognitive aspects of the self, like importance. For example, compartmentalization has been associated with higher self-esteem and less depression among people for whom positive components of the self are important (Showers, 1992 ). On the other hand, for those whose negative self-views are important, compartmentalization has been associated with lower self-esteem and higher depression.

Origins and Development of the Self

Developmental approaches.

Psychologists have long been interested in when and how infants develop a sense of self. One very basic question is whether selfhood in infancy is comparable to selfhood in adulthood. The answer depends on definitions of selfhood. For example, some researchers have measured and defined selfhood in infants as the ability to self-regulate and self-organize, which even animals can do. This definition bears little resemblance to selfhood in adulthood. Nativist and constructivist debates within developmental psychology (and language development in particular) that grapple with the problem of the origins of knowledge also have implications for understanding origins of the self. A nativist account (e.g., Chomsky, 1975 ) that considers the human mind to be innately constrained to formulate a very small set of representations would suggest that the mind is designed to develop a self. Information from the environment may form specific self-representations, but a nativist account would posit that the structure of the self is intrinsic. A constructivist account would reject the notion that there are not enough environmental stimuli to explain the development of a construct like the self unless one invokes a specific innate cognitive structure. Rather, constructivists might suggest that a child develops a theory of self in the same way scientific theories are developed (Gopnik, 2003 ).

Because infants and children cannot self-report their mental states as adults can, psychologists must use other methods to study the self in childhood. One method involves studying the development of children’s use of the personal pronouns “me,” “mine,” and “I” (Harter, 1983 ; Hobson, 1990 ). Another method that is used cross-culturally, mirror self-recognition (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979 ; Lewis & Ramsay, 2004 ), has been associated with brain maturation (Lewis, 2003 ) and myelination of the left temporal region (Carmody & Lewis, 2006 , 2010 ; Lewis & Carmody, 2008 ). Pretend play, which occurs between 15 and 24 months, is an indication that the self is developing because it requires the toddler’s ability to understand its own and others’ mental states (Lewis, 2011 ). The development of self-esteem has also historically been difficult to study due to a lack of self-esteem measures that can be used across the lifespan. Recently, psychologists have developed a lifespan self-esteem scale (Harris, Donnellan, & Trzesniewski, 2017 ) suitable for measuring global self-esteem from ages 5 to 93.

The development of theory of mind, the understanding that others have minds separate from one’s own, is also closely related to the development of the self. For example, people cannot make social comparisons until they have developed the required cognitive abilities, usually by middle childhood (Harter, 1999 ; Ruble, Boggiano, Feldman, & Loebl, 1980 ). Finally, developmental psychology is also useful in understanding the self beyond childhood and into adolescence and beyond. Adolescence is a time where goals of autonomy from parents and other adults become particularly salient (Bryan et al., 2016 ), adolescents experiment with different identities to see which fit best, and many long-term goals and personal aspirations are established (Crone & Dahl, 2012 ).

Biological Approaches

Biological approaches to understanding the origins of the self consider neurological, genetic, and hormonal underpinnings. These biological underpinnings are likely evolutionarily driven (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007 ). Neuroscientists have debated the extent to which self-knowledge is “special,” or processed differently than other kinds of knowledge. What is clear is that no brain region by itself is responsible for our sense of self, but different aspects of the self-knowledge may be associated with different brain regions. Furthermore, the same region that is implicated in self-related processing can also be implicated in other types of processing (Ochsner et al., 2005 ; Saxe, Moran, Scholz, & Gabrieli, 2006 ). Specifically, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) have been associated with self-related processing (Northoff Heinzel, De Greck, Bermpohl, Dobrowolny, & Panksepp, 2006 ). But meta-analyses have found that the mPFC and PCC are recruited during the processing of both self-specific and familiar stimuli more generally (e.g., familiar others) (Qin & Northoff, 2011 ).

Twin studies of personality traits can shed light on the genetic bases of self. For example, genes account for about 40% to 60% of the population variance in self-reports of the Big Five personality factors (for a review, see Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001 ). Self-esteem levels also seem to be heritable, with 30–50% of population variance accounted for by genes (Kamakura, Ando, & Ono, 2007 ; Kendler, Gardner, & Prescott, 1998 ).

Finally, hormones are unlikely to be a cause of the self but may affect the expression of the self. For example, testosterone and cortisol levels interact with personality traits to predict different levels of aggression (Tackett et al., 2015 ). Differences in levels of and in utero exposure to certain hormones also affect gender identity (Berenbaum & Beltz, 2011 ; Reiner & Gearhart, 2004 ).

Intrapsychic Approaches

Internal processes, including self-perception and introspection, also influence the development of the self. One of the most obvious ways to develop knowledge about the self (especially when existing self-knowledge is weak) is to observe one’s own behavior across different situations and then make inferences about the aspects of the self that may have caused those behaviors (Bem, 1972 ). And just as judgments about others’ attributes are less certain when multiple possible causes exist for a given behavior, the same is true of one’s own behaviors and the amount of information they yield about the self (Kelley, 1971 ).

Conversely, introspection involves understanding the self from the inside outward rather than from the outside in. Though surprisingly little thought (only 8%) is expended on self-reflection (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982 ), people buttress self-knowledge through introspection. For example, contemporary psychoanalysis can increase self-knowledge, even though an increase in self-knowledge on its own is unlikely to have therapeutic effects (Reppen, 2013 ). Writing is one form of introspection that does have psychological and physical therapeutic benefits (Pennebaker, 1997 ). Research shows that brief writing exercises can result in fewer physician visits (e.g., Francis & Pennebaker, 1992 ), and depressive episodes (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988 ), better immune function (e.g., Esterling, Kiecolt-Glaser, Bodnar, & Glaser, 1994 ), and higher grade point average (e.g., Cameron & Nicholls, 1998 ) and many other positive outcomes.

Experiencing the “subjective self” is yet another way that individuals gain self-knowledge. Unlike introspection, experiencing the subjective self involves outward engagement, a full engagement in the moment that draws attention away from the self (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1990 ). Being attentive to one’s emotions and thoughts in the moment can reveal much about one’s preferences and values. Apparently, people rely more on their subjective experiences than on their overt behaviors when constructing self-knowledge (Andersen, 1984 ; Andersen & Ross, 1984 ).

Interpersonal Approaches

At the risk of stating the obvious, humans are social animals and thus the self is rarely cut off from others. In fact, many individuals would rather give themselves a mild electric shock than be alone with their thoughts (Wilson et al., 2014 ). The myth of finding oneself by eschewing society is dubious, and one of the most famous proponents of this tradition, transcendentalist Henry David Thoreau, actually regularly entertained visitors during his supposed seclusion at Walden (Schulz, 2015 ). As early as infancy, the reactions of others can lay the foundation for one’s self-views. Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969 ; Hazan & Shaver, 1994 ) holds that children’s earliest interactions with their caregivers lead them to formulate schemas about their lovability and worth. This occurs outside of the infant’s awareness, and the schemas are based on the consistency and responsiveness of the care they receive. Highly consistent responsiveness to the infant’s needs provide the basis for the infant to develop feelings of self-worth (i.e., high global self-esteem) later in life. Though the mechanisms by which this occur are still being investigated, it may be that self-schemas developed during infancy provide the lens through which people interpret others’ reactions to them (e.g., Hazan & Shaver, 1987 ). Note, however, that early attachment relationships are in no way deterministic: 30–45% of people change their attachment style (i.e., their pattern of relating to others) across time (e.g., Cozzarelli, Karafa, Collins, & Tagler, 2003 ).

Early attachment relationships provide a working model for how an individual expects to be treated, which is associated with perceptions of self-worth. But others’ appraisals of the self are also a more direct source of self-knowledge. An extremely influential line of thought from sociology, symbolic interactionism (Cooley, 1902 ; Mead, 1934 ), emphasized the component of the self that James referred to as the social self. He wrote, “a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind” ( 1890 / 1950 , p. 294). The symbolic interactionists proposed that people come to know themselves not through introspection but rather through others’ reactions and perceptions of them. This “looking glass self” sees itself as others do (Yeung & Martin, 2003 ). People’s inferences about how others view them become internalized and guide their behavior. Thus the self is created socially and is sustained cyclically.

Research shows, however, that reflected appraisals may not tell the whole story. While it is clear that people’s self-views correlate strongly with how they believe others see them, self-views are not necessarily perfectly correlated with how people actually view them (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979 ). Further, people’s self-views may inform how they believe others see them rather than the other way around (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993 ). Lastly, individuals are better at knowing how people see them in general rather than knowing how specific others view them (Kenny & Albright, 1987 ).

Though others’ perceptions of the self are not an individual’s only source of self-knowledge, they are an important source, and in more than one way. For example, others’ provide a reference point for “social comparison.” According to Festinger’s social comparison theory ( 1954 ), people compare their own traits, preferences, abilities, and emotions to those of similar others, making both upward and downward comparisons. These comparisons tend to happen spontaneously and effortlessly. The direction of the comparison influences how one views and feels about the self. For example, comparing the self to someone worse off boosts self-esteem (e.g., Helgeson & Mickelson, 1995 ; Marsh & Parker, 1984 ). In addition to increasing self-knowledge, social comparisons are also motivating. For instance, those undergoing difficult or painful life events can cope better when they make downward comparisons (Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985 ). When motivated to improve the self in a given domain, however, people may make upward comparisons to idealized others (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999 ). Sometimes individuals make comparisons to inappropriate others, but they have the ability (with mental effort) to undo the changes made to the self-concept as a result of this comparison (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995 ).

Others can influence the self not only through interactions and comparisons but also when an individual becomes very close to a significant other. In this case, according to self-expansion theory (Aron & Aron, 1996 ), as intimacy increases, people experience cognitive overlap between the self and the significant other. People can acquire novel self-knowledge as they subsume attributes of the close other into the self.

Finally, the origins and development of the self are interpersonally influenced to the extent that our identities are dependent on the social roles we occupy (e.g., as mother, student, friend, professional, etc.). This will be covered in greater detail in the section on “The Social Self.” Here it is important simply to recognize that as the social roles of an individual inevitably change over time, so too does their identity.

Cultural Approaches

Markus and Kitayama’s seminal paper ( 1991 ) on differences in expression of the self in Eastern and Western cultures spawned an incredible amount of work investigating the importance of culture on self-construals. Building on the foundational work of Triandis ( 1989 ) and others, this work proposed that people in Western cultures see themselves as autonomous individuals who value independence and uniqueness more so than connectedness and harmony with others. In contrast to this individualism, people in the East were thought to be more collectivist, valuing interdependence and fitting in. However, the theoretical relationship between self-construals and the continuous individualism-collectivism variable have been treated in several different ways in the literature. Some have described individualism and collectivism as the origins of differences in self-construals (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996 ; Kim, Aune, Hunter, Kim, & Kim, 2001 ; Singelis & Brown, 1995 ). Others have considered self-construals as synonymous with individualism and collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002 ; Taras et al., 2014 ) or have used individualism-collectivism at the individual level as an analog of the variable at the cultural level (Smith, 2011 ).

However, in contrast to perspectives that treat individualism and collectivism as a unidimensional variable (e.g., Singelis, 1994 ), individualism and collectivism have also been theorized to be multifaceted “cultural syndromes” that include normative beliefs, values, and practices, as well as self-construals (Brewer & Chen, 2007 ; Triandis, 1993 ). In this view, there are many ways of being independent or collectivistic depending on the domain of functioning under consideration. For example, a person may be independent or interdependent when defining the self, experiencing the self, making decisions, looking after the self, moving between contexts, communicating with others, or dealing with conflicting interests (Vignoles et al., 2016 ). These domains of functioning are orthogonal such that being interdependent in one domain does not require being interdependent in another. This multidimensional picture of individual differences in individualism and collectivism is actually more similar to Markus and Kitayama’s ( 1991 ) initial treatment aiming to emphasize cultural diversity and contradicts the prevalent unidimensional approach to cultural differences that followed.

Recent research has pointed out other shortcomings of this dichotomous approach. There is a great deal of heterogeneity among the world’s cultures, so simplifying all culture to “Eastern” and “Western” or collectivistic versus individualistic types may be invalid. Vignoles and colleagues’ ( 2016 ) study of 16 nations supports this. They found that neither a contrast between Western and non-Western, nor between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, sufficiently captured the complexity of cross-cultural differences in selfhood. They conclude that “it is not useful to characterize any culture as ‘independent’ or ‘interdependent’ in a general sense” and rather advocate for research that identifies what kinds of independence and interdependence may be present in different contexts ( 2016 , p. 991). In addition, there is a great deal of within culture heterogeneity in self-construals For example, even within an individualistic, Western culture like the United States, working-class people and ethnic minorities tend to be more interdependent (Markus, 2017 ), tempering the geographically based generalizations one might draw about self-construals.

Another line of recent research on the self in cultural context that has explored self-construals beyond the East-West dichotomy is the study of multiculturalism and individuals who are a member of multiple cultural groups (Benet-Martinez & Hong, 2014 ). People may relate to each of the cultures to which they belong in different ways, and this may in turn have important effects. For example, categorization, which involves viewing one cultural identity as dominant over the others, is associated positively with well-being but negatively with personal growth (Yampolsky, Amiot, & de la Sablonnière, 2013 ). Integration involves cohesively connecting multiple cultures within the self while compartmentalization requires keeping one’s various cultures isolated because they are seen to be in opposition. Each of these strategies has different consequences.

Finally, the influence of religion remains significant in many parts of the world (Georgas, van de Vijver, & Berry, 2004 ; Inglehart & Baker, 2000 ), and so religion is also an important source of differences in self-construal. These religious traditions provide answers to the question of how the self should relate to others. For example, Buddhism emphasizes the interdependence of all things and thus agency does not necessarily reside in individual actors. Moreover, for Buddhists the boundaries between the self and the other are insignificant, and in fact the self is thought to be impermanent (see Garfield, Nichols, Rai, Nichols, & Strohminger, 2015 ).

Motivational Properties of the Self

Need for communion, agency, and coherence.

Understanding what motivates people is one of social psychology’s core questions, and a variety of motives have been proposed. Three motives that are particularly important to self-processes are the need for communion (belonging and interpersonal connectedness), the need for agency (autonomy and competence), and the need for coherence (patterns and regularities). The needs for communion and agency are the foundations of many aspects of social behavior (Baumeister & Leary, 1995 ; Wiggins & Broughton, 1991 ). Among attitude researchers, constructs similar to communion and agency (i.e., warmth and competence) represent the two basic dimensions of attitudes (e.g., Abele & Wojciszke, 2007 ; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007 ; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005 ). Of even more relevance to the self, communion and agency correspond with the dual forms of self-esteem (e.g., Franks & Marolla, 1976 ; Gecas, 1971 ). That is, self-esteem can be broken down into two components: self-liking and self-competence (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001 ). Self-competence is an evaluation of one’s ability to bring about a desired outcome while the need for communion is an evaluation of one’s goodness, worth, and lovability. Each of these dimensions of self-esteem predicts unique outcomes (e.g., Bosson & Swann, 1999 ; Tafarodi & Vu, 1997 ).

Those who do not fulfill their communion needs have poorer physical outcomes such as relatively poor physical health, weakened immune functioning, and higher mortality rates (House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988 ; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996 ). As far as psychological outcomes, people who lack positive connections with others also experience greater loneliness (Archibald, Bartholomew, & Marx, 1995 ; Newcomb & Bentler, 1986 ), while those with rich social networks report higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999 ). People’s sense of autonomy also contributes to psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989 ) and encourages people to strive for high performance in domains they care about. Autonomy strivings can also be beneficial in that they contribute to people’s need for self-growth (e.g., Heine, Kitayama, & Lehman, 2001 ; Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995 ).

Finally, a great deal of support exists for the notion that people have a fundamental need for psychological coherence or the need for regularity, predictability, meaning, and control (Guidano & Liotti, 1983 ; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006 ). Coherence is a distinct from consistency because it refers specifically to the consistency between a person’s enduring self-views and the other aspects of their psychological universe (English, Chen, & Swann, 2008 ). The coherence motive may be even more basic than the needs for communion and agency (Guidano & Liotti, 1983 ; Popper, 1963 ). That is, self-views serve as the lenses through which people perceive reality, and incoherence degrades the vision of reality that these lenses offer.

When people feel that their self-knowledge base is incoherent, they may not know how to act, and guiding action is thought to be the primary purpose of thinking in the first place (James, 1890 / 1950 ).

Self-Enhancement and Self-Verification Motives

Drawing on Prescott Lecky’s ( 1945 ) proposition that chronic self-views give people a strong sense of coherence, self-verification theory posits that people desire to be seen as they see themselves, even if their self-views are negative. Self-views can guide at least three stages of information processing: attention, recall, and interpretation. In addition, people act on the preference for self-confirmatory evaluations ensuring that their experiences reinforce their self-views. For example, just as those who see themselves as likable seek out and embrace others who evaluate them positively, so too do people who see themselves as dislikable seek out and embrace others who evaluate them negatively (e.g., Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989 ). The theory suggests that people both enter and leave relationships that fail to satisfy their self-verification strivings (Swann, De La Ronde, & Hixon, 1994 ), even divorcing people who they believe have overly positive appraisals of them (for a review, see Kwang & Swann, 2010 ). People may also communicate their identities visually through “identity cues” that enable others to understand and react accordingly to that identity (Gosling, 2008 ). People seek verification of their specific as well as global (self-views). They are especially inclined to seek self-verifying evaluations for self-views that are certain or important (Pelham & Swann, 1994 ; Swann & Pelham, 2002 ).

For the 70% of individuals with globally positive self-views (e.g., Diener & Diener, 1995 ), self-verification may look like self-enhancement strivings (Brown, 1986 ) in that it will compel people to seek and prefer positive feedback about the self. In fact, even people with negative self-views tend to self-enhance when they do not have the cognitive resources available to reflect on their self-views and compare it to the feedback available (Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990 ). In addition, people have a tendency to self-enhance before they self-verify (Swann et al., 1990 ). Other evidence for self-enhancement includes the tendency for people to view themselves as better than average, though this may be most likely for ambiguous traits that can describe a wide variety of behaviors because the evidence that people use to make self-evaluations is idiosyncratic (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989 ).

It is important to remember in discussions of self-verification and self-enhancement that people do not seek to see themselves as they actually are but rather as they see themselves . As mentioned in the section on accuracy, this self-view may overlap to varying degrees with “reality” or others’ perceptions of the self.

The Social Self

Identity negotiation.

People’s self-views influence the kinds of relationships they will engage in, and people can take on numerous identities depending on the situation and relationship. Identity negotiation theory (Swann & Bosson, 2008 ) suggests that relationship partners establish “who is who” via ongoing, mutual, and reciprocal interactions. Once people establish a “working consensus” for what roles each person will take in the relationship (e.g., Swann & Bosson, 2008 ), their agreed-upon expectations help disconnected individuals collaborate toward common obligations and goals, with some commitment to each other. Identity negotiation processes help define relationships and serve as a foundation for organized social activity. The identities that people negotiate tend to align with their chronic self-views. People follow these identity-negotiating processes, albeit largely unintentionally, during each of several successive stages of social interaction. Identities only survive to the extent that they are nourished and confirmed by the social environment, so negotiating identities in relationships is one way an individual ensures the survival of their self-views.

Personal and Social Self-Knowledge

Researchers have historically distinguished between two types of identity: personal and social. Personal identity refers to those features of the self that distinguish us from others while social identity refers to features of the self that are a source of commonality with others, such as group memberships. Once formed, social identities have a powerful influence on thought and behavior (Tajfel, 1981 ; Tajfel & Turner, 1979 ). Social category memberships can influence a person’s self-definition as much or more than idiosyncratic personal attributes (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008 ). One version of social identity theory posits that people enter groups that they view as both positive and distinctive to bolster their self-views (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988 ). Evidence shows that people display a strong ingroup bias, or tendency to favor their own group relative to outgroups (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1985 ; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971 ). This bias, along with the outgroup homogeneity effect whereby people see outgroup members as more similar than ingroup members (Linville & Jones, 1980 ) facilitates people’s ability to dehumanize members of outgroups. Dehumanization, perceiving a person as lacking in human qualities, then allows for the justification and maintenance of intergroup prejudice and conflict (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005 ; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003 ).

Self-categorization theory, in contrast to emphasizing motivation as in social identity theory, stresses the perceptual processes that lead humans to categorize the world into “us” and “them” (Turner, 1985 ; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987 ). Other approaches argue that social identities reduce uncertainty (e.g., Hogg, 2007 , 2012 ), make the world more coherent (e.g., Ellemers & Van Knippenberg, 1997 ), or protect people from the fear of death (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002 ). Though these approaches emphasize cognitive aspects of group membership, group-related emotions are also an important component of social identity. For instance, intergroup emotions theory proposes that a person’s emotional reactions toward other social groups can change in response to situationally induced shifts in self-categorization (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009 ).

Whatever the nature of the motive that causes people to identify with groups, although group memberships are critical for survival, they can also place people in grave danger when they motivate extreme action on behalf of the group. Research on identity fusion, which occurs when the boundaries between one’s personal and social identities become porous, shows how strong alignment with a group can lead to fighting and dying for that group at great personal cost (Whitehouse, McQuinn, Buhrmester, & Swann, 2014 ). This occurs when people come to view members of their social group as family (Swann et al., 2014 ).

Some research has investigated how personal and social identities are cognitively structured (Reid & Deaux, 1996 ). The segregation model of identity assumes that social and personal attributes are distinct (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991 ) while the integration model suggests that identities and attributes coexist in a limited set of cognitive structures. Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Cotting ( 1999 ) suggest that what constitutes social versus personal identity should not be determined by the attribute itself but rather the function it is serving (i.e., connecting the self to other people or distinguishing the self from other people). Similarly, optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991 ) argues that individuals have an inherent drive to identity with groups but an equally important drive to maintain their individuality. To cope, they strive to find a balance between these opposing forces by finding an identity that supports both the individual’s need for autonomy and affiliation.

For most people, gender and ethnicity are important social identities, and there is variation in the strength of people’s identification with these groups (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992 ). In terms of how gender affects the expression of the self, girls are often socialized to prioritize the qualities that align them to others, while boys are taught to prioritize the qualities that distinguish and differentiate them from others (e.g., Spence, Deaux, & Helmreich, 1985 ). Moreover, women’s self-esteem tends to be connected more to their relational qualities, while men’s self-esteem is linked to their independent qualities (Josephs, Markus, & Tafarodi, 1992 ).

Though society has made great strides in allowing men and women to embrace identities of their own choosing (e.g., Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2004 ), traditional social expectations about what it means to be a man or a women persist. For example, gender stereotypes have remained constant over the past thirty years even as women have made significant professional and political gains (Haines, Deaux, & Lofaro, 2016 ). These stereotypes remain entrenched for men as well. England ( 2010 ) argues that for the gender revolution to be complete, not only should traditionally male professions and domains be open to women but traditionally female domains should be increasingly occupied by men. This would help move society closer to attaining gender equality while signaling that traditionally female-dominated roles are equally valued.

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